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COVID-19
Implications for the findings and 
recommendations in this report
6Since the production of this report in March 2020, 
the world has faced the unprecedented threat 
of COVID-19. In light of this unique situation, 
we felt it was important to add an addendum 
to our original report addressing the impact of 
COVID-19 and implications for our findings and 
recommendations. 
The rapid spread of COVID-19 has exposed the 
fragility of societies and economic systems around 
the world, causing severe disruption to the global 
economy and adversely affecting the lives of 
billions. The estimated total number of people 
across the world who have lost their lives to the virus 
as of 9 June 2020 is 404,396.
In the UK, millions of people are now facing extended 
periods of heightened insecurity and financial 
hardship. Despite Government aid packages, there 
is significant potential for various social ills such as 
unemployment, homelessness, domestic violence 
and abuse, depression, anxiety and trauma to 
intensify in the coming months and years. 
It should be remembered, however, that many 
people in the UK experienced these social ills 
acutely even before the onset of COVID-19. Tens 
of thousands of children and young people in the 
UK already grow up in poverty, live in insecure and 
unsafe housing, witness or experience domestic 
violence and abuse on a daily basis, and face 
serious mistreatment at the hands of many of the 
adults and institutions in their lives.
With the final report of the cross-party 
Youth Violence Commission laying bare this 
reality, the Commission’s central findings and 
recommendations should be considered all the 
more crucial and pressing. 
Designed to ameliorate the worst effects of the 
pandemic in the immediate future, the scale of the 
Government’s aid package is likely to generate 
strong pressure for a further period of austerity 
in public services. The Commission has serious 
concerns about what this could mean for the 
quality and level of care and support provided 
to the most vulnerable young people in society, 
and in turn, the impact that this is likely to have on 
levels of serious violence.  
The Commission’s report explains why poverty 
and inequality are fundamental drivers of serious 
violence, both causing and intensifying many of 
the problems faced by children and young people. 
With COVID-19 expected to produce a rapid 
(albeit short-term) increase in unemployment that 
disproportionately affects young people, tackling 
rates of child poverty, family insecurity, and the 
growing chasm of inequality must be a central 
priority if we are to begin reducing current levels of 
serious violence.
Also at the forefront of our concerns are the 
potential implications of COVID-19 for the work 
of the 18 recently established Violence Reduction 
Units (VRUs) across England and Wales. As 
explained in the report, these VRUs are set to play 
a pivotal role in the reduction of serious violence 
across the UK. Given the potential for the impact of 
COVID-19 to create the types of social conditions 
in which one might reasonably expect to see 
increased rates of serious violence, it is imperative 
that support for these units is not only maintained, 
but increased.
The Commission recognises the potential for the 
Government to reduce public spending as a result 
of the impact of COVID-19. As this report shows, 
however, the proposed long-term funding of the 
18 VRUs would be trivial compared to the savings 
generated by the VRUs were they to achieve even 
minor reductions in rates of serious violence. 
Based on current funding levels, the cost of 
running the 18 regional VRUs for 10 years is £350 
million. The costs associated with serious violence 
between young people are of an entirely different 
magnitude: £10 billion over the coming 10 years 
assuming rates of violence continue at their current 
levels. The VRUs would need to reduce serious 
violence between young people by a mere 3% 
to be cost effective, and serious violence more 
generally by less than 1%. 
Given the potential for the VRUs to bring together 
a wide range of stakeholders to improve the 
content and delivery of support to young people 
at a local level, and to inform crucial policy change 
at a national level, we are confident that they will 
generate reductions in rates of violence that go 
far beyond those needed to justify the resources 
invested in these units.
Among the Commission’s other serious concerns 
– not all of which can be addressed in this short 
addendum – is the extent to which schools will be 
able to effectively support and care for children 
and young people returning to education after an 
extended period of confinement in their homes. 
The full extent of the lockdown’s effects on young 
people’s mental health, educational attainment, 
attitudes and behaviour will not be known for many 
years, but it is highly likely that schools will face 
severe challenges in the short to medium term.
If schools are unable to adapt and cope with 
these challenges, then there are serious risks 
of an additional spike in school exclusions, and 
a further widening of the attainment gap. This 
report highlights the immense damage that school 
exclusions inflict on young people’s life prospects, 
including the close connection that exclusions have 
to increased rates of serious violence between 
children and young people. Swift measures must 
be put in place to ensure that schools (including 
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Alternative Provision and Pupil Referral Units) 
are adequately resourced and prepared for the 
challenges ahead.
Another key issue concerns the glaring lack of 
trust between the police and those children and 
young people most at-risk of serious violence. 
More than ever, it is imperative to avoid any 
short-sighted criminal justice-based ‘crackdowns’ 
that are likely to prove counter-productive in the 
long-term. Ramping up stop and search practices 
and removing the requirement for these to be 
intelligence-led, for example, would severely 
undermine evidence-based prevention strategies 
that centre on building trust and confidence in the 
police.  
Driven in part by new initiatives such as the 
£200 million Youth Endowment Fund and the 
regional Violence Reduction Units, third sector 
organisations working to support young people 
are only now beginning to recover from over a 
decade of severe cuts to public spending. With 
the most vulnerable children and young people 
benefitting from the work of these organisations, it 
is vital that investment in youth services continues 
to increase in the coming years, especially given 
the damage that has been done by the COVID-19 
crisis to many youth organisations’ finances.
It is impossible to ignore the disproportionate 
effect that the virus has had on people from black 
Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds and those 
living in socioeconomically deprived communities, 
a reality that mirrors the wider inequalities and 
injustices referred to in this report. Tackling these 
inequalities and injustices, therefore, is all the more 
important when seen in the context of the impact 
of COVID-19.  
While it is important not to downplay the 
enormous human tragedy that the COVID-19 crisis 
constitutes, it is possible to take hope from some of 
the effects it may have on society moving forwards. 
The lives of our most vulnerable young people 
are often in the hands of people who have been 
deemed throughout the crisis to be ‘keyworkers’. 
The Commission hopes that the esteem afforded 
to keyworkers and those in caring professions 
throughout this pandemic will extend long into 
the coming years and decades, accompanied 
by improvements in pay and conditions which 
will underpin an enhanced quality of care for all 
children and young people in society.
Whatever the ‘new normal’ looks like, it must 
include a relentless drive to reduce poverty and 
inequality and ensure that all children and young 
people are given the best possible opportunities 
to cultivate and pursue their hopes and dreams for 
a better future. To reiterate, the costs associated 
with the recommendations in the Commission’s 
final report are dwarfed by the cost-savings 
associated with even minor reductions in serious 
violence. 
The Commission makes clear in its report that 
progressive steps have made in recent years to 
understand and respond to serious violence, and 
we remain confident that reductions in violence are 
possible in the coming months and years. For this 
to happen, however, we must not allow the impact 
of COVID-19 to take us back to square one.
Youth Violence Commission, 9 June 2020
8Serious violence 
between young people 
has devastating and far-
reaching consequences, 
not only for individuals 
and their families, but 
also for communities and 
society as a whole. It is 
clear that urgent action 
must be taken across a 
range of policy areas to 
protect young people up 
and down the country 
and across all sections of society. 
I established the Youth Violence Commission in 2016 
after seeing several young people from my Lewisham 
Deptford constituency lose their lives to youth 
violence in my first few months as an MP. By bringing 
together Members of Parliament from across the 
political spectrum, academics and sector experts 
(see Appendix A), we have been able to identify the 
root causes and propose how policymakers should 
move forward. This report marks the culmination 
of more than three years of extensive evidence 
gathering and research and I am very proud of what 
we have achieved.
Throughout this process, the overwhelming verdict 
from victims, youth workers, community leaders 
and other stakeholders has been that short-term 
solutions are not sufficient to effect long-term 
change. Following the publication of our interim 
report in 2018, we have welcomed the establishment 
of regional Violence Reduction Units (VRUs) and the 
adoption of a public health approach by regional 
and national government, both of which were 
recommended by the Commission. However, young 
people continue to lose their lives and the real work is 
yet to be done. 
To that end, this final report sets out a list of 
recommendations for ensuring that VRUs are 
successful. First and foremost, they need long-term 
funding commitments and to adopt expansive and 
ambitious roles at both the local and national levels, 
which will require them to collaborate effectively as a 
network.
The report also makes the social case for change – 
which is clearly compelling – and introduces a similarly 
powerful economic rationale for immediate action. 
The combined economic and social cost of youth 
violence has been huge over the last decade (totalling 
at least £780 million per year) and our hope is that our 
analysis will act as a powerful call to action.
As chair of the Commission since its inception, I 
would like to take this opportunity to thank every 
single person who has been involved in this process 
and supported our work over the last three years.  
The Commission has always sought to involve the 
widest possible range of stakeholders, from young 
people and those engaged in frontline practice and 
grassroots charities, to academics, researchers and 
senior professionals and policymakers. Without their 
insight, constructive criticism, passion and support, 
we would never have been able to achieve such a 
thorough piece of research.
In particular, I would like to highlight the young 
people who have contributed to this piece of work 
and provided their feedback. From the very start, we 
recognised the importance of including them in our 
conversations. Over 2,200 young people completed 
our ‘Safer Lives Survey’ and shared their experiences 
of how youth violence impacts their day-to-day lives. 
We also met a huge number of remarkable young 
people at our regional visits and evidence sessions. I 
know that it took you a great deal of courage to open 
up about your fears and I am immensely grateful that 
you did.
It is no coincidence that the UK Youth Parliament 
chose knife crime as one of the topics for its annual 
Commons debate in both 2018 and 2019, as well as 
recently launching a campaign on the issue. These 
decisions were based on ballots of hundreds of 
thousands of young people, demonstrating the 
strength of their desire to see change.
I want to end this foreword to our final report by 
stressing that youth violence must not be allowed 
to become a party-political issue. It is vital that 
policymakers from across the political spectrum 
continue to work together to ensure that our young 
people experience the hope and optimism they 
deserve. As chair of the Commission I will continue to 
push for this in Parliament, alongside my colleagues 
on the APPG on Knife Crime and the many individual 
MPs who have brought their own experiences to the 
Commons.
Foreword from Vicky Foxcroft, Chair of the  
Youth Violence Commission and Member of  
Parliament for Lewisham Deptford




Serious violence has a devastating impact on 
the lives of countless young people across the 
UK, leaving deep and enduring scars on the 
families, friends and communities affected. While 
the magnitude of the effort needed to protect 
young people from serious violence cannot be 
underestimated, we believe there is cause for 
cautious optimism. 
In recent years, among the vast majority of the 
individuals and groups with whom the Youth Violence 
Commission (YVC) has had the privilege of engaging, 
there has been nothing short of a sea-change in the 
way serious violence is being understood and talked 
about. 
Many readers will be all too familiar with the narrative 
that has increasingly dominated discussions among 
those working to reduce serious violence: the ‘public 
health approach’. For the YVC, these are not empty 
words. This shift in understanding opens up huge 
potential for fundamental change in the way we 
understand and respond to serious violence.
The evidence provided to the Commission over 
the last three years has often forced us to switch 
our focus, from the violence perpetrated by young 
people, to the shocking levels of serious violence and 
mistreatment inflicted on these same young people 
throughout their lives. 
Far too many young people have seen their own 
friends stabbed to death. Others have had to endure 
the crushing experience of seeing their own mothers 
being brutally and repeatedly attacked in their 
homes or have been the victims of domestic violence 
themselves. In addition, many grow up surrounded 
by stark levels of deprivation, insecurity and adverse 
early-life experiences that have left them suffering 
from severe trauma, which too often goes overlooked 
and unaddressed.
Many young people are also subject to failure at the 
level of policy and institutions, for example, attending 
schools that off-roll and exclude pupils at increasingly 
high rates, being faced with employment markets that 
offer little other than insecure, fixed-term and badly 
paid jobs, and living in communities in which flawed 
drug policies facilitate thriving illicit drug markets, 
leaving young people vulnerable to coercion and 
exploitation.
Based on a compelling social and economic case 
for action, the Commission’s main findings and 
recommendations are designed to help us to better 
understand and reduce the shocking levels of 
serious violence that saturate many young people’s 
lives, while also seeking to prevent the traumatic 
experiences that drain away too many young people’s 
opportunities, hopes and dreams for a better future.
The Commission fully supports the recent 
establishment of regional Violence Reduction Units. 
Several of our key recommendations are designed 
to ensure that these units are given the best possible 
opportunity to succeed in driving forward genuine 
public health approaches to reducing serious 
violence.
1.1. The causes of serious violence between young 
people
While the precise causes of any two incidents of 
serious violence are never exactly the same, the 
evidence provided to the Commission highlighted 
a number of particularly significant factors that 
increased the likelihood of young people committing 
or being subjected to serious violence. 
Beginning with the early years of a young person’s 
life, the Commission found that those who committed 
serious acts of violence had often been subjected 
to or witnessed domestic violence as children. For 
reasons including drug and alcohol addiction, or 
being forced to work multiple low-paying jobs that 
involved long and unpredictable hours, many of the 
same young people had parents who struggled to 
provide them with the levels of care and attention 
that were desperately needed. These situations were 
frequently exacerbated by the influence of older 
siblings who were already involved in crime including 
theft, drug distribution and violence.
A remarkably high proportion of young people 
committing serious acts of violence had been 
excluded from mainstream education – a process that 
they invariably told the Commission further damaged 
their self-esteem and identity, while simultaneously 
closing off avenues for them to pursue healthy and 
prosocial lives. Schools should act as centres of care 
and inclusion, but to do so, they must be provided 
with sufficient funding to support struggling pupils 
and they need inspection frameworks and league 
tables that strongly discourage pupil off-rolling and 
exclusion.
The Commission found serious problems with the 
provision of youth services. An extraordinary number 
of third sector organisations are being forced to 
compete for small pots of short-term project funding, 
leading to the closure of many organisations and a 
toxic climate of inadequate and ineffective services. 
The sector requires wholesale change that will 
facilitate the development of long-term strategies, 
sufficient and stable funding arrangements, and high-
quality services on which young people can rely. 
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Cuts to police officer numbers have led to a sharp 
decline in neighbourhood policing, eroding trust 
between communities and the police and severely 
undermining the police’s capacity to gather 
intelligence and develop effective, long-term solutions 
to violence. While the Commission recognises the 
importance of intelligence-led stop and search, it 
is also concerned by unduly high rates of stop and 
search imposed disproportionately on young people 
from black and minority ethnic backgrounds. This has 
served to undermine many young people’s trust and 
confidence in the police, further eroding the police’s 
ability to effectively tackle violent crime.
The prospects of decent and well-paid employment 
are bleak for many young people. The increasing 
prevalence of low-paid, insecure and fixed-term 
employment has served to demoralise and alienate a 
large section of the population, leaving young people 
vulnerable to exploitation by adults through the illicit 
drug markets.
Many young people are growing up in unsafe and 
squalid housing. Those living in large cities such as 
London are often acutely aware of the fact that they 
are unlikely to be in a position to afford housing in the 
area in which they grew up, and as a consequence will 
either be forced to remain living with their parents or 
move away from their families and friends when they 
enter early adulthood. In these circumstances, young 
people from the most socioeconomically deprived 
communities are becoming further demoralised and 
alienated from society, generating feelings of shame, 
anger and resentment that lie at the core of many 
instances of violence. 
Increasing rates of child poverty and growing levels 
of inequality are fundamental drivers of serious 
violence, both causing and intensifying many of the 
problems referred to above and driving a wedge 
between the wealthiest, who enjoy high levels of 
security and material luxury, and the poorest, whose 
lives are characterised by frustration, alienation and 
insecurity. 
1.2. The economic and social cost of serious 
violence between young people
Public resources are scarce relative to the demands 
on them and so it is imperative that appropriate 
decisions are made concerning their optimum 
allocation. Our analysis has revealed that in 
2018/19, serious youth violence across England 
and Wales generated a total economic and social 
cost of £1.3 billion. This constituted a rise of over 
50% on the total economic and social cost of 
serious youth violence across England and Wales 
since 2014/15. This significant increase in costs 
reflects the recent increase in levels of serious 
violence between young people. 
Over the past eleven years, serious youth violence 
across England and Wales had a total economic 
and social cost of £11 billion. These are staggering 
numbers, which reflect the devastating impact 
of serious youth violence. More specifically, our 
calculations include the following costs: i) police 
costs; ii) wider criminal justice system costs; iii) 
health service costs; iv) costs associated with 
physical and emotional harm; v) victim services 
costs; and vi) costs from lost economic output. 
12
There are two fundamental messages that emerge 
from our analysis:  
Firstly, in each of the past eleven years, the economic 
and social costs of serious youth violence across 
England and Wales have been huge. In each year, the 
total cost has been at least £780 million, and in some 
years, it has been far higher. This finding – particularly 
given these economic costs sit on top of devastating 
personal and social costs to so many individuals and 
communities – should act as a powerful call for action 
and investment of new and additional resource to 
help reduce levels of serious youth violence.  
Secondly, the costs have increased significantly in 
each and every region of England and Wales over 
the past four years, with some regions experiencing 
an increase in excess of 50%.  
In short, the findings from our cost analysis 
compound the call for action and investment to help 
reduce levels of violence. Investment in appropriate 
policies – as discussed elsewhere in this report – 
would serve to reduce levels of serious violence, 
which would ultimately lead to financial savings, 
freeing up resources in the long term.
1.3. The Public Health Approach and Violence 
Reduction Units
The publication of the Commission’s interim report 
in July 2018 called for the adoption of a public health 
approach to violence reduction, overseen and 
coordinated by regional Violence Reduction Units 
(VRUs). Following the report, both the (then) Home 
Secretary, Sajid Javid, and the Mayor of London, 
Sadiq Khan, endorsed such an approach, leading to 
the establishment of regional VRUs. 
The Commission welcomes the Government’s 
commitment of further support and resources to 
these VRUs. This is a progressive step in securing 
reductions in violence, and mirrors the positive work 
carried out by the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit 
(SVRU) that was established back in 2005. Pivotal to 
the success of the SVRU was its long-term vision of 
tackling the root causes of serious violence through 
the adoption of a public health approach to violence 
reduction. 
To be clear, the Commission’s perspective on the 
public health approach is that it should involve three 
main stages:
1) Understanding the nature of the problem by 
gathering and analysing sufficient data; 
2) Doing what works by developing and 
implementing policies and interventions 
informed by the best available theory, data 
(interpreted broadly to include, for example, 
the experiences and views of young people and 
frontline practitioners), and analysis; 
3) Learning from experience by robustly evaluating 
and subsequently improving these policies and 
interventions.
While the cyclical nature of democratic elections 
exerts pressure on those in positions of power and 
responsibility to chase short-term results, based on the 
evidence provided to the Commission, a strong case 
exists for the adoption of long-term strategies that 
entail substantial investment in upstream prevention. 
As the positive outcomes associated with these 
strategies are unlikely to accrue during the tenures 
of those pursuing farsighted violence-reduction 
strategies, it is particularly important that credit is 
given to those principled enough to prioritise the 
long-term safety of young people over the pursuit of 
short-term political gain. 
The YVC’s vision is that the regional VRUs should be 
empowered to act as the vehicles that coordinate 
public health approaches at a local level, while also – 
as a network – promoting evidence-informed policies 
nationally. Adopting these ambitious and expansive 
roles will give the VRUs the best possible opportunity 
to secure long-term, coherent, evidence-informed 
approaches to reducing serious violence. 
Based on recent developments, however, the 
Commission is concerned that at least two key 
changes are needed if the recently established 
regional VRUs are to fulfil their potential: 
1) Long-term funding commitments 
- regional VRUs have been given insufficient, 
short-term funding. Furthermore, the 
Commission has been alerted to the fact that 
too many of the regional VRUs have already 
been pressured to spend money in haste, 
resulting in short-sighted attempts to achieve 
immediate (yet inevitably elusive) results. This 
is antithetical to an evidence-informed, public 
health approach to reducing violence and 
sets the VRUs up to fail. 
2) A more ambitious and expansive role
early work by the regional VRUs indicates that 
many may be adopting a relatively narrow 
vision of their potential role, acting primarily as 
commissioning bodies for local level violence-
reduction initiatives. This is one important 
strand of a VRU’s local level work. It must be 
accompanied, however, by the regional VRUs 
coming together as a combined network in order 
to identify and promote the national level policy 
changes that are equally crucial in securing lasting 
reductions in serious violence. 
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1.4. Key Recommendations
The Commission welcomes the Government’s 
decision to support and invest in regional Violence 
Reduction Units (VRUs). Our utmost concern is 
that the recently established VRUs are given the 
best possible opportunity to succeed in bringing 
together and implementing genuine, holistic, 
public health approaches to reducing serious 
violence. To this end, the Commission’s central 
recommendations are as follows: 
Violence Reduction Units 
1) VRUs must receive enhanced funding 
immediately, accompanied by funding 
projections for a minimum of ten years. This will 
enable each unit to plan how best to deploy its 
resources strategically, while also ensuring those 
working within these units have the confidence 
to promote long-term, evidence-informed 
policies and initiatives. 
2) The VRUs should have a threefold purpose:
i) to lead on the development, implementation 
and commissioning of local level initiatives 
to reduce violence, helping to rationalise the 
many disparate funding streams available, 
while bringing together and coordinating 
relevant stakeholders;
ii) to feed the learning generated by each VRU’s 
local level work into relevant evidence bases, 
such as the ‘what works’ initiative currently 
being led by the Youth Endowment Fund; 
iii) as a combined VRU network, to identify and 
promote the national level policy changes 
that are beyond each regional VRU’s scope 
and control, but are nevertheless crucial to 
securing reductions in serious violence. 
3) In their capacity as local level coordinators of 
holistic public health approaches to reducing 
serious violence, VRUs should actively seek 
to engage all relevant stakeholders to feed 
into their short-term priorities and long-term 
planning. In addition, VRUs should provide 
regular feedback mechanisms to these same 
stakeholders to explain how their input has 
informed the VRU’s work and priorities. 
We expand on the rationale underpinning these 
recommendations later in the report.
These VRU-related recommendations aside, we are 
delighted to note the support structures put in place 
by the Home Office to enable the regional network 
of VRUs to meet and communicate regularly, both 
online through the initiative ‘Basecamp’, and through 
face-to-face events. Such communication is vital for 
ensuring that the VRUs – as a network – are able to 
come together to discuss and identify the national 
level policy changes that the VRU network should 
champion. 
Furthermore, the processes put in place to evaluate 
the work of the VRUs appear to be entirely appropriate 
and constructive, providing both continuous feedback 
as the VRUs evolve, as well as an important degree of 
oversight and scrutiny of their work. 
The YVC would highlight the importance of these 
evaluations adopting a long-term lens on what 
‘success’ ought to look like from the perspective 
of the VRUs. It is vital that the evaluations consider, 
for example, any changes facilitated by the VRUs in 
relation to local level partnership working that may 
prove pivotal in the long-term but may not generate 
immediate reductions in levels of serious violence.
A full list of the YVC’s recommendations across a broad 
range of policy areas can be found in Part 3. 
As communication between the regional VRUs and 
Central Government should be a two-way dialogue, 
based on the evidence gathered by the Commission, 
we suggest that in first instance the collective network 
of VRUs should support and promote the following 
recommendations for reducing serious violence 
between young people, which will require action at a 
national policy level: 
4) The planned increase in police recruitment 
should be used to underpin significant 
reinvestment in local neighbourhood 
policing. The YVC recognises the fundamental 
importance of effective community policing in 
the development of long-term, problem-solving 
approaches to reducing serious youth violence. 
It is the basis on which policing capacity, and 
public trust and confidence in policing, is built 
and sustained. 
5) Central Government should provide significant 
and immediate increased funding to enable 
schools to put in place the enhanced support 
necessary to avoid off-rolling and pursue an 
aspiration of zero exclusions. The Commission 
accepts that exclusion will be the only feasible 
option in some cases. Given the numerous 
causal links between excluding and off-rolling 
pupils and the likelihood of these same young 
people being involved in serious violence, 
however, it is imperative that schools are 
provided with sufficient investment to help keep 
pupils in mainstream education.
6) High quality youth services can transform the 
lives of young people. Central Government 
should provide Local Authorities with 
statutory funding and a clear statutory duty for 
providing youth services, the levels of which 
should be determined by the number of young 
people living in each Local Authority area. 
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Civil society organisations should be central to 
designing, delivering and leading youth services, 
working in partnership with Local Authorities 
and other key stakeholders. 
7) A collaboration of funders – including, but 
not limited to, Central, Regional and Local 
Governments, Arm’s Length Bodies, Trusts, 
Foundations and Corporates - should invest in 
programmes that help to prepare parents for 
parenthood and provide support in the early 
years of parenting.  
8) Central Government should commit to 
providing enhanced funding to support the full 
range of the Commission’s recommendations 
that cross multiple policy areas. While the social 
case for such investment is compelling, it is also 
economically prudent. Current levels of serious 
violence cost the taxpayer hundreds of millions 
of pounds every year – even minor reductions in 
these levels of violence will generate significant 
cost savings. 
We expand on the rationale underpinning these key 
recommendations and provide a full list of policy 
recommendations in the following sections. 
We hope that the YVC’s findings and 
recommendations will provide welcome support 
to each of the regional VRUs in their task of driving 
forward genuine public health approaches to 
reducing serious violence. While the size of this 
task should not be underestimated, it is one we are 
confident can be met, provided that the political 
will exists to drive forward the Commission’s 
recommendations. 
1.4. About the Youth Violence Commission
The Youth Violence Commission is chaired by MP 
Vicky Foxcroft and supported by a cross-party 
group of MPs. Its final report is the result of a joint 
collaboration between academics from the University 
of Warwick and The Open University. The Secretariat 
for the Commission is UK Youth. Many other groups 
and individuals have supported the Commission, 
details of whom can be found in Appendix A and B to 
the full report.  
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The cross-party Youth Violence Commission (YVC) 
was established in March 2017 following a debate the 
previous year on serious youth violence in the House 
of Commons. MPs Chuka Umunna, Vicky Foxcroft 
(now Chair of the Commission) and David Lammy led 
the debate, highlighting the devastating impact that 
serious violence has on many of our communities and 
calling for immediate action to be taken to reduce 
such violence.
Three years on, levels of serious violence between 
young people remain stubbornly high. Knife and 
offensive weapon offences involving those aged 10-
17 and resulting in a caution or conviction have risen 
year on year, from 2,639 in 2013 to 4,562 in 2019.1 
Following a similar trend, the number of finished 
consultant episodes for assault by a sharp object 
involving those under the age of 18 rose from 489 
in 2012/13 to 849 in 2018/19.2 As most sources of 
data on serious violence distinguish between those 
aged below or over 18, these statistics would be 
significantly higher if young people aged 18-24 were 
included. And, of course, official statistics collected 
by the police or the National Health Service always 
1  Ministry of Justice (2020) Knife and Offensive Weapon Sentencing Statistics: July to September 2019.
2  House of Commons Library (2019) Knife crime in England and Wales, Briefing Paper Number SN4304. 
represent underestimates, because they exclude the 
many incidents of serious violence that do not come 
to their attention.
While recent trends in levels of serious violence 
between young people are concerning, there 
have been some progressive policy developments 
since the YVC began its work in March 2017. The 
publication of the YVC’s Interim Report in July 2018 
– which called for the adoption of a public health 
approach to violence reduction coordinated by 
Violence Reduction Units (VRUs) – was followed by the 
establishment of a London VRU, and shortly thereafter 
another 17 regional VRUs across the UK.
This is a progressive step in securing reductions in 
violence, and mirrors the positive work carried out by 
the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit (SVRU) that was 
established back in 2005. Pivotal to the success of 
the SVRU was its long-term vision of tackling the root 
causes of serious violence through the adoption of a 
public health approach to violence reduction. 
For readers unfamiliar with the term ‘public health 
approach’, the YVC’s view is that public health 
approaches to reducing serious violence should 
involve three main stages: 1) gathering and analysing 
sufficient data to understand the nature of the 
problem; 2) doing what works by developing and 
implementing policies and interventions based on 
the best available theory, data, and analysis; and 
3) learning from experience by robustly evaluating 
and subsequently improving these policies and 
interventions.
Similarly, for readers unfamiliar with VRUs, these 
involve newly established teams of people whose 
responsibility it is to increase collaboration between 
a range of agencies at a local level, and drive forward 
evidence-informed policies and practices at a local 
and national level to reduce serious violence. All of 
the recently established VRUs have openly expressed 
their support for the adoption of long-term, 
sustainable, public health approaches to violence 
reduction, and some excellent work is already being 
carried out by many of these units at a local level. 
The long-term success of the VRUs, however, is far 
from certain. The YVC outlines its recommendations 
for ensuring the VRUs are given the best possible 
chance of success in Part 3 of this report. 
At the level of national policy, progress has been 
slower and more disappointing since the publication 
of the YVC’s interim report. Police forces continue 
to struggle under the strain of severely stretched 
Introduction
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resources, making it harder for the police to secure 
the trust and confidence of the communities they are 
supposed to serve and protect. In education, far too 
many children and young people are missing out on 
quality schooling as rates of off-rolling and exclusion 
continue to rise. Youth services, also decimated 
by recent cuts, require a far greater injection of 
investment to begin what will undoubtedly be a long 
and difficult process of recovery. 
The YVC explored these issues and many more 
through a series of expert evidence sessions held on 
the Parliamentary estate, alongside a national survey 
of young people and a review of the most relevant 
and recent research in these areas.
In short, while the magnitude of the effort needed 
to protect young people from serious violence 
cannot be underestimated, we believe there is 
cause for cautious optimism provided that the 
political will exists to drive forward the Commission’s 
recommendations in its final report. 
Roadmap to the Youth Violence Commission’s Final 
Report
This report is divided into four main parts as follows: 
Part 1, The Causes of Serious Youth Violence, presents 
the YVC’s analysis of new data generated by a series 
of six expert evidence sessions and a national survey 
of over 2,000 young people, supported by some of 
the most recent and relevant research on serious 
violence. 
Part 2, The Economic and Social Cost of Serious Youth 
Violence, examines the economic and social cost of 
serious violence between young people, taking into 
account a wide variety of costs including those to the 
health service, policing and criminal justice, victims’ 
services and many others.
Part 3, Looking Ahead and Recommendations, 
includes the YVC’s full list of policy recommendations, 
informed by the findings presented in the first two 
parts of the report. 
Finally, Part 4, Expert Reflections on the Final Report, 
contains a series of short contributions from a diverse 
range of leading thinkers and senior professionals. 
These pieces include reflections on the YVC’s work, 
but more importantly, provide a space in which these 
experts share their perspectives on the nature of 
serious violence between young people and what can 
and should be done about it. 
In the Appendices to the report, readers will find 
details of the people and groups directly involved in 
the YVC, more information about our expert evidence 
sessions and further analysis of our survey data. 
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Part 1: The Causes of Serious Youth Violence 
This section of the report provides a summary and 
analysis of the main issues identified through a 
combination of expert witness statements taken by 
the cross-party Youth Violence Commission (see 
Appendix B), a national survey of young people (see 
Appendix C), and consideration of some of the most 
relevant and recent research on the subject. 
It is important to note that each sub-section contains 
evidence from multiple sources – a reflection of the 
overlapping nature of the topics being covered. 
Overall, the research and evidence we collected 
made clear that serious violence between young 
people is an issue that cannot be adequately 
understood through a narrow criminal justice lens of 
suppression and enforcement. 
Not only would such a lens provide a distorted view 
of the problem, but crucially, it would also prevent the 
identification and development of effective solutions 
– solutions that are urgently needed to improve the 
safety, happiness and well-being of many children 
and young people whose lives are blighted by serious 
violence. 
Early Years Support and Early Intervention
“We are inspired by adults, so they should set a 
good example” Safer Lives Survey Respondent
The early years of a child’s life can have significant, 
long-lasting effects on their life-course trajectory, 
affecting everything from physical and mental health 
to skills development.3 Many of the witnesses to 
the Commission emphasised the vital importance 
of these years, and advocated strongly for early 
intervention. 
Witnesses spoke at length about the links between 
early childhood experiences and the likelihood of 
being involved in serious violence later in life. They 
also stressed, however, that these same experiences 
were linked to a much wider range of outcomes and 
behaviours that were distinct albeit related to serious 
violence in later years:
3  Campbell, F. (2014) ‘Early childhood investments substantially boost adult health’ Science, 343(6178), pp. 1478-1485; Heckman, J. J. (2006) ‘Skill forma-
tion and the economics of investing in disadvantaged children’ Science, 312(5782), pp. 1900-1902
4  Ofsted (2014) ‘Are you ready? Good practice in school readiness’, research report; Clarke, B. & Younas, F. (2017) ‘Helping Parents to Parent’, Social 
Mobility Commission research report
5  Hunt, S., Virgo, S., Klett-Davies, M., Page, A. & Apps, J. (2011) ‘Provider influence on the early home learning environment’, Department for Education 
research report, pp. 8
6  Taggart, B., Sylva, K., Melhuish, E., Sammons, P. & Siraj, I. (2015) ‘How pre-school influences children and young people’s attainment and developmental 
outcomes over time’, Department for Education research brief
7  Hamre, B. & Pianta, R. (2001) ‘Early Teacher–Child Relationships and the Trajectory of Children’s School Outcomes through Eighth Grade’, Child Devel-
opment, Volume 72, Number 2, pp. 634
In the long term, we want to think about the 
early experiences of these children. By the time 
a child starts school, they’re set on a trajectory, 
which for the great majority of children remains 
fairly constant right through adolescence…a low 
trajectory has a range of negative outcomes: poor 
educational attainment, lack of opportunities for 
employment, involvement in criminality, poor 
mental health, poor physical health often as well. 
And all of these things tend to cluster together 
amongst the same groups of disadvantaged 
children. One can raise children out of that 
trajectory, and in our research three factors 
which are open to policy change can improve 
the trajectories of children in disadvantaged 
circumstances…one is a good home learning 
environment for children. Parents who know what 
to do with their children can affect their child’s 
future. We need good early education and care 
services for children, which provide good learning 
opportunities for children in places like nursery 
schools, children’s centres and so on.
(Early Years, Education and Employability) 
As this witness highlights, there is strong evidence 
for the link between a good home learning 
environment in the early years and higher levels of 
school readiness.4 Research has shown that parental 
involvement in early learning has a greater impact 
on children’s wellbeing and achievement than any 
other factor, leading a 2011 Department for Education 
report to conclude that ‘supporting parents to help 
them provide a positive home learning environment 
is a vital part of improving outcomes for children, 
particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds.’5
There is also research evidence corroborating the 
witness’s emphasis on the importance of quality 
early education. A large-scale study in England 
found that the effects of high-quality pre-school 
provision can last into adolescence, in terms of both 
higher academic attainment and better social and 
behavioural outcomes.6 Relationships with staff 
in their first few years of school can also play an 
important role in children’s future success. 
A study undertaken in the United States found that 
teacher-child relationships in the early years ‘are 
unique predictors of academic and behavioural 
outcomes in early elementary school, with mediated 
effects through eighth grade’.7 If we can provide high 
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quality care and pedagogy to children in their early 
years, it can help to set them on a positive path for 
their entire life.
Another witness was keen to highlight the 
importance of communication and effective 
transition between pre-school and primary 
school services:
The early years are so important as you’ve 
already pinpointed. The people involved in 
youth violence in ten years’ time are being put 
on a trajectory for that now in the pre-school 
period. And I’d like to see much more integration 
of primary school education with pre-school 
services. 
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
Midwives, health visitors, children’s centre workers 
and social workers can have extensive insight into a 
young person’s family situation, but are not always 
able to communicate their understanding with one 
another or with the child’s school, undermining the 
ability of each of these agencies to meet the child’s 
needs. 
In the worst cases, parents only access very limited 
provision prior to their child starting school, even if 
they have a high need for support. The Social Mobility 
Commission has stated that ‘support for parents is 
weak and provision patchy, even though most want 
better advice…poorer children, who stand to gain 
most from high-quality childcare, are least likely to 
receive it.’8 
Parents from more disadvantaged backgrounds can 
also lack information about the funding available to 
them: research has found that working-class parents 
of very young children are less informed about 
government funding for childcare than middle-class 
parents. In a 2016 survey, almost one in four working 
class parents said that they had no knowledge that 
there was any support available at all.9 Inequality in 
knowledge and in provision can also start pre-birth: 
a survey by The Royal College of Midwives found that 
75% of expectant mothers in low-income households 
receive no antenatal education.10
Consistent with a substantial body of research, the 
Commission’s witnesses made clear that childhood 
poverty is associated with a wide range of detrimental 
effects on a child’s life course. The Joseph Rowntree 
8  Social Mobility Commission (2016) ‘State of the Nation’ research report. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-of-the-na-
tion-2016 
9  Social Mobility Commission (2016) ‘The Early Years: Building the Right Foundations’ research report. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/social-mobility-factsheets 
10  Winterman, D. (2011) Antenatal classes: What do you learn from them? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15736415 
11  Cooper, K. & Stewart, K. (2013) ‘Does money affect children’s outcomes? A systematic review’, research report for Joseph Rowntree Foundation
12  Fernald, A., Marchman, V. A., & Weisleder, A. (2013) ‘Socio-economic differences in language processing skill and vocabulary are evident at 18 months’ 
Developmental Science, 16, pp. 234–248
13  Social Mobility Commission (2016) ‘State of the Nation’ research report. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-of-the-na-
tion-2016
14  Social Mobility Commission (2016) ‘The Early Years: Building the Right Foundations’ research report. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/social-mobility-factsheets
15  Sitnick, S. L. ; Shaw, D. S. ; Weaver, C. M. ; Shelleby, E. C. ; Choe, D. E. ; Reuben, J. D. ; Gilliam, M. ; Winslow, E. B. ; Taraban, L. (2017) Early childhood 
predictors of severe youth violence in low-income male adolescents. Child Development. 88(1): 27-40. 
Foundation has presented evidence from a range 
of sources demonstrating that income poverty can 
contribute to significant delays in cognitive and 
language development.11 By 24 months there can be 
a sixth month gap between socio-economic groups in 
processing skills critical to language development.12 
These inequalities create class differences in school 
readiness: as the Social Mobility Commission put it, 
‘there are stark social class differences in how ready 
children are for school: in the last decade [2006-2016] 
500,000 poorer children were not school-ready by 
age five.’13 In 2015, 51% of children eligible for free 
school meals achieved a good level of development 
at age five compared to 69% of other children.14 Given 
the lasting effects of these early disparities, the case 
for effective early intervention to support the poorest 
families and to reduce inequity is strong, as stressed 
by our witnesses. 
The early years are not only formative for children’s 
cognitive development, but can also have a 
fundamental influence on social and emotional 
development. Studies have shown that when children 
are subjected to hostile, harsh or rejecting parenting 
styles, this can increase their propensity to become 
involved in serious violence in later life.15 Similarly, 
being subjected to domestic violence – either as 
a primary victim or through witnessing violence 
against other family members – can have long-lasting 
effects on young people’s predisposition to engage 
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in further acts of violence,16 as many of our witnesses 
highlighted:
There’s secondary trauma, which is trauma that 
doesn’t happen to you personally but you are 
in some way witness to it. And that would apply 
perhaps most strongly to the children and young 
people who are growing up in homes where 
domestic violence is perpetrated, and they 
pick up the secondary trauma, primarily seeing 
their mums battered senseless. And there is 
an absolute connection between that trauma 
experienced and witnessed in childhood and the 
violence perpetrated in that person’s future. 
(Public Health and Mental Health)
The first priority I would say is early intervention…
things like being physically abused, sexually 
abused, emotionally abused or neglected, living 
in a house with an alcohol or drug problem, or 
someone with severe mental health problems. 
People who’ve grown up with four of more of 
those compared to none of those are 10 times 
more likely by the age of 18 to be involved in 
violence every year…another way of putting that 
would be if you could stop adverse childhood 
experiences in early life, you cut violence across 
a life course by about two thirds, so early life 
intervention is critical.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
As the latter of these witnesses suggests, adverse 
childhood experiences are often interlinked, and have 
cumulative effects. For instance, one study of over 
135,000 young people in Minnesota found that ‘for 
each additional type of adverse event reported by 
youth, the risk of violence perpetration increased 35% 
to 144%’.17 The kinds of high quality early childcare, 
support for parents, pre-school provision and early 
education mentioned by the previous witnesses could 
have life-saving effects, if they prevent the adverse 
childhood experiences which significantly increase 
the likelihood of violence perpetration.
Of course, early intervention doesn’t always mean 
intervening early in the life-course, but can also 
mean providing the right support early on in the 
development of a problem – putting effective 
mentoring in place for a young person when they 
first seem at risk of harming themselves or others, for 
instance. One of our witnesses focused on this form of 
early intervention:  
16  Salzinger, S., Rosario, M. and Feldman, R.S. (2007) Physical child abuse and adolescent violent delinquency: The mediating and moderating roles of 
personal relationships. Child Maltreatment, 12(3), pp.208-219; Weaver, C.M., Borkowski, J.G. and Whitman, T.L., 2008. Violence breeds violence: Child-
hood exposure and adolescent conduct problems. Journal of community psychology, 36 (1) pp.96-112.
17  Duke, N., Pettingell, S., McMorris, B. & Borowsky, I. (2010) ‘Adolescent Violence Perpetration: Associations With Multiple Types of Adverse Childhood 
Experiences’, Pediatrics, 125, pp. 778
18  Irwin-Rogers, K. and Harding, S. (2018) Challenging the orthodoxy on pupil gang involvement: When two social fields collide. British Educational 
Research Journal. 44(3): 463-479; Joliffe, D., Farrington, D. P., Loeber, R., Pardini, D. (2016) Protective factors for violence: Results from the Pittsburgh 
Youth Study. Journal of Criminal Justice. 45: 32-40; Resnick, M. D., Bearman, P. S., Blum R. W., Bauman, K. E., Harris K. M., Jones, J., Tabor, J., Beuhring, 
T., Sieving R. E., Shew, M., Ireland, M., Bearinger, L. H., ad Udry, J. R. (1997) Protecting adolescents from harm. Findings from the National Longitudinal 
Study on Adolescent Health. The Journal of the American Medical Association. 278(10): 823-832.
19  Off-rolling is a term used to refer to the practice of removing a pupil from a school’s roll without using formal exclusionary processes, when such a 
removal is primarily in the best interest of the school rather than the pupil. 
I’m a real believer that there are opportunities to 
take this health model and transfer it across the 
UK. But not just within A&E departments and 
hospitals, where you could argue that by the time 
a young person has got stabbed it’s questionably 
too late. Goodness knows how many times 
they’ve gone to other local A&Es, but if we’re able 
to start there - within primary care and with the 
GPs, with the schools, with the communities, with 
the youth workers in those communities - then we 
can do something really amazing, really powerful 
and really hopeful.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
As this statement makes clear, effective early 
intervention requires well-resourced communities 
and public services, to facilitate strong relationships 
between children, families and professionals. 
Early intervention is only possible if professionals 
have the time and capacity to develop an in-
depth understanding of young people’s lives, so 
that they can identify behaviour changes or other 
warning signs of risk, and intervene in a sensitive, 
individualised manner.
Education
“There needs to be more access to activities 
and opportunities after school, working with 
relatable staff and teachers who understand us” 
Safer Lives Survey Respondent
The evidence generated by the Youth Violence 
Commission supports an established body of 
research that highlights the links between young 
people disengaging or being excluded from 
school, and an increase in the likelihood of being 
victims or perpetrators of serious violence.18 The 
reasons for these links are numerous.
Firstly, numerous witnesses provided evidence 
highlighting that our education system was failing 
many children and young people. Two of the most 
prominent sources of concern were: i) declining 
school budgets, which among other things prevented 
teachers and other adult professionals from forming 
high-quality, nurturing relationships with their pupils; 
and ii) rising rates of off-rolling19, fixed-term and 
permanent exclusions. 
A number of witnesses told us that funding cuts to 
education had led to reductions in pastoral support 
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services, which in turn impacted on teachers’ ability to 
perform their roles effectively:
All schools in this country are cutting, cutting, 
cutting the whole time, and having to…it’s just 
an impossible situation. And that means…the 
wraparound services, the pastoral services, the 
soft skills are the ones that you can’t afford.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
I became a learning mentor at a primary school 
in south-east London, and at that point there was 
a big push for mentors to be in primary schools. 
I took some of the pressure off the teachers – 
teachers could teach and I would deal with the 
behaviour of the young people. Then that was cut 
probably around 2006/2007, so what I’m saying 
is these are not new conversations…we’ve been 
here before.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
It’s really hard, and the reason is because the staff 
there, they’re scurrying around. They’re like headless 
chickens…too busy…and that’s what makes it tough.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
The evidence provided to the Commission reflects 
what has happened to education funding in recent 
years. Between 2009 and 2018, the number of pupils 
in state funded primary and secondary schools rose 
by 8.4%.20 During the same period, total school 
spending per pupil in England fell by 9% in real 
terms.21 Such sizeable cuts to funding have led to 
reductions in school staffing. 
Government figures show that staff numbers in 
secondary schools have fallen by 15,000 between 
2014-15 and 2016-17, despite the increase in pupil 
20  Department for Education (2019) Schools, pupils and their characteristics: January 2018. [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019] https://www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2018
21  The Institute for Fiscal Studies (2018) 2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019]
22  National Education Union (2018) Schools forced to cut teachers and teaching assistants to make ends meet. [Online] [Accessed 2nd February 2020] 
https://neu.org.uk/schools-forced-cut-teachers-and-teaching-assistants-posts-make-ends-meet
23  Alternative provision is a term that refers to institutions tasked with educating young people who have been excluded from mainstream schools in 
England and Wales.
24  Gibb, N. (2019) Pupil Referral Units: Written question – 211308. [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019] https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/
written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2019-01-22/211308/
25  The Institute for Fiscal Studies (2018) 2018 Annual Report on Education Spending in England [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019] https://www.ifs.org.
uk/uploads/publications/comms/R150.pdf
numbers.22 This equates to an average of 5.5 
fewer members of staff in each secondary school 
in England and Wales. Another of our witnesses 
suggested that this has left teachers unable to tackle 
difficult behaviour:
[Children] had said their teachers had dismissed 
the abusive behaviour that was happening in 
school between 8:30-15:00, when they are under 
the care of the institution…because the school 
just doesn’t have the time to deal with it. So we’re 
overlooking behaviours, and we’re just pushing 
it aside, and then people are being killed at a 
young age.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
These concerns were echoed by evidence from a 
witness who had been excluded from mainstream 
education and had a criminal record for serious violence:
I definitely feel like if young people had a mentor 
to give them that consistent support, or someone 
they could talk to, it would prevent them from 
going down the path that I did. And I think that 
the support they need, it needs to be a specific 
mentor; a teaching assistant cannot provide that 
kind of support.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
The reality of our current educational landscape is 
that young people can gain access to the kind of 
enhanced support described above, but only after 
they have been excluded from mainstream education. 
The Department for Education provides significant 
sums of money to Pupil Referral Units in an attempt 
to salvage what are usually very difficult situations 
for pupils who have been excluded from mainstream 
schooling. 
Following a written question directed to the 
Department for Education by the Chair of the YVC, 
MP Vicky Foxcroft, we found that the per pupil cost 
of Alternative Provision schooling23 is estimated to be 
somewhere between £17,000 and £18,000 per year.24 
This is over £11,000 more than the average amount 
spent per pupil in mainstream secondary schools: 
£6,200.25 
One of the main reasons for the higher per pupil 
cost in Alternative Provision (AP) is the lower student 
to teacher ratios in these schools. Depending on 
a child’s precise circumstances, they will often 
receive one-to-one support, or at the very least 
be taught in small groups of around four to six 
pupils. Such enhanced levels of support have the 
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potential to enable better relationships between 
adult professionals and pupils, as well as reducing 
the propensity for children to rail against the 
classroom environment.26  Yet, despite being able to 
provide such enhanced levels of support, outcomes 
for pupils in AP are poor: in 2015-16, only 18% 
of children who were subjected to multiple fixed 
term exclusions, and just 7% of children who were 
permanently excluded, went on to achieve good 
passes in English and Maths GCSEs.27 One expert 
provided a particularly damning indictment of our 
current approach:
Once pushed out, these young people are placed 
into alternative schools of varying quality. Shorter 
contact hours…their teachers are twice as likely to 
be unqualified and temporary…They are basically 
holding pens before [children] move onto the 
street. Almost none of them will gain GCSEs. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
The number of children subjected to fixed and 
permanent exclusions from mainstream education 
has been rising since 2012-2013.28 In 2016-17, an 
average of 40 children were permanently excluded 
from school each day. This number was 50 times 
higher for fixed-term exclusions, with 2,000 children 
being subject to a fixed-term exclusion on a daily 
basis.29 
One of the major problems with our current 
approach to exclusion is that by the time children are 
placed in an AP, they will have already undergone 
many months, or years, of feeling as though they are 
failing to fit into the mainstream mould. Based on 
previous research, this sense of failing to conform 
and live up to the norms and standards of one’s 
peers can do serious damage to a young person’s 
sense of self-worth and self-esteem.30 Often craving 
any form of adult attention – positive or negative 
– many children who are ultimately excluded 
from mainstream education will ‘act out’ in large 
classrooms of 30 or more pupils in order to attract 
their teacher’s gaze.31 
Some of the experts contributing to the YVC 
evidence sessions indicated a need for additional 
support in mainstream schools to replicate the level 
of enhanced support young people receive in AP, 
albeit before they have been excluded from the 
mainstream: 
26  Irwin-Rogers, K. (2016) Safer Schools: Keeping gang culture outside the gates. Catch22: London. 
27  Timpson, E. (2019) Timpson Review of School Exclusion [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019]
28  Timpson, E. (2019) Timpson Review of School Exclusion [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799979/Timpson_review_of_school_exclusion.pdf
29  Department for Education (2018) Permanent and fixed-period exclusions in England: 2016 to 2017. [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019] https://www.
gov.uk/government/statistics/permanent-and-fixed-period-exclusions-in-england-2016-to-2017
30  Irwin-Rogers, K. (2016) Safer Schools: Keeping gang culture outside the gates. Catch22: London. 
31  Trotman, D., Tucker, S. and Martyn, M. (2015) Understanding problematic pupil behaviour: perceptions of pupils and behaviour coordinators on sec-
ondary school exclusion in an English city. Educational Research. 57(3): 237-253. 
32  Hutchinson, J. and Crenna-Jennings, W. (2019) Unexplained pupil exits from schools: A growing problem? [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 2019] https://
epi.org.uk/publications-and-research/unexplained-pupil-exits/; Timpson, E. (2019) Timpson Review of School Exclusion [Online] [Accessed on 01 June 
2019] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799979/Timpson_review_of_school_exclu-
sion.pdf
There needs to be allocation of funding for more 
specialist workers in schools to take the weight off 
the everyday teachers. Because in referral units 
it’s one to four students, but in the mainstream 
it’s one teacher to 30 or more than, or one head 
of year to 150 students, and the ratio just doesn’t 
balance out. So people are being missed, issues 
are being missed and overlooked.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
Zero exclusion I think is a policy to aim for. The 
thing is it’s not going to work at the moment 
without substantial extra resources available in 
the schools to cope with those children.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
Finally, in addition to extra resources, several experts 
highlighted the potential role and influence of Ofsted, 
which is a non-ministerial department responsible 
for inspecting schools in England. More specifically, 
experts were critical of the fact that Ofsted failed to 
place sufficient emphasis on, and hold schools to 
account for their use of, fixed-term and permanent 
exclusions: 
At the moment schools are only held to account 
on their examination results. Ofsted used to go 
in and hold schools to account on permanent 
exclusions, but they don’t anymore.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
Recent reports have also drawn attention to a practice 
known as ‘off-rolling’, through which schools remove 
a child from the school roll without implementing a 
formal, permanent exclusion, or by encouraging or 
coercing parents to remove their child when this in 
the best interests of the school rather than the child.32 
As with some permanent exclusions, experts have 
suggested that some schools are off-rolling pupils in 
order to achieve the requisite examination scores and 
attendance statistics to ensure they achieve a positive 
Ofsted rating. Far from Ofsted serving to restrain bad 
practice around exclusions and off-rolling, therefore, 
inspections that focus overwhelmingly on metrics 
around progress scores and examinations results may 
be contributing problems around school exclusions 
and off-rolling.
Mainstream schools are struggling to cope with 
stretched resources, and partly as a consequence 
many are engaging in the overuse of off-rolling and 
exclusionary processes that leave many children 
disengaged from one of society’s most integral 
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prosocial institutions. Confirming the findings of 
previous research33 – experts contributing to the YVC 
evidence sessions made clear their concerns about 
a range of flaws and shortcomings in our current 
education system, highlighting the ways in which these 
flaws and shortcomings are contributing to rising 
levels of serious violence between young people.
Employment
“If young people had better opportunities and 
access to employment it would make my area 
safer” Safer Lives Survey Respondent
Employment is a centrally important issue for many 
young people, providing not only financial security, 
but purpose, direction, and identity. Many witnesses 
were concerned that a significant proportion of 
young people either were unable to find work or were 
only able to obtain insecure forms of employment. 
Recent figures show that almost half a million young 
people aged 16-24 were unemployed between 
October-December 2019.34 While this number is low 
by historical standards, the quality of employment for 
those in work was a major concern of many witnesses. 
Indeed, figures indicate that over one in five young 
people aged 16-24 are subject to insecure work (zero-
hours contracts, temporary employment, working for 
an agency, or some combination of these); this is far 
higher than any other age group.35 
Many of the witnesses to the Commission emphasised 
the pivotal importance of high quality employment in 
young people’s lives, and suggested that more could 
be done to ensure that young people are supported 
to obtain desirable skills, develop their aspirations, 
and ultimately gain good quality work.
Schools can of course be a strong influence on the 
employment prospects of young people and their 
career goals, as one of our witnesses highlighted: 
Schools have a role to play, particularly in upping 
the levels of aspirations of young people. I 
work to some extent with charities which work 
with children who are involved in violence, and 
one of the things that they report to me is that 
the children they counsel typically would not 
be able to give a clear answer to the question, 
‘What profession would you like to get involved 
33 Ang, R. P., Huan, V. S., Chan, W. T. Cheon, S. A. and Leaw, J. N. (2015) The role of delinquency, proactive aggression, psychopathy and behavioural 
school engagement in reported youth gang membership. Journal of Adolescence. (41), 148-156; Hawkins, J. D., Herrenkohl, T. I., Farrington, D. P., Brew-
er, D., Catalano, R. F., Harachi, T. W. and Cothern, L. (2000) Predictors of youth violence. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Juvenile 
Justice Bulletin, April 2000.
34  House of Commons Library (2020) Youth unemployment statistics. [Online] [Accessed 3rd February 2020] https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/
ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN05871
35  Trust for London (2020) Insecure work by age. [Online] [Accessed 3rd February 2020] https://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/data/insecure-work-age/; Hud-
son-Sharp, N. and Runge, J. (2017) International trends in insecure work: A report for the Trades Union Congress. London: National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research. 
36  Kintrea, K., St Clair, R. & Houston, M. (2011) ‘The influence of parents, places and poverty on educational attitudes and aspirations’, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation report, pp. 8
37  “Schools: The Engine of Social Mobility”, Social Mobility Commission. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-mobility-fact-
sheets 
in?’. Their parents also, with some exceptions, 
also find it difficult to name aspirations for their 
children. So schools have a definite role to play in 
terms of counselling and also in terms of raising 
aspirations.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
This echoes a report by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, which stated that ‘place, family and 
schools tend to coalesce around particular views of 
future options [for young people] and reinforce each 
other’.36 This can be a wholly positive phenomenon, 
if a young person’s local community, parents, wider 
family and school all encourage them to have an 
ambitious vision for their future. On the other hand, it 
can be a substantial constraint on young people, if all 
of the adults, institutions and communities in their lives 
appear to set limits on what they think particular young 
people can achieve, or provide no guidance at all.
The Social Mobility Foundation has been more 
forceful about the role of educational institutions 
in this, stating: ‘Schools do not focus enough on 
destinations (where their pupils go next). Success 
in exams must not be seen as an end in itself.’37 The 
accountability regime governing schools could 
contribute to this problem, placing significantly more 
emphasis on results than destinations: schools are 
judged far more publicly and directly on their exam 
performance than they are on where their students go 
on to after education. 
Another witnessed focused on the consequences of 
low aspirations:
I absolutely agree about low aspiration being 
so key where a lot of the people that I work with 
do not have a clear view of what they want to do 
when they leave school. I can think of a young 
person who said they can only imagine working in 
a pub, and then that slipping away to not working 
in a pub and just being basically an alcoholic like 
their mum.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
Lacking a hopeful, positive vision for the future, 
which can serve as a motivation and a guide, can 
clearly have detrimental effects on young people’s 
outcomes. Research has suggested that aspirations 
in themselves aren’t always the most significant factor 
determining a young person’s life course, however: 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation emphasise that, 
26
whatever their aspirations, young people ‘also need 
to be able to navigate the paths to their goals’.38 
Young people need guidance and support to get 
into the careers that they aspire to. For instance, 
young people need help ensure to that they acquire 
the relevant qualifications and develop the necessary 
skills.
 
In the contemporary economy, IT and technology 
skills are especially desirable, as one of our witnesses 
stressed:
There’s a tech literacy wage premium of about 
£10,000, and I think that’s vastly understated 
personally. So, if we can find a way to give people 
a boost with tech skills, an area where we also 
have a skills and employment gap, actually 
that could supercharge young people into jobs 
regardless of their background.
(Early years, Education and Employability)
Employers often refer to different forms of skills 
gap when assessing the quality of the labour force; 
upskilling young people in the relevant areas could help 
both to close that gap and to boost youth employment. 
Alongside developing aspirations and gaining the 
right skills, young people can also benefit significantly 
from meaningful work experience:
I think in relation to work experience there have 
been numerous studies done to show that if 
people get work experience in school, they’re 
less likely to be unemployed. They’re more likely 
to meet people who will be useful to them and 
form early relationships with potential mentors 
in businesses. Too often though most of the 
work experience schemes we come across are in 
retail – most young people don’t want to go into 
retail, and that’s totally fair enough. And also, 
most of them are done through family contacts. 
That’s a big problem. There is way too much of 
that going on.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
The Social Mobility Commission has also been critical 
of schools on this front, highlighting the damaging 
effects of ‘poor careers advice and work experience’.39 
The degree of insight that young people have into the 
working world can clearly have an influence on how 
they view the job market, and the goals that they set 
for themselves. If their only work experience prior to 
leaving school is highly limited and uninspiring, young 
people may not feel galvanised by the potential 
careers they can envisage.
38  Kintrea, K., St Clair, R. & Houston, M. (2011) ‘The influence of parents, places and poverty on educational attitudes and aspirations’, Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation report, pp. 8
39  “State of the Nation Report”, Social Mobility Commission. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-of-the-nation-2016
40  Prince’s Trust (2019) ‘The Prince’s Trust Ebay Youth Index 2019’, available online at: https://www.princes-trust.org.uk/about-the-trust/research-poli-
cies-reports/youth-index-2019?gclid=CjwKCAiA767jBRBqEiwAGdAOr_bNk9t-gwym--RZuZE90FSc2AT3eaw1mHFjhz9jX_oXu2VduGTVnxoCyV0QA-
vD_BwE [accessed 24/02/2019]
41  Lunghy, E., Osman, A., M. K., Musa, A., Angel, Silva, Che (2019) Insiders Looking Out: Solutions to Youth Violence from People who have Lived it, London: 
The Winch, pp. 25
42  Billingham (2018) Hackney Wick Through Young Eyes: What local people value, the problems they face, and what they want to change, London: Wick 
Award and Hackney Quest
Together, these factors can leave young people 
pessimistic and anxious about their prospects. A 
large-scale survey of young people across Britain 
recently undertaken by the Princes Trust found that 
nearly 75% of young people feel their generation 
is less certain about future employment than their 
parents; 53% worry that they are never going to be 
financially stable; and over a quarter feel that they 
are going to fail.40 The jobs that are open to young 
people may not be appealing to them, for a number 
of reasons. Young people in Camden working on 
the Take Back the Power report stated frankly that for 
many young people, the jobs available to them are 
‘unrewarding, low-paid and boring’.41 
Opportunities to gain income illegitimately can seem 
clearer and simpler than opportunities in the job 
market: young people from Hackney in one recent 
research report said that it is easier for young people 
to make money illegally than legally.42 If this remains 
the reality for many of our under-30s, we will continue 
to see far too many young people engaging in 
criminal activity rather than in work opportunities, and 
we will continue to suffer the effects of far too many 
young people committing acts of violence.
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Housing and Communities
“We need to build communities that involve 
rather than alienate young people” Safer Lives 
Survey Respondent
Many of the witnesses who gave evidence to the 
Commission spoke of the links between the economic 
situation that young people find themselves in, 
the psychological effects this has on them, and 
the behavioural tendencies that result. Housing is 
one fundamentally important feature of anyone’s 
economic circumstances: taken for granted by many, 
secure housing is often the base from which people 
build their lives, emotionally, financially, and literally. 
The insufficient supply of housing which is secure, 
affordable and high quality (especially in London) was 
commented upon by multiple witnesses.
For those in the most tenuous housing situations, a move 
to a better – if equally precarious – housing situation can 
be a primary concern. Housing can be an overwhelming 
preoccupation for those in the least fortunate situations, 
such that life aspirations can be shaped by the desire to 
get into just a slightly better home:
They’re not thinking that they can have a home in the 
way that many of us in this room have. I remember 
working with a young man who was in one of the 
residential units that I worked in, and his aspiration 
was to be in a B&B as his brother had been in a B&B. 
And, you know, that’s not acceptable.
(Early years, Education, and Employability)
Clearly, this witness felt that the considerable 
constraints placed on this young man’s ambitions by 
his housing circumstances were a significant barrier 
to his progress and development. It appears that the 
horizons of his aspiration were dictated to an extent 
by the housing prospects he was most familiar with: 
either a residential unit or a B&B.
The potential ramifications of housing insecurity on 
other areas of young people’s lives were made clear 
by one witness who highlighted the links between 
housing insecurity, work, and crime: 
From a homeless young person’s perspective, 
if you have managed to get a supported 
accommodation bed that’s absolutely brilliant. 
You’re learning skills, you want to move on, move 
on to your own accommodation. You may move on 
then to insecure private rented accommodation 
where the rents are far too high to live on minimum 
wage, which means that you’re pushed out of the 
employment market. Again, you don’t have any 
income and will be forced into crime again.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
43  https://www.plymouth.gov.uk/housing/privaterentedaccommodation/rentaffordablehousing
44  Valuation Office Agency (2019) Statistical Summary. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/private-rental-market-summary-statistics-
april-2018-to-march-2019 [Accessed 10 March 2020]
As this witness makes clear, moving on to higher 
quality housing and more independent living can 
bring significant risks and pitfalls. Renting privately 
can involve exorbitant costs, and substantial 
uncertainty. This can exacerbate poverty and intensify 
the temptation to seek money through illicit means 
as young people become effectively shut out of the 
employment market by their housing situation. The 
witness was not suggesting that young people should 
stay permanently in supported accommodation, of 
course, but they were emphasising that a housing 
market characterised by insecurity, precariousness 
and inflated costs is significantly exacerbating the 
challenges faced by vulnerable young people.
Given the conditions experienced by many young 
people in the private rental sector, council or social 
housing can be a highly preferable alternative, in terms 
of affordability, security and quality. Unfortunately, 
witnesses to the Commission emphasised that there is 
a chronic lack of such housing: 
There just isn’t the [council housing] stock 
available. That’s not just for young people as you 
know, that’s for all ages. For every house that’s 
bought through right to buy, there should be 
another council house built – it should be one to 
one, but actually it’s eight to one or something. 
That shows the number of the stock is just 
diminishing and diminishing and diminishing. 
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
I think developers have targets, and they try, they 
call it ‘affordable housing’, but affordable housing 
normally isn’t affordable in city centres. They 
don’t want to build social housing.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
The government definition of affordable rented housing 
is housing charged at ‘a rent of no more than 80 per 
cent of the local market rent (including service charges, 
where applicable)’.43 In March 2019, the median monthly 
rent in London was £1,49544 - 80% of which would still be 
wholly unaffordable to many of its young people. With 
insufficient council and social housing stock, massive 
rental costs, and a questionable statutory definition of 
affordability, young people’s quest to find somewhere 
to live can be futile and demoralising. 
As well as housing, witnesses to the Commission 
highlighted the growing costs of local activities 
which had previously been enjoyed by young 
people for free, further undermining the affordability 
of community life. One witness focused on the 
privatisation of public play spaces:
Even the parks are being taken over - companies 
have come in and run the football and the sports 
spaces now. And I live in this community – the kids 
used to go and play football there. Now you have 
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to pay to go on there, because it’s a MUGA, multi-
games area, and it’s all booked out to corporates. 
So kids get squeezed out.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
Growth in the cost of housing and of popular leisure 
activities are two examples of financial displacement: 
young people being squeezed out (as this witness 
put it) of the places they live or spend time in because 
they can no longer afford them. Similar concerns were 
expressed by young people themselves in recent 
research undertaken by London Youth. Their report 
concluded that young people in London are ‘hugely 
concerned about the lack of affordable housing’, 
and are conscious of ‘the impact of regeneration 
on the areas in which they live, including what this 
might mean for their ability to continue to live in the 
communities where they have grown up’.45 
Recent youth-led research undertaken in Hackney, East 
London, found similar concerns. One respondent said: 
‘people will have to move out, no young person will own 
a house’, ‘in London there’s no places to live, you cannot 
get into a place in London’.46 Even for young people who 
can stay in their home community, rapid demographic 
changes in their area prompted by regeneration and 
rising house prices – often forcing family members or 
friends to move elsewhere – can undermine their sense 
of belonging. Urban geographers have called this 
‘affective displacement’: a compromised sense of being 
part of your community, due to feeling progressively 
displaced by wealthier groups.47 This feeling was 
expressed in the Hackney study: young people 
reported that that they ‘don’t belong anymore’, that ‘the 
area is not really ours anymore’, and that ‘Hackney is no 
longer the Hackney I grew up in’.48
In short, witnesses were unequivocal in their views that 
decent, secure housing was a prerequisite to ensuring 
young people’s safety and well-being. One witness 
summed up the views and concerns of many who 
spoke with the Commission: 
Housing is fundamental to all of us, so whether 
or not you’re a young person who might end up 
being involved with crime…that is the absolute 
basis to make sure that we have fulfilling lives. 
And the lack of quality accommodation, whether 
or not it’s the private rented sector, or whether or 
not it’s in the local authority sector, it is a massive 
issue – the lack of it for our young people.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
45  London Youth (2017) ‘Young people’s capital of the world?’, available online at: http://londonyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Young-peoples-
capital-of-the-world-March-2017.pdf
46  Billingham (2018) Hackney Wick Through Young Eyes: What local people value, the problems they face, and what they want to change, London: Wick 
Award and Hackney Quest, pp. 56
47  Butcher, M. & Dickens, L. (2016) ‘Spatial dislocation and affective displacement: Youth perspectives on gentrification in London’, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 40, Issue 4, pp. 800-816
48  Billingham (2018) Hackney Wick Through Young Eyes: What local people value, the problems they face, and what they want to change, London: Wick 
Award and Hackney Quest.
49  APPG on Knife Crime (2019) New research draws link between youth service cuts and rising knife crime. [Online] [Accessed on 22nd November 2019] 
http://www.preventknifecrime.co.uk/news/
50  YMCA (2018) Youth and Consequences: A report examining Local Authority expenditure on youth services in England and Wales. [Online] [Accessed on 
22nd November 2019] https://www.ymca.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Youth-Consequences-v0.2.pdf
51  YMCA (2018) Youth and Consequences: A report examining Local Authority expenditure on youth services in England and Wales. [Online] [Accessed on 
22nd November 2019] https://www.ymca.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Youth-Consequences-v0.2.pdf
52  APPG on Knife Crime (2019) New research draws link between youth service cuts and rising knife crime. [Online] [Accessed on 22nd November 2019] 
http://www.preventknifecrime.co.uk/news/
Youth Services 
“There needs to be more opportunities for 
younger people - that’s why they get into 
gangs: there is nothing for people to do around 
here at night. There should be youth clubs to 
help kids stay out of trouble” Safer Lives Survey 
Respondent
The link between high quality youth services and 
a reduction in serious violence is increasingly 
well understood.49 Through our research and 
evidence gathering we have been able to build up a 
comprehensive picture of the role of youth services, 
and in this section we have sought to set out the 
key findings regarding the types of youth provision 
that play a positive role in reducing serious violence 
among young people, and considerations around 
how this provision is funded and delivered.
The witnesses in our evidence sessions made clear 
that there is no shortage of motivated individuals 
and organisations keen to support young people 
through the provision of high-quality youth services. 
Since 2010, however, public spending cuts have had a 
significant impact on youth services, as councils have 
sought to prioritise and protect ‘essential services’:
It’s not just little salami slices, that used to 
be the case – whole youth services are now 
disappearing; whole areas don’t have youth 
workers. This is dangerous. 
(Youth Services and Community Work)
While councils have seen their budgets reduced by 
up to 50% between 2010 and 2018, local government 
spending on youth services in England fell by 62%, 
equating to over £750m in cuts.50 From 2010 to 
2018, 600 youth clubs closed nationally, 3,500 youth 
workers lost their jobs, and there was an overall 
reduction of 139,000 places on youth programmes.51
There has been wide variation in cuts to the provision 
of youth services across the country, with some 
councils estimated to have cut youth budgets by as 
much as 91%.52 Across all of the evidence sessions, 
Commission witnesses linked the scale and impact 
of youth service cuts to escalating violence between 
young people: 
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When I was younger, youth club was a way for 
me to get out my aggression – it was a way for 
me to express myself and whatnot. There are no 
more youth clubs. From the day a young person 
is born to the day a young person picks up a 
knife something clearly went wrong in that young 
person’s life, and there’s no youth workers dealing 
with the mental health of that young person.
(Media, Music and Role Models)
It is worth noting that the ongoing APPG on Knife 
Crime, chaired by MP Sarah Jones, recently reported 
that the areas hit by the greatest cuts to youth services 
in recent years have been the areas subject to some 
the greatest increases in serious violence between 
young people.53 The top four areas for cuts to youth 
services – City of Wolverhampton (91%), City of 
Westminster (91%), Cambridgeshire County Council, 
(88%), and Wokingham Borough Council (81%), 
saw rises in knife crime of 87%, 47%, 95% and 99% 
respectively. 
Commission witnesses commented at length on the 
restructuring brought about by austerity in youth 
services and how this has affected the support and 
guidance available to young people at-risk of being 
drawn into serious violence. They discussed a shift 
in priority from early stage intervention to late-stage 
and short-term crisis intervention, accompanied by 
short-term funding cycles:
For me the teachable moment is an incredibly 
short window when young people, young men and 
young women are suddenly aware, often for the 
first time, of their vulnerability. They have had to 
create bravado, this mask while they are at home or 
on the streets, having grown up undoubtedly with 
incredible adversity through their childhood. So 
there’s definitely a teachable moment. 
(Public Health and Mental Health)
The “teachable moment” mentioned above refers 
to the unique opportunity afforded by a particular 
crisis in a young person’s life, such as an incident of 
hospitalisation following a stab wound. Against a 
backdrop of funding decimation, significant cash 
injections have been made in youth organisations 
operating in hospital accident and emergency 
departments to enable youth workers to engage 
young people who have been on the receiving end of 
serious violence.54 
While such “teachable moments” constitute 
important opportunities to connect with young 
people and provide much needed support, witnesses 
stressed that it should not come at the cost of long-
term early intervention, which attempts to support 
young people before they are involved in weapon 
carrying and serious violence:
It’s almost like until the kid’s in trouble then we 
won’t do anything; so let’s do the prevention work 
as well. 
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
This type of proactive youth work that involves 
ongoing support and guidance is increasingly scarce 
in the current climate of cuts to public spending: 
What’s happened since 2010 has been the 
dismantling of youth services across the country. 
We know from reports that were released last 
year that over £300m has disappeared, possibly 
more since then. And what that has created is a 
fractured approach across the country.
(Youth Services and Community Work)
One source of optimism came from those discussing 
the potential role of faith groups in supporting young 
people. Witnesses described the strong desire and 
capacity for faith organisations to step into the gaps 
left by cuts to frontline youth services, but highlighted 
the need for additional training specifically around 
violence reduction: 
There are around 50,000 churches in the UK, 
40,000 of them have their own buildings… for 
me it is a no brainer. You’ve got faith groups who 
could actually step into that gap. They are willing; 
a lot of them have youth groups already. A lot of 
them are very well connected to the communities 
which are being impacted by youth violence. But 
the problem is that a lot of those faith groups, 
whether it’s churches or mosques or whatever, 
they’re not equipped, and they’re not trained 
to really deal with the issue of serious youth 
violence.
(Housing, Communities and Faith Groups)
The evidence sessions revealed a picture of youth 
services characterised by short-term and inconsistent 
funding and planning cycles, which follow the 
agendas set by electoral politics and a small number 
of influential funding bodies. This hampers the 
ability of youth services and particularly grassroots 
organisations to engage in long-term, early stage 
intervention that builds consistent relationships and 
trust with vulnerable young people: 
Because we’re running back-to-back project, 
project, project, there’s no sustainability… 
the real work happens in those one-to-one 
relationships that are built, and the trust that is 
built within those. And that’s something that for 
the last five years I’ve not seen.
(Youth Services and Community Work)
Another issue raised by witnesses was the extent to 
which significant resources in the youth sector 
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were being spent not on frontline provision, but on 
bureaucratic and professionalised bid writing and 
back-end programme evaluations. This has led to 
small grassroots local charities being squeezed out 
by larger national organisations that have sufficient 
resources to employ dedicated teams of bid-writers 
that can out-compete smaller charities, at least on 
paper. While larger organisations have become savvy 
to the nuances of successful bid writing, witnesses 
warned that in practice the services they deliver often 
rely on the exploitation of smaller charities:
We’ve got really large organisations that don’t 
have any connection with the local communities 
that get funded to do the work, and they don’t 
help the young people. And then they try to come 
to organisations like mine to say ‘where are the 
young people?’. But we don’t have any resources 
to undertake the work.
(Youth Services and Community Work)
One witness highlighted that if the shortcomings 
of the current provision of youth services are to be 
addressed, then long term strategies need to be 
developed that are independent of and immune to 
the whims of short-termist political cycles:
I’m making a plea for a 20-year plan. And it needs 
to be a 20-year plan that is immune from electoral 
cycles, and is immune from politics big and small 
‘p’, where funding and leadership and strategy 
are guaranteed and sustainable. Because when 
you’re dealing with issues that have a generation 
or more in the making, barring miracles, 
pretending that they’re going to take less than a 
generation to fix is just a fool’s errand.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
55  Rahman, K. and Robinson, M. (2018) Bank Holiday Bloodbath. Mail Online. Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5701127/Bank-Holi-
day-bloodbath-ELEVEN-gun-knife-acid-attacks-Britain-weekend.html; see further Gordon, F. (2018) Children, Young People and the Press in a Transi-
tioning Society: Representations, Reactions and Criminalisation. London: Springer. 
56  Lazarus, B. (2019) Blood on his hands: How privately educated bishop’s son and ex BBC DJ Tim Westwood champions drill music gangs behind a 
sickening wave of violence on the streets of Britain. Mail Online. Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6635923/Blood-hands-private-
ly-educated-Tim-Westwood-champions-drill-music-gangs.html
Media, Music and Role Models
“Young people are actually a lot more 
approachable and kinder than they’re made 
out to be in the media – we’re an interesting 
and creative group that deserve more positive 
recognition” Safer Lives Survey Respondent
Utilising terms such as ‘bloodbath’, mainstream media 
outlets often produce sensationalist reports that run 
the risk of glamourising serious violence between 
young people.55 One witness, however, highlighted 
that in terms of its influence on young people, the role 
of the mainstream media is sometimes overstated: 
The other thing to remember is Generation 
X is a digital-only generation. They’re online 
seven hours a day with three devices each, and 
they’re consuming online brands like Netflix and 
YouTube. They’re not even on mainstream TV 
and radio. So when we put mainstream media in 
the dock, those young people that are affected 
by this youth violence, they’re not on those 
platforms, so there’s a disconnect there. 
(Media, Music and Role Models)
While many young people might not be influenced 
directly by its reports, mainstream media outlets 
can nevertheless exert a powerful influence over 
public opinion (and as a consequence, politicians), 
which in turn can serve to shape and constrain policy 
agendas. A good example of this has been the 
recent preoccupation of a number of mainstream 
media outlets with ‘drill’56 – a genre of music created 
by young people allegedly involved in urban street 
gangs and associated illicit activities such as drug 
distribution. One witness described the role drill 
music played in some teenagers’ lives:
Drill is reaffirming what it is like to be a teenage 
boy, so reaffirming their daily lives, entrenching 
their thoughts about the most extreme aspects 
of what it’s like to be a teenage boy living in a 
housing estate in London…is it any surprise that 
boys like that -- often from single parent homes, 
constantly told they’re a problem in school, 
vilified in mainstream media -- are seeking a 
way of gaining recognition, respect and a voice 
with which to vent their frustrations. Drill music 
reinforces ideas about violence and at worst 
encourages it, but it doesn’t cause it.
(Media, Music and Role Models)
The role of drill music in encouraging or causing 
violence remains a contested topic, with some studies 
indicating that drill both constitutes a reflection of the 
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violence already present in young people’s lives, as 
well as having the potential to be a proximate driver of 
further violence.57
One witness drew attention to the fact that many 
young, and predominantly black, men in London 
use drill music as a means of making money, in the 
context of high unemployment rates in BAME (Black, 
Asian and minority ethnic people) communities. 
They highlighted that if the police are perceived to 
be suppressing drill music, this could have negative 
ramifications, particularly for young black people’s 
perceptions of the police:
Drill music is for a lot of young black men in 
London at the moment one of the only means 
of making an income. You know, there’s high 
unemployment in black communities, up to 
50% in some areas. A bit of music that you can 
put online and make some cash because other 
people are buying it. If you hear the police 
slamming that, it’s quite important to understand 
the effect of that on young black people. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
While there was some disagreement on the extent 
to which certain drill tracks uploaded to social media 
ought to be censored on the grounds of their content 
(for example, tracks that contained direct threats against 
other individuals or groups), most witnesses agreed that 
focusing time, energy and resources on the suppression 
of music was not prudent with other pressing priorities: 
Music is the tip of a huge iceberg. Its negative 
influence over young teenage boys in particular 
only becomes activated by bigger environmental 
forces…we can do better than being distracted 
by their music taste.
(Media, Music and Role Models)
Similar views were expressed in relation to social 
media more broadly. Reflecting the findings of recent 
studies,58 witnesses generally recognised that social 
media played a role in catalysing and triggering 
incidents of serious violence between young people: 
The situation now is that videos are posted online. 
Tensions are raised, and people are goaded into 
violent action. Recently in London parents have 
had to contend with the murder of their child, 
whilst opposing gangs have been celebrating 
what they consider to be a success online. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
Some witnesses suggested that ‘control’ ought to be 
exercised over some of the more extreme content 
uploaded to social media, but neglected to expand 
on what such control might constitute in practice: 
57  Irwin-Rogers, K., Densley, J. and Pinkney, C. (2018) Social media and gang violence. In J. L. Ireland, P. Birch and C. A. Ireland (Eds.) International Hand-
book on Aggression. Abingdon: Routledge. 
58  Irwin-Rogers, K. and Pinkney, C. (2017) Social Media as a catalyst and trigger for youth violence. London: Catch22. 
59  House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2019) Serious Youth Violence. Sixteenth Report of Session 2017-19. Available at: https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/1016/1016.pdf
60  Redmon-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions, 1999, 7 BHRC 375, para 20, per Sedley LJ.
A 14-year-old gets beaten up. That gets filmed 
and put on Instagram. This child then suffers 
shame because of people viewing that on 
Instagram and mocking him etc. He then, he’s 
highly motivated to seek retribution, to get a knife 
and get his own back as it were on those who 
beat him up. So the control of humiliating videos 
on those media I think is one thing which we can 
do in the very short term.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
Many of the lyrics expressed in drill music videos 
are likely to violate YouTube’s own guidelines, which 
state that the platform will remove malicious content 
involving ‘hurtful or negative comments’ designed 
to ‘humiliate someone’. Social media companies, 
however, have been slow to deploy the resources 
necessary to enforce their own guidelines, often 
placing the burden on platform users to report 
content, rather than proactively scrutinising the 
content uploaded to their platforms.59
If the police present themselves as a primary actor in 
censoring drill music, then it is crucial that free speech 
rights are protected. Common law precedent is clear 
that ‘free speech includes not only the inoffensive 
but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the 
heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative’.60 
This pivotal statement, however, contains the caveat: 
‘provided it does not tend to provoke violence’. 
Whether drill ‘tends to provoke violence’ is therefore 
the crux of the matter when it comes to determining 
whether a particular track ought to be censored. 
Several witnesses discussed the importance of 
prosocial role models, and their absence in the lives 
of many young people who are involved in serious 
violence. One witness suggested that there was a 
lack of BAME role models in the workplace, largely 
because people from a BAME background faced 
workplace discrimination that affected both rates of 
pay and the ability to reach positions of seniority:
The idea of having role models within the 
workplace hasn’t been discussed enough, 
I think. Because we have quite a chronic 
misrepresentation of BAME people within 
employment, and there’s a very clear glass ceiling 
and ethnic minority pay gaps, the glass cliff as 
it’s called, to get to the top…we need to have 
more people that look like and come from the 
same backgrounds as these young people in the 
working world, and get them more visible in that 
space. But also it’s about how you communicate 
what is going well, what is happening and what 
opportunities young people can take – that’s not 
being done effectively enough yet.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
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While recent drives to improve the quality and 
quantity of apprenticeships for young people were 
praised, some witnesses thought the young people 
benefitting from these schemes were unlikely to be 
those drawn for the cohort of young people currently 
involved in serious violence. To reach this cohort, 
one witness suggested doing more to tap into the 
potential of social media platforms: 
I’ll come back to the mentorship again and the 
role model point, because it is just so critical…the 
government has just spent a lot of money on a ‘Go 
Far on Apprenticeship’ campaign – that’s great, 
but it’s not going to be half as effective as doing 
something actually a lot rawer. Social media is 
completely essential to this in terms of how you 
reach young people from atypical backgrounds 
who often aren’t engaging with formal processes.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
Other witnesses also stressed the importance of 
prosocial role models, particularly in the lives of 
BAME young people, but directed attention toward 
the role of school curriculums that focused myopically 
on white historical figures, at the expense of people 
of colour:
Finally, some witnesses argued that the problem 
wasn’t a lack of prosocial BAME role models per 
se, but that the media – like the education system – 
neglected to highlight the achievement of people 
from a BAME background:
We’ve got role models, but what we don’t have 
is representation in the media. We don’t have 
an interest in the successful lives of people from 
many diverse backgrounds. 
(Media, Music and Role Models)
Policing and the Criminal Justice System
“If relationships were to improve between 
young people and the police, there would be 
less crime and young people would feel safer 
and more likely to ask for help” Safer Lives 
Survey Respondent
While the Commission recognises the need to avoid 
framing violence reduction as a narrow suppression 
and enforcement issue, both policing and the wider 
criminal justice system have the potential to play key 
roles in reducing serious violence between young 
people. 
Many of our witnesses highlighted that in order to 
effectively tackle serious violence, the police need 
to be able to depend on the support, trust and 
confidence of young people: 
Engaging with young people and children is 
critical for the Met. Due to the size and scale of 
London we have millions of interactions with 
young people each year…so winning the trust 
and confidence of young people is key for the 
Met to operate effectively in London. When 
trust breaks down that is a significant concern 
for us. Trust is something that’s hard to win, but 
easily lost.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
Despite winning the trust and confidence of young 
people being a clear priority of police forces across 
the country, the Commission found that many young 
people hold relatively negative perceptions of the 
police. For example, findings from our Safer Lives 
survey revealed that less than half of all young people 
responding to the survey agreed or very much 
agreed with the statement ‘The police make the lives 
of young people safer’. 
Some witnesses argued that far from providing a 
means of protection, engaging with the police had 
the potential to make young people less safe:
To go and report something to a policeman 
is signing your death warrant, so you’d 
never ever going to be able to break that. 
That’s something deep embedded in every 
community where you do not grass…so that’s 
something you’re going to find really hard to 
change…because you’re basically saying to 
someone, ‘sign your death warrant’, and their 
family’s possibly as well. 
(Youth Services and Community Work)
Another key issue at the heart of young people’s 
perceptions of police legitimacy is stop and search. 
The police’s use of stop and search has a long and 
contentious history, particularly in England’s capital 
(see Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010). 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that of the 
issues discussed across the six evidence sessions, 
stop and search was among the most contested. 
Some experts argued vociferously in favour of stop 
and search:
I believe that stop and search is a vital police 
tactic that saves lives. In the past 12 months, 
4,200 weapons have been taken off the streets 
of London through the use of this tactic…
who knows how many more families would be 
grieving the loss of a loved one had these 4,200 
weapons not been removed from our streets.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
Accompanied by a straightforward rationale – the 
removal of potentially lethal weapons from the 
streets – these stark statistics appear to provide 
strong support for the continued use of stop and 
search. Yet quantitative data on the potential for stop 
and search to reduce violent crime is limited. 
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In 2009-10, when the rate of stop and search in 
London was relatively high (25 per 1,000 people), 
there were 130 murders in the capital. By 2014-15, 
when the rate of stop and search in London had 
fallen to 10 per 1,000 people, the capital saw fewer 
murders: 84 (Full Fact, 2018; Home Office, 2019). 
In other words, murders in London were falling at 
the same time that the use of stop and search was 
significantly declining. 
A similar pattern has been seen in other cities 
across the globe. In New York, for example, stop 
and search underwent a dramatic decline between 
2011 and 2016, from 685,724 to just 12,404 (New 
York Civil Liberties Union, 2019). If stop and search 
helped to reduce violence, we would have expected 
homicides in New York to have risen significantly as 
its use plummeted. The opposite is true: homicides 
in New York declined from 769 in 2011 to 630 in 2016 
(Disaster Centre, 2017). 
It is worth highlighting that one can identify other 
periods during which stop and search has declined 
and murder rates have gone up, and vice versa. 
Owing to the serious limitations associated with 
relying on such simple correlations, researchers have 
conducted more sophisticated quantitative analysis 
using a decade’s worth of data on crime rates and 
stop and search in London. The authors concluded 
that: ‘claims that [stop and search] is an effective 
way to control and deter offending seem misplaced 
(Tiratelli et al., 2018).
One potential contributing factor to the seeming 
ineffectiveness of stop and search in deterring 
weapon possession and violence is that objective 
shifts in rates of stop and search may not translate 
straightforwardly into young people’s subjective 
experiences and perceptions:
61  Myhill, A. and Quinton, P. (2011) It’s a fair cop? Police legitimacy, publication cooperation, and crime reduction. [Online] [Accessed 22nd November 2019] 
https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Fair_cop_Full_Report.pdf
Despite the huge drop we’ve had in stop and 
search over the last few years, only 16% of 
young BAME people think that stop and search 
is being used less than it was five years ago…
and nearly two fifths thought it was actually 
being used more. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
Even assuming that young people typically engage 
in relatively rational decision-making when choosing 
between different courses of action – accurately 
weighing up the costs and benefits of each of their 
options – if they are unable to detect shifts in the 
levels with which police officers are conducting 
stop and search in their area, this would significantly 
undermine the potential of stop and search being an 
effective deterrent. 
Several experts offered explanations for why the use 
of stop and search could be counter-productive. 
First and foremost, people highlighted the potential 
for stop and search to alienate young people, and 
particularly Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) 
young people, from the police: 
What we do know about stop and search?...
the huge impact that it has on young people’s 
trust in the police, and particularly young BAME 
people…we conducted a range of interviews with 
young BAME people who have been stopped 
and searched, and they reported feelings of 
victimisation, humiliation and harassment. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
Even in some police forces where they’ve said 
that they’re not particularly policing drugs, we’re 
still seeing 60%-70% of stop and searches being 
used for drugs. And that is also driving up the 
disproportionality because black people are 
more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs. 
And that’s despite the fact that white people are 
actually more likely to be found carrying drugs.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
[Stop and search] alienates black and ethnic 
minority youth from the police, when they are 
precisely the sorts of young people that police 
need to give them information, to support them in 
their job. So that’s why I think it’s very dangerous. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
Studies have shown that if trust, confidence, and 
perceptions of police legitimacy decline as a result of 
intensified stop and search, this can have a marked 
effect on the people’s willingness to cooperate 
with the police and obey the law.61 Therefore, if the 
ultimate goal is to reduce levels of violence, the likely 
effect of stop and search on perceptions of police 
legitimacy ought to be factored into any decisions 
about the use of this police tactic. 
34
A number of witnesses suggested that there were 
better ways of gathering intelligence and reducing 
the risk of violence between young people than 
stop and search. Some, for example, highlighted 
the importance of identifying positive spaces of 
interaction between young people and the police: 
Now our school in Haringey has got an absolutely 
outstanding PCSO who’s been there for a couple 
of years, forged really positive relationships with 
the young people. They go to him now if there’s 
an issue on the street. They go to him now with 
intelligence if they need to. 
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
In summary, the most recent and robust research 
suggests that stop and search is of limited use in 
reducing rates of violent crime.62 In addition, high 
rates of stop and search leave many young people 
feeling discriminated against and violated by an 
institution that is supposed to help them to feel safe 
and protected. 
Seen in this context, it would be prudent to avoid 
high rates of stop and search that are prompted by 
suspicion and hostility, and focus police officers’ 
time, energy and resources into forging constructive 
relationships with young people through proactive 
and positive interactions across a range of public 
spaces including schools and youth centres. 
The Commission recognises the difficulty of such 
work in the context of significant cuts to policing 
budgets in recent years. Between March 2010 and 
March 2018, cuts to police funding led to the loss 
of 21,732 officers.63 Losing these officers has made 
it more difficult to move beyond reactive policing, 
which is concerning given that several witnesses 
discussed the crucial nature of child-centred and 
community-based policing:
We think community policing is an absolutely 
critical part of the system for all the reasons that 
other people have said. Community policing 
is critical to community confidence and the 
legitimacy of the whole law enforcement family.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
At the heart of [child centred policing] is a key 
principle, which is that children should be treated 
as children first in every encounter. Policing 
should be professional, and should look behind 
the behaviour…And the police should recognise 
that young people are not really adults: there are 
different vulnerabilities, there are different needs 
of communication – trauma is something that we 
take really seriously.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
62  Tiratelli, M., Quinton, P. and Bradford, B. (2018) Does Stop and Search Deter Crime? Evidence From Ten Years of London-wide Data. The British Journal 
of Criminology. 58(5): 1212-1231. 
63  Home Office (2018) Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 2018. [Online] [Accessed 4th February 2020] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/726401/hosb1118-police-workforce.pdf
Let’s not pay lip service to community policing. 
We have to engage. We have lost great swathes 
of communities that I police; we’ve lost it. We 
have to start somewhere, and my view is we start 
in schools.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
The Prime Minister’s recent announcement of plans to 
recruit an additional 20,000 officers is a welcome one 
in this regard, particularly given the potential for these 
officers to be engaged in the type of work described 
by our witnesses above. 
Another key topic discussed in our evidence sessions 
concerned the state of prisons and the secure estate 
for children and young people. Prisons were generally 
described as places that lacked the resources to 
provide any kind of meaningful, prosocial training 
or education to the majority of prisoners, which 
exacerbated existing problems: 
Far too many boys are being locked in their cells 
for more than 22 hours each day and not able 
to get into classrooms…increasing self-harm, 
increasing use of restraint, increasing use of 
segregation of young adults. Custody has the 
worst reconviction rates of any criminal justice 
disposal, and so it should be a last resort. But 
for those who are in it we really need to focus on 
those basic human needs being met. Because if 
they’re not you’re going to end up with increased 
resentment, frustration, trauma, and a sense of 
hopelessness, which is not what we want to end 
up with a young person coming out of custody.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
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A number of witnesses lamented the low-quality of 
education provided in the secure estate, but provided 
necessary steps for improvement, as well as examples 
of existing best practice:
My final point is actually around technology for 
education in custodial establishments: the lack of 
the internet, the lack of any technology – this has 
got to change. Particularly for [young people], 
this is how learning should be done; this is how it 
can be individualised, how it can be made more 
engaging, so we really need to think very carefully 
about a big review of what technology is there.
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
I think the thing that makes me sad sometimes 
about prison education is this real idea of this 
low aspiration. That it should reflect a traditional 
classroom. It’s about literacy, numeracy, 
worksheets, but it’s preparing people for low 
skilled work…the work that we’ve been doing, 
for example in Isis Young Offenders, where 
Goldsmith’s University have been going in, 
students have been studying alongside students 
at the prison. Suddenly they’re thinking actually 
university could be a place for me that have never 
ever thought about university before, and so 
really proving that aspiration is key. 
(Early Years, Education and Employability)
It needs to be recognised, however, that before any 
meaningful academic education can take place, many 
young people embroiled in the secure estate require 
serious support around trauma and mental health. 
Often a key factor in explaining their offences, trauma 
generated by early adverse childhood experiences, 
such as witnessing or experiencing physical or sexual 
abuse, is commonplace among those in the secure 
estate, and therefore likely to pose a significant barrier 
to education.64
Aside from needing to improve education and 
employability training across the secure estate, 
another issue that formed a significant barrier to 
people living healthy and prosocial post-prison lives 
was the stigma of a criminal record. One witness 
highlighted that the criminal record regime in 
England and Wales was one of the most severe in 
the world, and consequently served to keep those 
released from prison ‘trapped in a life of crime’:
There is a group of young people, probably now 
around the age of 25, who badly want to leave the 
life of crime behind, but because we’ve got the 
most aggressive regime other than Texas - of not 
being able to leave your criminal record behind, 
64  Chitsabesan, P. Kroll, L., Bailey, S., Kenning, C., Sneider, S., Macdonald, W. and Theodosiou, L. (2006) Mental Health Needs of Young Offenders in Cus-
tody and in the Community. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 188: 534-540; Youth Justice Board (2007) Accommodation needs and experiences. Youth 
Justice Board, London. 
65  Amnesty International (2018) Trapped in the Matrix: Secrecy, stigma and bias in the Met’s Gang Database. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/
files/reports/Trapped%20in%20the%20Matrix%20Amnesty%20report.pdf; Williams, P. (2015) Criminalising the Other: challenging the race-gang nex-
us. Race & Class. 56(3): 18-35; Williams, P. and Clarke, B. (2016) Dangerous Associations: Joint enterprise, gangs and racism. London: Centre for Crime 
and Justice Studies.
66  Metropolitan Police (2020) Stop and search dashboard. [Online] [Accessed 2nd February 2020] https://www.met.police.uk/sd/stats-and-data/met/stop-
and-search-dashboard/
of not being able to seal your criminal record 
from employers - you’re trapped in a life of crime 
because you can’t get a job.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
A theme that echoed across all of the Commission’s 
evidence sessions was that of ethnicity. More 
specifically, witnesses were keen to highlight that 
those from BAME backgrounds faced additional 
barriers and challenges in their lives, as well as 
potential discrimination. One witness drew our 
attention to the fact that disproportionality in the 
secure estate had increased, arguing that diversionary 
policies had primarily benefited white young people:
Diversion and preventative approaches have 
only served to benefit white people, and to 
the detriment of black, Asian minority ethnic 
individuals. So what we see is increasing 
disproportionality, disparity within the system… 
there’s a virtue to the gang, and it’s appropriate to 
say this: the virtue to the gang is that it can secure 
the convictions of groups of young black and 
brown individuals who are seen as engaging in 
violent behaviour.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
The use of the term ‘gang’ to label groups of 
predominantly BAME young people has been criticised 
in a number of recent studies, which suggest that ‘gang 
lists’ such as the Met’s Gang Matrix are means by which 
the police target their resources on young people 
from particular communities in a manner that lacks 
transparency and due process.65 Similarly, the practice 
of stop and search, which is predominantly conducted 
on suspicion of drug possession,66 was criticised by one 
witness on the basis that it disproportionately targets 
BAME young people:  
I made reference to cannabis use as a gateway 
drug - it’s a gateway into the criminal justice 
system for black and Asian young men. 
Essentially, [black and Asian young men] smoke 
cannabis, there’s a stop and search, ‘oh and by 
the way we found X, Y and Z’ – these become the 
strategies by which we pull [BAME] individuals 
into the criminal justice system.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
In addition to the criminalising potential of gang lists 
and high rates of stop and search conducted on 
suspicion of drug possession, the recent creation of 
Knife Crime Prevention Orders (a late addition to the 
Offensive Weapons Act 2019) holds further potential 
to drag significant numbers of young people into the 
criminal justice system. These orders can be imposed 
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on children as young as 12 on a balance of probabilities 
judgement, and are highly likely to result in children 
and young people being criminalised for behaviour 
that would otherwise have fallen below the threshold 
required to impose criminal justice sanctions.67
Supporting the conclusions of a well-established 
body of literature68 – as well as the findings of 
our Safer Lives Survey (see Appendix C) – several 
witnesses recognised the close link between illicit 
drug markets and serious violence: 
Undoubtedly there is a link between drugs and 
violence, and we see that link. Drugs are very 
profitable. You fight to keep your market and at 
all costs you’ll use what it takes. And I think we’re 
seeing in London and maybe elsewhere across 
the UK the purity of cocaine was going up, the 
purity of cannabis is going up. It’s becoming 
stronger, it’s becoming more potent, and that 
drives violence because it’s unregulated, it’s 
unrestricted, and you’ve got to watch your patch.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
In short, to prevent conflict and violence, the flow of 
the vast majority of goods and services across our 
economy is regulated and governed by legislation, 
contracts and courts. Because many drugs have been 
prohibited, however, those involved in the distribution 
of these drugs do not have recourse to contracts 
and courts; instead, they rely on serious violence to 
defend their business interests and settle disputes.69
One witness drew attention to the fact that under 
drug prohibition, some drugs had significantly 
increased in strength, posing a greater threat to 
young people’s mental well-being:  
67  Irwin-Rogers, K. and Billingham, L. (2020) From social media to mattering: Reframing the narrative around serious violence between young people. 
Onati Special Issue: ‘Youth Violence’ reframed: Disrupting Discourses; Standing Committee for Youth Justice (2019) SCYJ Submission to Consultation 
on Knife Crime Prevention Orders Guidance. Available at: http://scyj.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FINAL-SCYJ-Submission-to-Consulta-
tion-on-Knife-Crime-Prevention-Orders-Guidance.pdf
68  Irwin-Rogers, K. (2019) Illicit drug markets, Consumer Capitalism and the Rise of Social Media: A Toxic Trap for Young People. Critical Criminology. 
27(4): 591-610; Whittaker, A., Densley, J., Cheston, L., Tyrell, T., Higgins, M., Felix-Baptiste, C. and Havard, T. (2019) Reluctant Gangsters Revisited: The 
Evolution of Gangs from Postcodes to Profits. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research. 1-22.
69  European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2019) EU Drug Markets Report 2019. Available at: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/2019/
drug-markets
I don’t know if everybody’s aware here, but 
cannabis that probably we recreationally used 
in the ‘80s and ‘90s was 1.4% THC content. It’s 
now 10 times that, and that’s what the kids are 
smoking day in, day out. 
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
While opinion was divided on the precise ways in 
which drug policy could be improved, witnesses 
generally agreed that it would be prudent to explore 
alternative approaches to reducing the harms 
associated with drugs, learning lessons from other 
jurisdictions and basing policy not on ideology but 
the best evidence available:
We are going to have to follow the evidence 
[on drug policy]. Does the evidence tell us that 
actually we’re doing more harm than good in 
terms of what we’re doing? Stop and searching 
people, and arresting people and throwing them 
into prison because of smoking cannabis or 
perhaps having a few grams of cocaine on them – 
has that made the problem any better?
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
What I don’t understand is why we don’t learn the 
lessons from other countries, which have been 
very successful about decriminalising drugs, and 
reducing harm.
(Policing and Criminal Justice)
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Poverty and Inequality 
“Young people living in poverty and hardship 
go through and do things they would not 
necessarily do to make money. These things 
pose risks, however, some young people are so 
desperate they don’t care about the risks.” Safer 
Lives Survey Respondent
While the Commission did not hold an evidence 
session specifically on the issues of poverty and 
inequality, both were recurring themes throughout 
many witness statements. One witness spoke about 
the ‘shame of poverty’, arguing that child poverty 
was best conceptualised as a form of violence 
inflicted on children:
The shame of poverty, deprivation: of wanting 
things, of seeing things that they can’t have; of 
the free school meals, that’s often talked about – 
how people on free school meals feel the shame 
around it. The violent impact on that young 
person’s life is something I think you also need to 
consider.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
Shame has been identified as a fundamental and 
significant driver of violence in a well-established 
body of literature.70 Some theories linking shame to 
violence suggest that acts of violence begin with an 
individual feeling a sense of rejection – in this case, 
rejection by a society that allows some of its young 
people to grow up in poverty while others enjoy 
the head-start and benefits that come accompany 
extreme wealth. Such rejection elicits feelings of 
shame, to which many young people respond with 
anger, which then manifests in acts of violence.71 
70  Gilligan, J. (2003) Shame, Guilt and Violence. Social Research. 70(4): 1149-1180. 
71  Thomas, H. E. (1995) Experiencing a Shame Response as a Precursor to Violence. Bulletin American Academy Psychiatry Law. 23(4): 587-593. 
72  Child Poverty Action Group (2019) Child poverty in London – Key Facts http://www.cpag.org.uk/campaigns/child-poverty-london/keyfacts
73  New Policy Institute. (2017). London’s poverty profile: Inequality. www.londonspovertyprofile.org.uk. Accessed February 01, 2019.
It is of significant concern, therefore, that in London 
alone there are over 700,000 children growing up 
in relative poverty.72 Indeed, inequality in the UK’s 
capital city is stark: the top 10% of households 
in London command a combined wealth of £260 
billion, whereas the bottom 10% are indebted by 
£1.3 billion.73 
The stark divide between rich and poor was raised 
by many witnesses, some of whom discussed the 
role of modern technology in exposing the blatant 
gulfs in wealth:
Inequality is a critical issue. Not only do we see 
that in cities where rich and poor people are 
living right next to each other, but things like 
information technology makes it very easy now 
for people to see what the rich have…people are 
often facing a stark issue around those that have 
and those that have not. Relative poverty as well 
as absolute poverty is another driver of violence 
that can be addressed.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
The visceral experience of a childhood lived in 
poverty was highlighted by one of the Commission’s 
young witnesses who had recently been released 
from prison for committing a serious act of violence: 
I live on a grey estate where it’s normal for me to 
see blood stains on the floor. It’s normal for me to 
see used condoms on the floor. It’s normal for me 
to see even quite blatant gang wars happening 
on this estate. But then literally right across the 
way you can see a house – right across my road 
there’s a beautiful house with a garage and a 
drive. They’ve got their own trees in the back 
yard and pools and everything, and it’s right in 
front of me. 
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That massive difference started to play with my 
head so much, because I just couldn’t understand 
it. It was just too vast for me to understand how, 
it just kept on making me think, and also ask my 
friends, is this life? Is this really what we’ve come 
to settle for? And obviously when you’re going 
down that road with a young mind, a mind that at 
the time can’t do anything, you’re just realising it, 
it messes with you even more.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
Some witnesses highlighted other routes by which 
poverty could lead to violence. One witness, for 
example, discussed the role of poverty in increasing 
the likelihood of young men being drawn into illicit 
activities such as drug dealing and robbery:  
Being a young man if you come from a single 
parent house, it may be difficult for your parent 
to be able to afford certain clothing or the top 
mobile phones and stuff, which then makes you a 
target for other young people to pick on. That can 
affect mental health, and also lead you down the 
path into drug dealing or robbery just to get what 
you think you need.
(Public Health and Mental Health)
The fast money that young people can make from 
drug distribution provides an incredibly powerful 
pull on those living in poverty, despite the fact that 
their involvement significantly increases the risk of 
being the victims or perpetrators of serious violence.74 
The pull of illicit drug markets is all the greater when 
young people feel that they lack control and influence 
in their lives – a deficit neatly summed up by one of 
our witnesses in their closing statement:
We need to understand [young people’s] sense 
of powerlessness in society as a whole and 
their inability to affect any kind of change in any 
aspect of their life. That lack of hope, the lack of 
being able to influence anything – that’s really 
something that needs to be addressed.
(Youth Services and Community Work)
74  Irwin-Rogers, K. (2019) Illicit drug markets, Consumer Capitalism and the Rise of Social Media: A Toxic Trap for Young People. Critical Criminology. 
27(4): 591-610; Irwin-Rogers, K., Decker, S., Rostami, A., Stephenson, S., and Van Hellemont, E. (2019) In I. Vojnovic, A. Pearson, G. Asiki, G. DeVerteuil 
and A. Adriana (Eds.) Handbook of Global Urban Health. New York: Routledge. Pp. 484-508. 
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Part 2
The Economic and Social Cost of Serious 
Youth Violence
40
1. Motivation and Summary
Public resources are scarce relative to the demands 
on them, even when dealing with an issue as serious 
as Youth Violence, hence the need for a methodology 
to guide the best and optimal allocation of such 
resources amongst its competing uses, e.g. the NHS, 
Police, Schools and Social Services. This applies 
equally to any public service or body, for example, it 
applies to the allocation of police resources dealing 
with the multitude of potential crimes.  The police 
need to decide how much resource is allocated 
to preventing each crime.  The well-established 
methodology of ‘economic and social cost-benefit 
analysis’ known as CBA75, is the gold standard for 
this type of assessment and evaluation. This CBA 
methodology76  will be used in the analysis in this 
part of the report to assess, evaluate and quantify - in 
monetary terms – some of the main economic and 
social costs of serious youth violence.  
The analysis here will focus only on incidents and 
offences of youth violence (offences committed by 
young people aged 24 or under) that involve the use 
of a knife instrument or a gun.  This does mean that 
the estimates of the costs of serious youth violence 
reported here are lower than they would otherwise be 
if including other serious violence.  
The levels of such violence (in particular knife crime) 
have been on the rise over the past several years, and 
by 2017, the level has reached such a critical point that 
the Prime Minister at the time, Theresa May, held an 
emergency Serious Violence Summit77 in April 2019.  
As things stand, without any significant deployment 
of new and additional resources, it is reasonable to 
assume that the current high levels of serious youth 
violence are unlikely to reduce in any significant way 
over the coming months and years. 
As an introduction to this part of the report, here are 
some of the main findings:
We established that the total economic and social 
cost of serious youth violence across England and 
Wales in 2014/15 was at least £440 million, but 
more likely in the region of £790 million.  The first 
number is an under-estimate as it is calculated using 
only crimes recorded by the Police, which omits the 
large volume of non-fatal serious youth violence 
incidents that are not reported to the Police.  These 
non-reported incidents are estimated from the 
British Crime Survey78, in order to establish a more 
accurate estimate of the total volume of offences 
75  Boardman, A.E. et al, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 5th Edition, 2018.
76  Boardman, A.E. et al, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 5th Edition, 2018.
77  https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-opening-statement-at-serious-violence-summit-1-april-2019
78  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/british-crime-survey-methodology
actually carried out and to show the real magnitude 
of the total economic and social cost, which is the 
higher number. That said, both of these numbers are 
substantial by any measure.
In 2018/19, the total economic and social cost of 
serious youth violence across England and Wales 
was at least £700 million, but more likely in the 
region of £1.3 billion. This means that the total cost 
rose by well over 50% between the year 2014/15 
and the year 2018/19.  There is a direct correlation 
between this growth and the magnitude of the 
growth in serious youth violence over the same 
period. 
Over the full period of the last eleven years, the total 
economic and social cost of serious youth violence 
across England and Wales was at least £6 billion, 
but more likely in the region of £11 billion. These 
are staggering numbers, capturing the huge adverse 
impacts of this serious youth violence on individuals, 
communities and the various services such as the 
Police, the Criminal Justice Service and the NHS. 
The two key fundamental messages emerge from 
the analysis, calculations and results presented in this 
chapter are as follows:  
Firstly, we show that in each of the past eleven years, 
the absolute magnitude of the total economic and 
social cost of serious youth violence across England 
and Wales has been huge - in each year, the total 
cost has been at least circa £780 million, and in some 
years much more than this.  This evidence in itself is a 
call for action and investment of new and additional 
resource to help reduce the levels of serious youth 
violence.  
Secondly, we show the costs have increased 
significantly in each and every region of England 
and Wales over the past four years, with some 
regions experiencing an increase in total costs in 
excess of 50%.  This evidence compounds the call 
for appropriate action and investment in appropriate 
policies, as discussed elsewhere in this report to 
reduce the level of violence and in turn the economic 
and social costs, within the context of limited budgets 
and ever growing demands on such budgets.
Roadmap to Part 2
In section 2, we outline the main adverse impacts 
of serious youth violence, our approach and discuss 
what is omitted from the estimated cost calculations.  
Part 2: The Economic and Social Cost of  
Serious Youth Violence
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Section 3 presents our results at the aggregate level: 
we present results of the total number of offences that 
relate to serious youth violence and the estimated 
total economic and social costs of serious youth 
violence. This information is presented across the 
ten regions in England and Wales for the past eleven 
years. 
Section 4 presents our results in a disaggregated 
format, the estimated costs for each category of 
adverse impact. There are six categories that the costs 
of serious youth violence are associated with: 
• Police
• Criminal Justice System
• health services
• victim services
• physical and emotional harm
• lost economic output.  
Some information about our data and methodology 
are referenced in Sections 3 and 4 but we also discuss 
that further in section 5.  
In section 6 we briefly discuss some of the economic 
and social costs that have been left out of the analysis 
such as the costs associated with the fear of violence 
and the costs to victims’ families.  There is also a brief 
discussion of the need for future work to assess and 
evaluate the net benefits (net of costs) of specific 
policies recommended in this report to help reduce 
levels of youth violence. 
Appendices A and B within Part 2, contain tables 
showing all the estimated costs, that are referenced in 
Sections 3 and 4.
2. The Adverse Impacts of Serious Youth Violence
Our aim is to assess, evaluate and quantify the 
adverse economic and social impacts of serious youth 
violence in the absence of any significant deployment 
of (new and additional) public resources, to use the 
terminology from HM Treasury’s Green Book79 (their 
seminal text on the CBA methodology), assuming 
‘Business As Usual (BAU)’.
Such evaluation is important as it will quantify the total 
economic and social cost of the currently high level of 
serious youth violence in the England and Wales – the 
cost of inaction.  While that figure will be of significant 
independent interest, it provides the ‘benchmark’ cost 
against which the net total costs/benefits of various 
policy interventions can then be assessed, which 
we discuss in Part 3 of this report, helping guide the 
allocation of (new/additional) public resources to 
address this matter.
We will in particular measure and estimate the 
economic and social cost resulting from fatalities due 
79  HM Treasury, Green Book: Central Government Guidance on Appraisal and Evaluation, 2018.
80  Youth Violence Commission, Interim Report, 2018.
81  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables
to youth violence, and several other direct impacts of 
such violence.  There are also direct costs to various 
public services (such as the Police, the NHS, and the 
Criminal Justice System (CJS)) from dealing with the 
consequences of violence.
Our calculations and results will be an underestimate 
of the true cost since we have not measured and 
costed some additional negative ‘externalities’ that 
such high levels of violence generate - the adverse 
impacts on individuals, families, communities and 
society at large, for example, perceived risks, and 
the fear of violence, which we have omitted from the 
current analysis. This is, however, something that is 
critical to try to measure and estimate in future work. 
That such indirect costs are significant is obvious 
and perhaps is one reason for the Serious Violence 
summit in April 2019, and the reason the current 
Government has started to invest in the network 
of the newly established Violence Reduction Units 
(VRUs) across the country, which are adopting 
public health approaches to conceptualising and 
responding to serious violence – mirroring the top-
line recommendations in the YVC’s Interim Report80 
launched in Parliament in July 2018.
Further discussion of direct and indirect costs is 
provided below. While some of these costs are 
relatively easy to measure such as the cost to the 
police of deploying resource to deal with the 
violence – others are harder to measure, such as the 
cost of the loss of life, but there are well-established 
methodologies that enable us to do so. 
We now outline some of the main elements of the 
analysis to establish the economic and social cost of 
serious youth violence (knife and gun crime). First, 
we establish the sources of such costs and then we 
measure such costs and attach an economic value to 
them (in Great British Pounds – GBP).
 We focus here, due to measurement and data 
availability, on knife-crime and gun related youth 
violence.  The outcomes of knife crime can be many 
including stabbing that results in loss of life, and 
also outcomes that result in some form of non-life 
threatening injury.  We will include gun violence in 
the analysis and calculations, although the levels of 
such violence are significantly lower than those from 
knife crime.  It should be noted, that we are omitting 
incidents of youth violence that do not involve a 
knife instrument or a gun from our analysis and 
calculations.
As previously mentioned, data on recorded 
knife crime (and gun violence) are available from 
the Police81, but we have also assessed levels of 
unrecorded knife-crime, from the British Crime Survey 
to gather a more accurate picture of the levels and 
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nature of serious youth violence.  Based on work 
done in the 2018 Home Office report, the incidence 
of actual violence is likely to be around 2.6 times 
that which is recorded by the Police.  This number is 
known as the ‘multiplier’.82  
One point to note upfront is that data on offences are 
not available by age and we have used information 
and data from other sources to make reasonable 
estimates of what proportion of the relevant offences 
(knife crime and gun violence) are committed by 
young people aged 24 or under. We will discuss 
our detailed approach on this in Section 5, but in 
summary concluded for such offences that lead to 
a homicide, an estimated 36% of the total of such 
offences are committed by young people, and 
for such offences that lead to a non-fatal injury, an 
estimated 60% of the total of such offences are 
committed by young people.
3. Total Number of Offences and Total Economic 
and Social Costs
In this section, we will present the data on the volume 
(total number) of serious youth violence (offences 
committed by young people aged 24 or under), 
across the regions of England and Wales and for 
the past eleven years.  We present this data in two 
different ways: first, in section 3.1, we present the 
data as recorded by the Police. In section 3.2, we will 
present data on the total volume of offences informed 
by the British Crime Survey (BCS), and using the Police 
Recorded Crime (PRC) data as the base data.
We then present the results of our analysis and 
calculations on the total economic and social costs 
of serious youth violence. We do so for each of the 
regions of England and Wales and across the past 
eleven years.  
The total economic and social cost of serious youth 
violence across England and Wales in 2018/19 the 
total cost was at least £700 million, but more likely 
in the region of £1.3 billion. In 2014/15 it was at least 
£440 million, but more likely in the region of £790 
million – with the lower number in these ranges very 
likely to be an underestimate. 
Key things to note are firstly, these are staggering 
numbers, by any measure and within any context. 
Secondly, these are per annum numbers - the £440 
million is the estimated minimum total economic and 
social cost of serious youth violence in the one year 
of 2014/15.  Thirdly, the total cost has significantly 
increased – by over 50% – over this recent four year 
period, which is not surprising given the significant 
increase in knife crime over the same period.
82  Heeks, M. et al, “The economic and social costs of crime”, second edition, Research Report 99, Home Office, July 2018.
3.1. Police Recorded Crime (PRC) Data
 
In this subsection we present the total cost estimates 
based solely on the PRC data on serious youth 
violence. As mentioned, this is an under-estimate of 
the true total economic and social costs of serious 
youth violence as much (non-fatal) violence is not 
recorded.  
3.1.1. Total Offences
Figure 1 shows the total number of knife related 
offenses committed by young people (of age 24 
or under) as recorded by the police in four regions 
of England, and for two years.  Full data, across all 
regions in England and Wales, and for past eleven 
years, is in Table A1 in Part 2, Appendix A.  These 
numbers include offences that resulted in fatalities 
and those that resulted in non-fatal injury.
Figure 1:  Total number of knife related offences 
committed by young people recorded by the Police.   
Figure 1 shows that in each of these four regions, 
there has been a significant growth in violence by 
50% or more - in the number of knife related offenses 
over a period four years.  As can be seen from Table 
A1 in Part 2, Appendix A, this is the same in the other 
six regions of England and Wales.  So each and every 
region in England and Wales has seen a significant 
growth in the number of knife related offenses over 
this period of four years.    
In aggregate terms, as Table A1 shows, in 2014/15, 
there were in total, across England and Wales, 15,832 
Police recorded knife related offences committed 
by someone of age 24 or under, while in 2018/19 the 
number was 28,344, which is a growth in the number 
of offences by young people over this four year 
period of 80%.   
Figure 2 below shows the total number of gun 
violence related offences committed by young 
people (24 or under) as recorded by the Police. 
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Figure 2:  Total number of gun violence related 
offences committed by young people as recorded by 
the Police.
While we have included these gun related offence 
numbers here, in Figure 2, these numbers are tiny 
compared to knife crime numbers in Figure 1, in 
absolute terms.  But what is noticeable from Figure 
2 is that there is also a non-trivial increase in the 
number of gun related offences across the same 
four years. As can be seen from Table A2 in Part 2, 
Appendix A, gun violence by young people, across 
England and Wales, increased by around 40% from 
2014/15 to 2018/19.   While this is not nearly as large 
as the increase in knife crime, which as noted above, 
was 80% - this is still huge.
Combining Figures 1 and 2, we have Figure 3 below 
that thus shows the total number of serious violent 
offences committed by young people as recorded by 
the Police. 
Figure 3:  Total number of serious violent offences 
committed by young people as recorded by the 
Police.
Figure 3 looks almost identical to Figure 1 since as 
noted above gun related offences as show in Figure 2 
make up a tiny fraction of the total offences compared 
to knife related offences.
3.1.2. Total Economic and Social Costs
We now look at total economic and social costs of 
serious youth violence, using only the PRC data above 
for the numbers of offences.  Figure 4 below show 
the total economic and social cost – summing up six 
categories/areas of direct costs – resulting from the 
above offences, for four regions and two years.
The six categories are: Police costs; Health costs, 
Criminal Justice System costs; Emotional and 
Physical Harm costs, Lost Output costs, Victim 
Services costs. More details of what these costs 
are will be detailed in Section 4, where the main 
estimated results of these individual costs are 
presented.  
These total costs are underestimates of the full, 
total economic and social cost for several reasons 
discussed elsewhere.
Figure 4: The total economic and social cost – in 
pounds - of serious youth violence, using Police 
Recorded Crime data on the total number of offences.
From Figure 4 above, it is clear that in each of these 
four regions, the total economic and social cost of 
serious youth violence significantly increased from 
an already high base over the intervening four years, 
between 2014/15 and 2018/19.  There is however 
much variation across the regions. The total economic 
and social cost of serious youth violence grew by 
55% in the North West, by 68% in the West Midlands, 
by 40% in London and by 135% in South East.  Of 
course these variations in costs correspond to similar 
variations in levels of violence. 
As shown in Table A10 in Part 2, Appendix A, at the 
aggregate level across the whole of England and 
Wales, the total economic and social cost of serious 
youth violence for 2014/15 comes to £440 million 
and for 2018/19 comes to £700 million.  Both of 
these figures are huge and are underestimates.  And 
to emphasise these are per annum figures, one for 
the year 2014/15 and one for the year 2018/19.  It is 
worth noting that this is a growth by 59% in the total 
economic and social cost of serious youth violence, 
over this four year period.
3.2.   British Crime Survey Data together with PRC 
Data
For offences that result in a fatality, we only use PRC 
data. But for offences that do not result in a fatality, 
the Home Office 2018 report has used the British 
Crime Survey data to estimate more accurate levels of 
such offences, many of which are not recorded by the 
police.   For such offences, we apply a multiplier of 2.6 
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to the PRC data on non-fatal, violent injuries caused 
by the knife instrument to arrive at a more accurate 
estimate of the number of offences. This multiplier is 
based on the detailed work in the 2018 Home Office 
report - see Section 5 below for further information.
3.2.1. Total Offences
Figure 5 below provides a summary highlight of the 
calculations of the total number of violent (using 
a knife instrument or gun) offenses committed by 
young people – Table B1 in Part 2, Appendix B has 
the exact numbers across all regions of England and 
Wales and across the past eleven years.
Figure 5:  Total number of serious youth violence 
offenses (using a knife instrument or a gun) committed 
by young people, using the data from the British Crime 
Survey data and the PRC data.
Figure 5 above shows that in each of these four 
regions, there has been a significant increase – growth 
in violence by 50% or more - in the number of knife 
and gun related offences over this recent period of 
four years.  As can be seen from Table B1 in Part 2, 
Appendix B, which shows the full data, this is the same 
in the other six regions of England and Wales.  So 
each and every region in England and Wales has seen 
a significant growth in the number of knife related 
offences over this period of four years.  
In aggregate terms, as Table B1 in Part 2, Appendix B 
shows, in 2014/15, there were in total, across England 
and Wales, 40,847 knife offences committed by 
young people aged 24 or under, while in 2018/19 
the number was 73,395, which is an increase in the 
number of offences over this four year period of 
80% - which, interestingly, is the same percentage 
growth in the number of offences with only PRC data, 
as noted above in Section 3.1.1.   
Figure 6 above right show the percentage increases 
– year on year – since 2014/15, in the total number 
of offences committed by young people. As can be 
seen, there is significant growth each year between 
2014/15 and 2018/19, of 11%, 21%, 19% and 12%. 
Figure 6:  Percentage increases – year on year – in the 
total number of serious youth violent offences using 
the data from the British Crime Survey data and the 
PRC data (with 2014/15 as base year).
3.2.2. Total Economic and Social Costs
Figure 7 summarises the total economic and social 
cost. These costs are more accurate estimates 
of the costs of serious youth violence but are still 
an underestimate as they only capture direct 
costs, neglecting the indirect costs, such as those 
associated with the fear of violence - more on this in 
Section 6.
Figure 7:  The total economic and social cost (in 
pounds) of serious youth violence, using the British 
Crime Survey data and the PRC data.  
From Figure 7, it is clear that in each of these four 
regions, the total economic and social cost of serious 
youth violence significantly increased from an already 
huge base over the intervening four years, between 
2014/15 and 2018/19.  There is however much 
variation across the regions. The total economic and 
social cost of serious youth violence grew by 76% 
in the North West, by 82% in the West Midlands, 
by 47% in London and by 134% in South East.  Of 
course, these variations in costs correspond to similar 
variations in levels of violence. 
As shown in Table B8 in Part 2, Appendix B, at 
the aggregate level across whole of England and 
Wales - the total economic and social cost of serious 
youth violence for 2014/15 comes to £786 million 
and for 2018/19 comes to £1.3billion.  Both of these 
figures are vast and a present a reasonable estimate 
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of the true costs of serious youth violence.  And to 
emphasise these are per annum figures, one for the 
year 2014/15 and one for the year 2018/19.  It is also 
worth noting that this is a growth by 65% in the total 
economic and social cost of serious youth violence, 
over this four year period.
Figure 8 below show the percentage increases – year 
on year – since 2014/15, in the total economic and 
social cost of serious violence. As can be seen, there 
is significant growth each year between 2014/15 and 
2018/19, of 12%, 16%, 21% and 7%. 
Figure 8:  Percentage increases – year on year – in 
the total economic and social cost of serious youth 
violence using the data from the British Crime Survey 
data and the PRC data (with 2014/15 as base year).
4. Costs by Category
In this section, we outline how the total economic and 
social costs associated with knife and gun offences 
committed by young people break down across 
particular categories of cost.  Four of these categories 
constitute public services, namely, the Police, the 
Criminal Justice System, the Health Services and 
Victim Services.  All four of these services incur direct 
and indirect costs associated with serious violence 
and their resources are respectively deployed to deal 
with the consequences of the violence.  We show and 
discuss the costs to each such service in sections 4.1, 
4.2, 4.3, and 4.5, respectively.
The other two important cost categories concern the 
victims of serious violence.  The most important is 
the physical and emotional harm caused by a violent 
incident. We present the results on that in section 
4.4.  The other cost is lost economic output due to the 
violence and we present the results on that in section 4.6.
4.1.   Cost to the Police
Here we present the results of our calculations that 
estimate the cost to the Police in dealing with and 
investigating incidents of serious youth violence – 
which the Home Office 2018 report denotes as the 
costs in response to the crime.  Such costs capture the 
opportunity cost of police time and resources taken 
up investigating incidents of serious youth violence 
rather than engaging in other activities such as 
responding to other crime and non-crime activities. 
Let us state some of the main results.  First, we will 
show that the costs to the Police of dealing with 
this violence have been increasing over the past 
four years or so. But also in absolute terms that 
the numbers are high. Total cost to Police across 
England and Wales from serious youth violence 
increased from £52 million in 2014/15 to £84 million 
in 2018/19.  These are substantial figures, particularly 
in the context of overly stretched police budgets. 
Significant reductions in levels of serious violence 
between young people would free up police capacity 
that could then be redeployed to tackle other forms 
of crime that are currently being neglected, due in 
large part to a lack of resources.
This is an increase in the cost to the Police over this 
four year period by 62%.  This is a significant increase, 
arising of course from the weighty increase in serious 
youth violence offenses.
Section 6.1 of the Home Office 2018 report describes 
the methodology used to arrive at the average unit 
cost per incident to the Police.  For an incident that 
leads to a homicide, the unit cost (in 2015/16 prices) is 
£11,960.  And for an incident that leads to a non-fatal, 
violent injury the unit cost to the Police is £1,130.  
These unit costs, as noted in the Home Office 2018 
report, have been estimated using cost data from 
the Police but also using the overall crime data from 
both the police and from the British Crime Survey.  In 
particular, it is noted in that report that the accurate 
total cost to the police would be when the unit cost is 
applied to the volume of offences using the multiplier 
that is informed by the British Crime Survey.  It is the 
Police costs shown in Figure 10 below that constitute 
more accurate estimates.  It should be emphasised 
that for offences that lead to a homicide the multiplier 
is not applied since the number of homicides are all 
recorded by the Police.  The multiplier is only used as 
a way to estimate those non-recorded incidents that 
lead to a non-fatal injury.
We first apply the unit costs only to the PRC data on 
serious youth violence offences.  Figure 9 overleaf 
shows the police costs for each of the ten regions 
in England and Wales and for two selected years, 
2014/15 and 2018/19.  The exact costs and for the past 
eleven years are in Table A4 in Part 2, Appendix A.  As 
noted above, these are underestimates of the true 
costs to Police. But act as lower bound to such costs. 
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Figure 9: The total costs to Police from Serious Youth 
Violence across all regions and for selected two years 
using only PRC data
What is clear from Figure 9 is the significant increase 
in police costs over the recent four year period.  So, 
for example, the cost to the police in London from 
dealing with and investigating serious youth violence 
has risen by 52% between 2014/15 and 2018/19.  In 
other regions the increase is less, but for some is 
much more. For example, the cost to the police in the 
North East has risen by 83% over this period.
In Figure 10 below (which for reasons noted above, is 
the more accurate picture of the costs to the police.), 
once again, it is clear there has been a significant 
increase in costs to police in all the ten regions over 
the four year period from 2014/15 to 2018/19.  For 
London, the increase is 59%, while for the West 
Midlands the increase is 98% - the exact figures for the 
past eleven years is in Part 2, Table B2 in Appendix B. 
Once again, we see massive increases in costs to the 
police.
A good illustration of the magnitude of police costs 
can be gathered from the statistics concerning 
London in 2018/19: £27 million.  In 2014/15, the 
corresponding figure was £17 million.  
Figure 10: The total costs to Police from Serious Youth 
Violence across all regions and for selected two years 
using the British Crime Survey data and the PRC data
4.2. Costs to the Criminal Justice System (CJS)
Here we present the results of our calculations that 
estimate the cost to the Criminal Justice System 
(CJS) in dealing with incidents of serious youth 
violence. Such costs relate to Prosecution (CPS), the 
Courts, Jury Service, Legal Aid, Probation and Prison 
Services, and the Youth Justice Board.
Let us state upfront some of the main results.  First, 
we show that the costs to the CJS of dealing with 
the consequences of serious youth violence have 
been increasing over the past four years or so. But 
also in absolute terms, the numbers are high. We 
will show that total cost to the CJS across England 
and Wales from serious youth violence incidents 
and cases increased from £113 million in 2014/15 
to £181 million in 2018/19.  Both of these figures 
are substantial.  A significant reduction in levels of 
serious youth violence would generate significant 
cost savings in the context of severely limited CJS 
resources – resources that could then be redeployed 
to improve the CJS in various ways.  
This is an increase in the cost to the CJS over this 
four year period by 60%, which is roughly the same 
increase as with the police costs noted above.  This 
is a significant increase, arising of course from the 
significant increase in serious youth violence offences.
Section 6.2 of the Home Office 2018 report describes 
the methodology used to arrive at the average unit 
cost per incident to the CJS.  For an incident that 
leads to a homicide, the unit cost (in 2015/16 prices) is 
£800,980. And for an incident that leads to a non-fatal, 
violent injury the unit cost to the CJS is £1370.   Just 
pause to look at the cost per incident when there is a 
fatality in the said incident. 
These unit costs – as noted in the Home Office 2018 
report – have been estimated using cost data on the 
various areas of the CJS, provided by the Ministry 
of Justice, but also crime data from both the Police 
and from the British Crime Survey.  In particular, the 
accurate total cost to the CJS would be estimated 
when these unit costs are applied to volume of 
offences using the multiplier that is informed by the 
British Crime Survey.  Hence it is the CJS costs shown 
in Figure 12 below that are better estimates. 
That said, we first apply the unit costs only to the PRC 
data on serious youth violence offences.   Figure 11 
below shows the CJS costs for each of the ten regions 
in England and Wales and for two selected years, 
2014/15 and 2018/19.  The exact costs and for the past 
eleven years are in Table A5 in Appendix A.  As noted 
above, these are almost certainly under-estimates of 
the true costs to CJS, but act as a lower bound to such 
costs.
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Figure 11: The total costs to the Criminal Justice 
System from Serious Youth Violence across all regions 
and for selected two years using only PRC data
What is clear first of all from Figure 11 is the increase 
in CJS costs over the recent four year period.  So, for 
example, the cost to the CJS in London from serious 
youth violence has risen by 39% between 2014/15 and 
2018/19.  Other regions the increase is less, but for 
some is much more. For example, the cost to the CJS 
in the North East has risen by 57% over this period.
Let us now turn to Figure 12, which, for reasons 
noted above, is the more accurate picture of the 
costs to the CJS.  Once again, it is clear there has 
been a significant increase in costs to CJS in all the 
ten regions over the four year period from 2014/15 
to 2018/19.  For London, the increase is 42% while 
for the West Midlands the increase is by 64% - the 
exact figures and for the past eleven years is in Table 
B3 in Part 2, Appendix B. Once again, we see huge 
increases in costs, this time to the CJS.
Figure 12: The total costs to the Criminal Justice 
System from Serious Youth Violence across all regions 
and for selected two years using the British Crime 
Survey data and the PRC data
To illustrate the magnitudes just look at the cost 
of serious youth violence to the CJS in London in 
2018/19: £54 million.  In 2014/15, the corresponding 
figure was £38 million.
4.3. Costs to Health Services
Here we present the results of our calculations that 
estimate the cost to the Health Services in dealing 
with incidents of serious youth violence. Such costs 
come from dealing with the physical and emotional 
harms from this violence. These include ambulance 
costs, medical procedure costs associated with 
physical harm, and counselling costs associated with 
the emotional harms. 
Let us here state some of the main results.  First, 
we show that the costs to the Health Services from 
dealing with the consequences of serious youth 
violence have been increasing over the past four years 
or so. But also in absolute terms, the numbers are 
high.  We show that total cost to the Health Services 
across England and Wales from serious youth 
violence incidents and cases increased from £38 
million in 2014/15 to £67 million in 2018/19.  Both of 
these figures are huge and a significant reduction in 
serious youth violence would mean savings of these 
huge costs and in the context of limited health and 
NHS funding, resources that could then be deployed 
to the multitude of other areas of the health services.
This is an increase in the cost to the Health Services 
over this four year period by 76% - higher increase 
than the corresponding increases in Police and CJS 
costs, as noted above.  This is a significant increase, 
arising of course from the significant increase in 
serious youth violence offenses.
Section 5.4 of the Home Office 2018 report describes 
the methodology used to arrive at the average unit 
cost - that is, per incident - to health services.  For 
an incident that leads to a homicide, the unit cost 
(in 2015/16 prices) is £1100. And for an incident that 
leads to a non-fatal, violent injury the unit cost is £920.  
These unit costs – as noted in the Home Office 2018 
report – have been estimated using cost data from 
various sources including the NHS Reference costs, 
but also crime data from both the Police and from the 
British Crime Survey.  In particular, the more accurate 
picture on the total costs to the health services would 
be when the unit costs are applied to volume of 
offences using the multiplier that is informed by the 
British Crime Survey.
  
It is the health services costs shown in Figure 14 below 
that are better estimates. 
That said, we first apply to the unit costs only to 
the PRC data on serious youth violence offences.   
Figure 13 below shows the health service costs for 
each of the ten regions in England and Wales and 
for two selected years, 2014/15 and 2018/19.  The 
exact costs and for the past eleven years are in Table 
A6 in Part 2, Appendix A.  As noted above, these 
are underestimates of the true costs to the health 
services. But act as lower bound to such costs.
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Figure 13: The total costs to Health Services from 
Serious Youth Violence across all regions and for 
selected two years using only PRC data
What is clear first of all from Figure 13 is the increase 
in health service costs over the recent four year 
period.  So, for example, the cost to the health 
services in London from serious youth violence has 
risen by 60% between 2014/15 and 2018/19.  Other 
regions the increase is less, but for some is much 
more. For example, the cost to the health services in 
the North East has risen by 89% over this period.
Let us now turn to Figure 14 below, which, for reasons 
noted above, is the more accurate picture of the costs 
to the health services.  Once again, it is clear there 
has been a significant increase in costs to the health 
services in all the ten regions over the four year period 
from 2014/15 to 2018/19.  For London, the increase 
is 57% while for the West Midlands the increase is by 
99% - the exact figures and for the past eleven years 
is in Table B4 in Part 2, Appendix B. Once again, 
gigantic increases in costs to the health services.
Figure 14: The total costs to the Health Services from 
Serious Youth Violence across all regions and for 
selected two years using the British Crime Survey data 
and the PRC data
To illustrate the magnitudes just look at the cost to 
the health services in London in 2018/19.  It is £22 
million - the cost to the health services in London in 
the one year of 2018/19 from dealing with offences 
relating to serious youth violence.  In 2014/15, the 
corresponding figure was £14 million.
83  Dolan, P. et al,  “Estimating the intangible victim costs of serious violence”,  British Journal of Criminology, 2005
4.4. Costs of Physical and Emotional Harm 
Here we present the results of our calculations that 
estimate the cost of the physical and emotional 
harm to victims of serious youth violence. Such 
costs come from the reduction in the quality of life 
of the victim from the physical and emotional harm 
suffered as a result of the incident.  Victims of serious 
youth violence will suffer substantial physical and 
emotional injuries. In order to quantify this cost the 
well-established ‘quality-adjusted life years (QALY)’ 
methodology - first used in Dolan et al. (2005)83 – is 
used to estimate the cost.  For details of this approach 
and methodology, see Section 5.2 of the Home Office 
2018 report.
Let us state some of the main results.  First, we will 
show that the costs of Physical and Emotional Harm 
from serious youth violence has been increasing 
over the past four years or so. But also in absolute 
terms the numbers are high. We show that total 
economic and social cost of physical and emotional 
hard across England and Wales from serious youth 
violence increased from £485 million in 2014/15 
to £814 million in 2018/19.  Both of these figures 
are staggering.  The social welfare gains would be 
significant following a reduction in youth violence. 
And these costs (numbers) do not capture the 
adverse indirect impact of the said violence on 
families, communities and society at large as we 
have not estimated such negative externalities of the 
violence, which ought to be estimated in future work 
as previously mentioned.
This is an increase in the total economic and social 
cost from physical and emotional harm over this four 
year period by 68% - around similar corresponding 
increases in Police and CJS costs, as noted above.  
This is a significant increase, arising of course from the 
significant increase in serious youth violence offenses 
in particular these costs capture the huge increase in 
the number of fatalities especially with knife crime.
Section 5.2 of the Home Office 2018 report describes 
the methodology used to arrive at the average unit 
cost per incident of physical and emotional harm.  
For an incident that leads to a homicide, the unit cost 
(in 2015/16 prices) is just over £2 million. And for an 
incident that leads to a non-fatal, violent injury the 
unit cost is £8240.   
These unit costs, as noted in the Home Office 2018 
report, have been estimated using a well-established 
QALY approach, but also crime data from both 
the Police and from the British Crime Survey.  In 
particular, the accurate total cost of the physical and 
emotional harm would be when the unit costs are 
applied to volume of offences using the multiplier that 
is informed by the British Crime Survey.  The costs 
shown in Figure 16 below that are better estimates. 
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However, we first apply to the unit costs only to the 
PRC data on serious youth violence offences.   Figure 
15 below shows the physical and emotional harm 
costs for each of the ten regions in England and Wales 
and for two selected years, 2014/15 and 2018/19.  The 
exact costs and for the past eleven years are in Table 
A7 in Part 2, Appendix A.  As noted above, these are 
under-estimates of the true costs of the physical and 
emotional harm. But act as lower bound to such costs.
 
Figure 15: The total costs of Physical and Emotional 
Harm from Serious Youth Violence across all regions 
and for selected two years using only PRC data
What is clear from Figure 15 is the increase in these 
costs over the recent four year period.  So, for 
example, the cost of the physical and emotional hard 
in London from serious youth violence has risen by 
40% between 2014/15 and 2018/19.  Other regions 
the increase is less, but for some is much more. For 
example, the cost from physical and emotional hard in 
the North West has risen by 53% over this period.
Let us now turn to Figure 16 below, which is the 
more accurate picture of the costs of physical and 
emotional harm.  Once again, it is clear there has 
been a significant increase in these costs in all the 
ten regions over the four year period from 2014/15 
to 2018/19.  For London, the increase is 46% while for 
the West Midlands the increase is by 83% - the exact 
figures and for the past eleven years is in Table B5 in 
Appendix B. Once again, huge increases in costs of 
physical and emotional harm.  
 
Figure 16: The total costs of Physical and Emotional 
Harm from Serious Youth Violence across all regions 
and for selected two years using the British Crime 
Survey data and the PRC data
To illustrate the magnitudes, look at the cost in 
London in 2018/19.  It is £249 million - the cost of 
physical and emotional harm in London in the one 
year of 2018/19 from serious youth violence.  In 
2014/15, the corresponding figure was £171 million.
Figure 17 below show the percentage increases – year 
on year – since 2014/15, in the total cost of physical 
and emotional harm from serious youth violence 
across England and Wales. As can be seen, there is 
significant growth each year between 2014/15 and 
2018/19, of 13%, 15%, 22% and 7%. 
Figure 17:  Percentage increases – year on year – in the 
total cost of physical and emotional harm from serious 
youth violence in England and Wales using the data 
from the British Crime Survey data and the PRC data  
(putting 2014/15 as base year).
4.5. Costs to Victim Services 
Here we present the results of our calculations that 
estimate the cost to Victim Services arising from 
serious youth violence. Such costs arise from the cost 
of support provided to victims of crime as well as their 
families and friends, and from the opportunity cost of 
volunteer time in delivering victim services.
Let us here state some of the main results.  First, we 
show that the costs to Victim Services from dealing 
with the consequences of serious youth violence have 
been increasing over the past four years or so. But 
also in absolute terms the numbers are high. We show 
that total cost to Victim Services across England 
and Wales from serious youth violence increased 
from £392 million in 2014/15 to £554 million in 
2018/19.  Both of these figures are huge. That would 
mean savings of these huge costs and in the context 
of limited Victim Services resources, resources that 
could then be deployed to the multitude of areas of 
their work.
This is an increase in the cost to Victim Services over 
this four year period by 42% - similar percentages 
increases to corresponding increases in other 
categories of costs, as noted above.  This is a 
significant increase, arising of course from the 
significant increase in serious youth violence incidents 
that lead to fatalities.
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Section 5.5 of the Home Office 2018 report describes 
the methodology used to arrive at the average unit 
cost - that is, per incident – to Victim Services.  For 
an incident that leads to a homicide, the unit cost 
(in 2015/16 prices) is £5480. And for an incident that 
leads to a non-fatal, violent injury the unit cost is less 
than £10 and hence rounded to £0.  This means the 
costs will be the same with or without applying the 
multiplier. These unit costs – as noted in the Home 
Office 2018 report – have been estimated using 
cost data from various sources such as the publically 
available data from Victim Support, but also crime 
data from both the Police and from the British Crime 
Survey.  
Figure 18 below shows the costs to Victim Services for 
each of the ten regions in England and Wales and for 
two selected years, 2014/15 and 2018/19.  The exact 
costs and for the past eleven years are in Table A8 in 
Appendix A (and reproduced in Table B6 in 
Appendix, for sake of completeness).
What is clear from Figure 18 is the increase in the 
costs to Victim Services over the recent four year 
period.  So, for example, the cost to Victim Services 
in London from serious youth violence has risen by 
24% between 2014/15 and 2018/19.  Other regions 
the increase is less, but for some is much more. For 
example, the cost to the health services in the West 
Midlands has risen by 42% over this period.
Figure 18: The total costs for Victim Services from 
Serious Youth Violence across all regions and for 
selected two years using only PRC data
To illustrate the magnitudes look at the cost in 
London in 2018/19.  It is £148 million - the cost 
to Victim Services in London in the one year of 
2018/19 from serious youth violence.  In 2014/15, the 
corresponding figure was £120 million.
4.6. Costs from Lost Economic Output 
Here we present the results of our calculations that 
estimate the cost from lost economic output arising 
from serious youth violence. Lost economic output 
estimates the lost productivity from time off work 
and reduced productivity whilst at work for victims 
of crime. Victims of crime may take time off work as a 
result of the crime and may also be less productive at 
work for some time following the crime. For details of 
the methodology, see Section 5.3 of the Home Office 
2018 report.
Let us here state some of the main results.  First, we 
show that the costs of Lost Output from serious youth 
violence has been increasing over the past four years 
or so. But also in absolute terms the numbers are high. 
The best estimate of these costs shows that the total 
economic and social cost from Lost Output across 
England and Wales from serious youth violence 
increased from £102 million in 2014/15 to £176 
million in 2018/19.  Both of these figures are huge 
and so the gains to individuals, firms, the economy 
and society would be significant if youth violence 
were reduced. 
This is an increase in the cost from lost output 
over this four year period by 73% - around similar 
corresponding increases in the other five categories 
of total costs, as noted above.  This is a significant 
increase, arising of course from the growing increase 
in serious youth violence offenses in particular these 
costs capture the huge number of fatalities.
Section 5.3 of the Home Office 2018 report describes 
the methodology used to arrive at the average unit 
cost - that is, per incident – from lost output.  For 
an incident that leads to a homicide, the unit cost 
(in 2015/16 prices) is £254,710. And for an incident 
that leads to a non-fatal, violent injury the unit cost is 
£2060.  These unit costs – as noted in the Home Office 
2018 report – have been estimated using a detailed 
approach to reductions in productivity, but also 
crime data from both the Police and from the British 
Crime Survey.  In particular, as with other costs, it is 
thus noted that the accurate total cost of Lost Output 
would be when the unit costs are applied to volume 
of offences using the multiplier that is informed by the 
British Crime Survey.  
It is the costs shown in Figure 20 below that are better 
estimates. 
However, we first apply to the unit costs only to 
the PRC data on serious youth violence offences.   
Figure 19 below shows the costs of lost output for 
each of the ten regions in England and Wales and 
for two selected years, 2014/15 and 2018/19.  The 
exact costs and for the past eleven years are in 
Table A9 in Appendix A.  As noted above, these are 
underestimates of the true costs of Lost Output. But 
act as lower bound to such costs.
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Figure 19: The total costs from Lost Output from 
Serious Youth Violence across all regions and for 
selected two years using only PRC data
What is clear first of all from Figure 16 is the increase 
in these costs over the recent four year period.  So, 
for example, the cost of lost output in London from 
serious youth violence has risen by 47% between 
2014/15 and 2018/19.  Other regions the increase is 
less, but for some is much more. For example, the 
cost from physical and emotional hard in the West 
Midlands has risen by 81% over this period.
Let us now turn to Figure 20 below, which, for reasons 
noted above, is the more accurate picture of the 
costs from lost output.  It is clear there has been a 
significant increase in these costs in all the ten regions 
over the four year period from 2014/15 to 2018/19.  
For London, the increase is 49% while for the West 
Midlands the increase is by 86% - the exact figures 
and for the past eleven years is in Table B7 in Part 2, 
Appendix B. Once again, huge increases in costs from 
lost output.
Figure 20: The total costs from Lost Output from 
Serious Youth Violence across all regions and for 
selected two years using the British Crime Survey data 
and the PRC data
To illustrate the magnitudes just look at the cost in 
London in 2018/19.  It is £55 million - the cost from 
lost output in London in the one year of 2018/19 
84  Heeks, M. et al, “The economic and social costs of crime”, second edition, Research Report 99, Home Office, July 2018
85  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables - Knife crime open data year ending March 2009 onwards    
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/policeforceareadatatables  
86  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/offencesinvolvingtheuseofweaponsdatatables
87  https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommmunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/appendixtableshomicideinenglandandwales - in 2017-2018 
(most recently published year), 36% of knife homicides were committed by under 16, plus 16-17, plus 18-24 age groups. 
88  See for example: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/mopac_knife_crime_strategy_june_2017.pdf  
from serious youth violence.  In 2014/15, the 
corresponding figure was £37 million.
5.  Data and Methodology
In section 5, we describe our data and methodology, 
including a brief discussion of the unit costs that are 
taken from the analysis and calculations from the 2018 
Home Office report.84
5.1.     Police Recorded Crime (PRC) Data
The raw data on number of offences involving a knife 
or sharp instrument are from the Police Recorded 
Crime (PRC) data.85   And similarly, the raw data for 
number of offences involving a weapon are from the 
PRC data too.86    This data is available for the past 
eleven years, from 2008/09 till 2018/19.  For each year, 
the data is from 1st April till 31st March. 
The raw data for each year is by Police Force Area in 
England and Wales and by offence description.  We 
used this raw data to calculate the total number of 
such offences in each of the ten regions of England 
and Wales and by (a) the number of offences that led 
to a homicide and (b) the number of offences that led 
to violence with injury (non-fatal).   
These offences are across all ages.  But we are 
interested in offences committed by young people, 
that is, offences committed by those aged 24 or 
under.   Data by age (and region and offence type) is 
not readily available.
So we proceeded as follows.  We estimated - using 
other sources of data – the number of the above 
offences committed by young people.
So we estimated that 36% of all offences (knife or 
gun related) recorded by the Police that led to a 
homicide was committed by young people.87   And 
we estimated that 60% of all offences recorded by 
the Police that led to a non-fatal violent injury was 
committed by young people.88   We assume these 
proportions remain the same across all of the past 
eleven years.
While this is of course a rough estimation, it is 
a reasonable assumption. We adopt it to then 
to calculate the total number of serious violent 
offences committed by young people in each year 
since 2008/09 and in each region of England and 
Wales.  These are shown in Table A3 in the Part 2, 
Appendix A.
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5.2.   British Crime Survey Data
The PRC data is accurate as it is recorded by the 
Police at the time of the incident/offence.  For 
offences that lead to a homicide, this data captures 
all such offences.  But there will be serious youth 
violence offences that don’t lead to a fatality that are 
not recorded by the Police.  The British Crime Survey89 
is a survey that aims to capture/estimate the true 
level of such offences.  And we will appeal to such 
data to estimate the true number of offences - police 
recorded and those not recorded by the police – 
committed by young people that lead to a non-fatal 
violent injury.     
To estimate this, we accept the analysis undertaken 
about this very issue in the 2018 Home Office Report 
in which so-called ‘multipliers’ are derived from the 
BCS data.  It is estimated in that Report that for every 
Police recorded offence leading to a violent injury, 
there are 2.6 times as many such offences actually 
occurring.  So the multiplier is 2.6, which is what 
we thus adopt in our calculations of the number of 
offences by young people leading to non-fatal, violent 
injury.   
Table B3 in Appendix B shows a more accurate total 
number of serious offences committed by young 
people which is arrived at by adding the PRC data 
on homicides (times 0.36 to account for age) and 2.6 
times the PRC data on non-fatal, violent injury (times 
0.6 to account for age).
5.3.   Methodology
The overall aim of our analysis in this part of the report 
was to derive the total economic and social costs of 
serious youth violence.  We identified the sources 
of such costs to the following categories:  Costs 
to various public services from the serious youth 
violence, namely, to the Police, the Criminal Justice 
System (CJS), Health Services and Victim Services.   
We also importantly calculated the economic and 
social cost from the physical and emotional harm and 
from lost output.
We focused on the above six categories due to 
data availability and established ways to measure 
them.  Some costs such as the costs from the fear 
of youth violence we have left out due to difficulty 
in measuring this but is something  which ought to 
be assessed, measured and costed in future work.  
Indeed, given that, the total economic and social cost 
of serious youth violence calculated in this report 
would be considered an under-estimate of the true 
total cost of such violence.
The methods to measure and estimate these six 
category of costs are relatively well-established in 
the economic cost-benefit analysis. Fortunately, the 
2018 Home Report applied the said methods on 
89  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/british-crime-survey-methodology
these six sets of costs to various crimes in general.   
In particular one of main, substantive and critical 
numbers that the 2018 Home Office Report derives 
are the so-called unit costs, for each and every one of 
these six category of cost, where the ‘unit’ cost is the 
cost per incident.  This will be different for an incident 
that leads to a homicide from one the leads to a non-
fatal, violent injury.  
These units costs are reported below. Although these 
costs are in 2015/16 prices, with inflation having been 
relatively low over the past three years, these will still 
constitute a relatively accurate reflection of prices in 
2018/2019.
Of course the unit cost for each category of cost is 
higher for an offence that leads to a homicide than 
one that does not, and significantly so in several 
categories.








Figure 21:  The unit costs – that is, the cost to each 
category for an offence that leads to a homicide.
Non-Fatal Injury  (2015/16 prices)
Health Services £920
Lost Output £2,060
Other CJS Costs £1,370
Physical and Emotional Harm £8,240
Police Costs £1,130
Total £13,720
Figure 22:  The unit costs – that is, the cost to each 
category for an offence that leads to non-fatal injury.
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Section 6:  Conclusions and Omissions
Two overall and fundamental messages emerge from 
the analysis, calculations and results presented above 
in this part of the report:  
Firstly, we showed that in each of the past eleven 
years, the absolute magnitude of the total economic 
and social cost of serious youth violence across 
England and Wales has been considerable - in each 
year, the total cost has been at least circa £780 
million, and in some years much more than this.  This 
evidence in itself is a call for action and investment of 
new and additional resource to help reduce the levels 
of serious youth violence.  
Secondly, we showed the economic and social costs 
have increased significantly in each and every region 
of England and Wales over the past four years or so, 
with some regions experiencing an increase in total 
costs in excess of 50%.  This evidence compounds 
the call for appropriate action and investment to 
help reduce the levels of violence.  Investment in 
appropriate policies – as discussed elsewhere in this 
report – that would help reduce the level of violence, 
which in turn will reduce these economic and social 
costs, in the context of limited budgets and ever 
growing demands on such budgets.
Indeed, to re-state and re-emphasise the orders of 
magnitude, we showed that over the full period of the 
past eleven years, the total economic and social cost 
of serious youth violence across England and Wales 
is at least £6 billion, but more likely in the region of 
£11 billion. These are staggering numbers, capturing 
the huge adverse impacts of this serious youth 
violence on individuals and various services such as 
the police, the Criminal Justice System and the NHS. 
Still, these numbers are underestimates of the true 
total economic and social cost of serious youth 
violence since a number of important costs lie 
outside our analysis.  We have already alluded to what 
some of these omissions are, but it is worth briefly 
highlighting them here again.
We did not, for example, attempt to cost associated 
with the fear of violence.  This is hard to do but an 
attempt must be made in future work as this cost 
will be considerable.  The fear of violence is meant 
to capture the adverse impacts of serious youth 
violence on communities and society at large.  For 
example, the emotional trauma of a fatal stabbing on 
individuals, families and communities is considerable.  
This is a serious and significant social cost of the said 
violence. It has to be assessed, and an attempt made 
to measure it and impute a monetary cost to it.  This 
is critical in order to estimate a more accurate, total 
economic and social cost of serious youth violence.  In 
turn, this would provide further weight to the case for 
allocating additional public resources to reduce levels 
of violence. 
There are other similar types of negative externalities 
of serious youth violence, adversely impacting on 
people, communities and societies, that we have 
also not assessed, measured and attributed a cost 
to, and future work ought to look into them. Another 
example is to consider how such high levels of knife 
crime are causing further breakdowns in social norms 
on various crucial matters such as staying away from 
crime, being prosocial and law-abiding citizens, 
being kind and respectful and so on.  These are all 
social costs of first order  arising from high levels of 
serious youth violence. They should form part of the 
calculation of the total economic and social cost of 
serious youth violence.  
The expected costs of all such negative externalities 
will be huge, and may well more than double the 
numbers reported in this section of the report.   The 
figures we present already provide a prima facie case 
for significant and sustained deployment of new and 
additional public resource to help reduce levels of 
serious youth violence. But we can and must make the 
case even stronger, emphasise the urgency of the task 
in hand hence our call for further work on the costs of 
serious youth violence as noted above.
In Part 3, we will discuss the matter of undertaking an 
additional assessment of the net benefits (net of costs) 
of the various specific policy recommendations we 
outline in this final report. 
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A1 Total number of youth (age 24 or under) offences with a knife instrument (fatal and non-fatal):
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/13 2010/12 2009/10 2008/09
North East 944 854 641 619 500 407 47 438 459 449 500
North West 4,023 2,566 2,196 2,097 1,996 1,971 1,836 2,002 2,221 2,503 3,008
Yorkshire and the Humber 2,800 2,571 2,073 1,691 1,405 1,290 1,231 1,424 1,299 1,479 1,528
East Midlands 1,885 1,629 1,343 1,134 1,040 1,112 1,037 1,052 1,109 1,206 1,389
West Midlands 2,939 2,532 2,203 1,899 1,478 1,444 1,375 1,857 2,379 2,484 2,831
East of England 1,635 1,716 1,800 1,347 1,101 894 859 904 1,093 1,168 1,261
London 9,045 8,897 7,278 5,894 5,848 6,078 6,875 8,550 8,134 7,700 7,591
South East 2,834 2,566 2,064 1,614 1,212 1,113 1,182 1,288 1,418 1,753 1,942
South West 1,290 1,154 1,014 770 716 651 634 775 870 1,015 1,135
Wales 823 686 565 441 446 344 373 373 443 466 562
28,219 25,171 21,177 17,505 15,742 15,304 15,450 18,662 19,424 20,223 21,747
A2 Total number of youth (age 24 or under) offences with a gun (fatal and non-fatal):
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 2
North West 19 19 17 16 15 16 17 19 24 27 27
Yorkshire and the Humber 14 14 15 12 8 9 11 9 10 10 9
East Midlands 8 8 8 6 4 5 7 8 9 8 10
West Midlands 16 16 15 13 12 14 14 18 26 23 22
East of England 10 10 11 7 7 6 5 7 9 8 7
London 41 41 42 31 30 32 44 57 65 75 57
South East 7 7 7 7 5 7 8 7 9 9 10
South West 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 8 7 6 5
Wales 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 3
124 124 124 102 90 99 115 137 166 172 152
Note: Due to unavailability of 2018/19 figures at this point time, we have used in Table A2 above figures of 
the year 2017/18 for the year 2018/19.
A3 Total number of offences from Serious Youth Violence (sum of A1 and A2):
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 946 857 643 621 501 409 49 439 462 451 502
North West 4,042 2,585 2,212 2,113 2,011 1,987 1,853 2,021 2,245 2,530 3,035
Yorkshire and the Humber 2,814 2,584 2,089 1,703 1,413 1,299 1,242 1,433 1,310 1,488 1,538
East Midlands 1,893 1,637 1,351 1,140 1,044 1,117 1,043 1,061 1,118 1,215 1,399
West Midlands 2,955 2,549 2,217 1,912 1,490 1,458 1,389 1,875 2,404 2,507 2,853
East of England 1,645 1,727 1,811 1,354 1,108 900 865 911 1,102 1,177 1,269
London 9,085 8,938 7,320 5,924 5,879 6,110 6,918 8,606 8,198 7,775 7,648
South East 2,841 2,573 2,071 1,621 1,217 1,120 1,190 1,295 1,427 1,763 1,952
South West 1,296 1,159 1,019 775 721 656 639 783 877 1,021 1,140
Wales 825 688 567 443 448 346 375 376 446 469 564
28,344 25,296 21,301 17,607 15,832 15,402 15,565 18,799 19,590 20,395 21,900
A4 – Total Police Cost from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 1,129,461 993,078 752,317 730,547 606,169 513,466 98,868 525,038 554,977 526,003 591,287
North West 4,696,590 3,061,967 2,604,395 2,502,238 2,385,237 2,362,881 2,198,791 2,402,758 2,690,455 2,928,650 3,543,032
Yorkshire and the Humber 3,263,411 2,995,804 2,463,555 2,016,781 1,690,199 1,564,070 1,476,584 1,739,832 1,558,614 1,792,363 1,875,670
East Midlands 2,221,809 1,920,742 1,617,162 1,350,995 1,229,236 1,320,394 1,226,347 1,302,008 1,341,135 1,431,983 1,629,110
West Midlands 3,447,601 3,023,278 2,593,028 2,239,290 1,760,551 1,723,800 1,676,294 2,198,235 2,863,837 2,916,043 3,353,306
East of England 1,974,758 2,039,539 2,135,885 1,613,062 1,306,292 1,111,255 1,027,392 1,116,272 1,343,235 1,404,421 1,473,067
London 10,558,100 10,566,758 8,516,858 6,939,261 6,880,594 7,130,305 8,052,615 9,958,690 9,542,198 9,042,931 8,975,655
South East 3,331,728 2,989,674 2,411,446 1,933,649 1,424,528 1,321,691 1,444,103 1,538,975 1,722,016 2,086,696 2,296,854
South West 1,538,376 1,356,365 1,205,097 929,941 855,875 807,246 768,995 941,293 1,048,160 1,230,580 1,400,618
Wales 961,109 828,968 681,370 533,288 526,965 416,051 456,490 446,319 538,547 606,064 693,868
33,122,943 29,776,173 24,981,112 20,789,051 18,665,645 18,271,160 18,426,479 22,169,419 23,203,174 23,965,733 25,832,466
A5 – Total CJS Cost from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 5,735,376 3,021,833 2,745,606 2,955,283 3,620,959 4,375,485 3,305,328 2,715,920 3,102,968 1,842,485 2,498,639
North West 15,080,866 13,948,465 10,739,904 11,392,590 11,084,982 11,364,502 10,259,741 11,592,032 14,407,813 8,621,535 12,517,633
Yorkshire and the Humber 9,995,267 9,104,557 10,502,254 9,192,912 8,851,929 8,884,245 7,102,549 10,832,391 7,615,321 10,212,738 12,291,379
East Midlands 8,716,172 7,501,764 8,557,021 6,168,897 5,054,800 5,824,964 4,921,820 9,102,838 7,292,702 6,046,356 5,503,663
West Midlands 12,035,511 14,069,260 9,497,371 8,392,377 7,683,665 7,622,379 9,766,357 8,470,268 14,146,073 9,575,166 13,461,336
East of England 10,804,359 8,900,969 9,053,986 7,950,494 5,528,481 8,184,403 4,895,874 7,675,164 8,718,281 7,144,601 4,641,201
London 33,971,696 46,723,166 28,138,585 26,198,566 25,611,848 25,063,107 26,816,493 29,047,923 31,757,247 29,602,768 35,079,331
South East 12,848,965 9,602,935 8,073,182 9,739,059 5,323,033 5,663,448 8,931,287 7,348,240 10,040,172 9,429,221 9,411,404
South West 7,225,729 5,023,131 5,372,702 5,051,833 4,051,607 5,777,593 4,303,639 5,251,677 5,386,256 7,106,444 9,841,384
Wales 3,239,151 4,777,742 3,755,466 3,011,531 2,123,633 2,309,447 2,916,654 2,105,435 3,141,998 6,249,203 4,912,883
119,653,093 122,673,823 96,436,077 90,053,542 78,934,937 85,069,573 83,219,742 94,141,889 105,608,829 95,830,519 110,158,853
Please note that all figures are rounded.
Part 2 Appendix A:  Offences and Costs  
(using only Police Recorded Crime data)
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Part 2 Appendix A:  Offences and Costs  
(using only Police Recorded Crime data)
A6 – Total Health Costs from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 871,668 788,583 592,393 572,079 461,859 376,875 45,551 404,655 425,182 415,034 461,856
North West 3,720,804 2,380,643 2,037,217 1,945,527 1,852,088 1,830,523 1,706,864 1,861,024 2,068,193 2,328,762 2,794,400
Yorkshire and the Humber 2,590,694 2,379,031 1,923,285 1,567,961 1,301,468 1,196,747 1,143,900 1,320,813 1,206,152 1,371,077 1,417,208
East Midlands 1,742,842 1,507,043 1,244,267 1,050,222 961,693 1,028,674 960,761 977,504 1,029,736 1,118,581 1,287,648
West Midlands 2,720,723 2,347,304 2,041,442 1,760,859 1,372,497 1,342,759 1,279,931 1,726,033 2,214,531 2,307,869 2,627,057
East of England 1,515,512 1,589,994 1,668,038 1,247,528 1,020,257 829,738 796,419 839,476 1,015,836 1,083,727 1,167,990
London 8,363,737 8,231,023 6,738,680 5,454,565 5,412,456 5,625,101 6,369,041 7,921,761 7,547,411 7,157,922 7,042,178
South East 2,615,919 2,368,491 1,906,813 1,493,182 1,120,347 1,031,519 1,096,963 1,192,831 1,314,761 1,623,220 1,797,313
South West 1,193,679 1,067,234 938,231 714,071 663,757 604,585 589,103 721,273 808,224 940,300 1,050,997
Wales 759,746 633,527 522,610 408,238 412,746 318,931 345,732 346,215 411,159 432,942 520,255
26,095,324 23,292,874 19,612,976 16,214,232 14,579,168 14,185,453 14,334,265 17,311,582 18,041,184 18,779,434 20,166,903
A7 – Total Cost of Physical and Emotional Harm from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 19,312,230 11,853,221 10,137,333 10,577,471 11,741,804 13,265,092 8,802,133 9,103,739 10,211,872 6,891,994 8,831,846
North West 58,060,960 48,296,065 38,227,004 39,452,074 38,178,391 38,793,242 35,298,721 39,538,597 47,894,965 34,220,090 46,694,522
Yorkshire and the Humber 39,116,568 35,728,610 37,030,283 31,824,874 29,582,857 29,133,039 24,244,191 34,816,353 25,890,907 33,465,844 39,090,390
East Midlands 31,479,898 27,129,674 28,526,756 21,346,089 18,006,364 20,344,545 17,656,825 28,582,647 24,155,489 21,376,686 20,831,084
West Midlands 45,069,061 48,439,382 35,026,901 30,732,169 26,915,722 26,605,287 31,844,038 30,756,668 47,961,994 36,586,195 48,288,648
East of England 35,735,762 31,180,199 31,974,613 26,970,774 19,532,935 25,448,394 16,752,146 24,177,662 27,780,890 24,046,611 17,985,181
London 130,699,084 163,084,738 107,294,540 95,721,241 93,985,441 93,646,208 101,983,127 115,680,672 120,797,878 113,227,116 126,836,925
South East 46,644,148 36,967,096 30,648,273 32,859,879 19,510,259 19,940,261 28,746,555 25,130,543 32,731,456 32,719,148 33,560,046
South West 24,817,221 18,462,041 18,711,068 16,736,910 13,887,154 18,060,767 14,160,220 17,291,760 18,083,758 23,216,839 30,872,031
Wales 12,269,741 15,615,838 12,400,107 9,888,458 7,609,292 7,613,034 9,323,961 7,223,097 10,241,610 18,408,945 15,389,047
443,204,672 436,756,862 349,976,878 316,109,940 278,950,219 292,849,869 288,811,917 332,301,737 365,750,820 344,159,467 388,379,720
A8 – Total Cost of Victim Services from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 30,421 12,666 12,775 14,420 20,109 26,150 22,196 14,489 16,932 8,395 12,415
North West 65,405 71,323 52,832 58,243 57,088 59,224 52,913 60,473 77,662 35,333 57,290
Yorkshire and the Humber 42,076 38,131 52,366 47,017 47,400 48,691 37,015 60,780 39,895 56,019 69,798
East Midlands 41,963 36,045 45,962 31,571 24,836 29,433 23,934 52,427 39,484 30,033 24,586
West Midlands 54,736 72,492 44,270 39,559 38,665 38,549 53,889 40,449 74,374 42,084 65,468
East of England 58,600 44,791 45,043 41,771 27,486 47,639 25,434 44,049 49,400 37,918 19,895
London 147,516 236,292 124,116 123,925 120,332 114,399 118,825 118,271 140,668 129,874 168,601
South East 61,383 41,655 35,881 51,525 25,056 28,296 50,032 38,200 55,411 48,073 46,173
South West 37,351 23,542 27,255 27,344 21,000 33,438 23,491 28,641 28,676 39,120 56,740
Wales 14,451 26,287 20,411 16,479 10,345 12,577 16,466 10,900 17,343 38,423 28,370
553,903 603,223 460,912 451,853 392,319 438,396 424,195 468,679 539,845 465,270 549,337
A9 – Total Cost of Lost Output from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 3,351,966 2,348,721 1,914,451 1,944,674 1,959,720 2,047,450 1,123,575 1,572,930 1,731,379 1,315,685 1,605,571
North West 11,341,708 8,613,315 6,993,264 7,036,994 6,774,613 6,824,661 6,257,275 6,950,420 8,205,462 6,840,634 8,893,857
Yorkshire and the Humber 7,737,530 7,081,987 6,716,700 5,674,889 5,095,803 4,920,724 4,265,017 5,754,955 4,536,959 5,648,355 6,385,880
East Midlands 5,833,862 5,033,476 4,901,544 3,804,668 3,296,489 3,658,018 3,252,879 4,601,805 4,123,034 3,886,943 4,014,820
West Midlands 8,611,375 8,592,447 6,608,661 5,763,566 4,852,829 4,780,876 5,346,243 5,726,529 8,381,777 7,104,584 8,895,569
East of England 6,090,579 5,621,750 5,808,112 4,715,926 3,549,572 4,050,563 2,953,931 3,907,103 4,548,278 4,171,826 3,530,969
London 25,517,104 29,305,978 20,801,371 17,917,296 17,657,660 17,860,727 19,730,209 23,181,465 23,374,067 22,005,129 23,528,458
South East 8,682,633 7,220,601 5,921,073 5,714,921 3,661,826 3,612,085 4,759,025 4,429,114 5,494,266 5,847,222 6,149,612
South West 4,391,957 3,473,224 3,355,293 2,857,450 2,452,814 2,892,754 2,400,261 2,933,251 3,129,556 3,906,028 4,964,879
Wales 2,366,275 2,628,461 2,109,645 1,672,549 1,400,352 1,293,004 1,532,023 1,276,899 1,718,884 2,737,891 2,470,697
83,924,990 79,919,960 65,130,113 57,102,932 50,701,677 51,940,861 51,620,438 60,334,472 65,243,662 63,464,296 70,440,314
A10 - Total Cost of Serious Youth Violence (sum of A4, A5, A6, A7, A8 and A9), in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 30,431,121 19,018,102 16,154,876 16,794,475 18,410,621 20,604,517 13,397,651 14,336,769 16,043,311 10,999,595 14,001,614
North West 92,966,334 76,371,778 60,654,616 62,387,665 60,332,400 61,235,033 55,774,305 62,405,303 75,344,550 54,975,003 74,500,733
Yorkshire and the Humber 62,745,546 57,328,120 58,688,442 50,324,434 46,569,655 45,747,516 38,269,257 54,525,124 40,847,849 52,546,395 61,130,327
East Midlands 50,036,546 43,128,743 44,892,712 33,752,441 28,573,418 32,206,028 28,042,565 44,619,230 37,981,579 33,890,582 33,290,911
West Midlands 71,939,007 76,544,162 55,811,673 48,927,820 42,623,930 42,113,649 49,966,752 48,918,182 75,642,585 58,531,941 76,691,384
East of England 56,179,569 49,377,241 50,685,677 42,539,555 30,965,023 39,671,993 26,451,196 37,759,726 43,455,919 37,889,104 28,818,303
London 209,257,236 258,147,954 171,614,151 152,354,853 149,668,331 149,439,848 163,070,310 185,908,782 193,159,469 181,165,740 201,631,149
South East 74,184,777 59,190,453 48,996,667 51,792,214 31,065,048 31,597,299 45,027,964 39,677,903 51,358,082 51,753,579 53,261,402
South West 39,204,314 29,405,537 29,609,646 26,317,549 21,932,206 28,176,383 22,245,709 27,167,895 28,484,630 36,439,311 48,186,649
Wales 19,610,473 24,510,824 19,489,609 15,530,544 12,083,333 11,963,044 14,591,327 11,408,865 16,069,541 28,473,469 24,015,120
706,554,924 693,022,914 556,598,068 500,721,550 442,223,964 462,755,312 456,837,036 526,727,778 578,387,515 546,664,719 615,527,594
56
B1 Total Number of Offences from Serious Youth Violence (using either a knife instrument or a gun; fatal and 
non-fatal), using Multiplier:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East  2,459  2,223  1,667  1,611  1,298  1,056  121  1,139  1,195  1,172  1,303 
North West  10,452  6,658  5,700  5,439  5,178  5,113  4,764  5,193  5,759  6,503  7,810 
Yorkshire and the Humber  7,276  6,676  5,380  4,386  3,642  3,342  3,194  3,689  3,372  3,831  3,957 
East Midlands  4,902  4,231  3,483  2,944  2,700  2,887  2,693  2,727  2,880  3,135  3,611 
West Midlands  7,634  6,568  5,719  4,931  3,836  3,748  3,563  4,820  6,170  6,451  7,347 
East of England  4,263  4,462  4,681  3,499  2,863  2,320  2,239  2,354  2,847  3,047  3,290 
London  23,482  23,072  18,896  15,294  15,176  15,776  17,848  22,207  21,122  19,996  19,697 
South East  7,356  6,662  5,359  4,184  3,145  2,888  3,062  3,341  3,673  4,547  5,039 
South West  3,346  2,994  2,629  1,995  1,856  1,684  1,643  2,009  2,257  2,629  2,936 
Wales  2,225  1,808  1,497  1,169  1,182  918  996  1,004  1,191  1,246  1,493 
 73,395  65,354  55,010  45,451  40,874  39,731  40,124  48,482  50,466  52,558  56,484 
B2 Multiplier Police Cost from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 2,829,087 2,536,493 1,908,528 1,848,433 1,506,130 1,244,820 180,485 1,315,314 1,383,973 1,341,507 1,496,697
North West 11,934,777 7,664,090 6,545,311 6,261,621 5,963,559 5,894,582 5,488,171 5,987,281 6,661,382 7,418,554 8,938,323
Yorkshire and the Humber 8,301,715 7,619,714 6,182,429 5,049,177 4,208,588 3,873,101 3,682,478 4,288,250 3,888,641 4,440,140 4,609,912
East Midlands 5,614,088 4,851,981 4,026,954 3,388,636 3,100,435 3,320,732 3,090,220 3,185,362 3,332,180 3,601,606 4,128,698
West Midlands 8,730,280 7,565,038 6,550,017 5,650,205 4,410,656 4,311,430 4,133,127 5,526,813 7,119,337 7,372,988 8,432,017
East of England 4,913,745 5,130,398 5,378,052 4,036,665 3,289,710 2,715,600 2,580,630 2,746,734 3,314,387 3,518,081 3,757,274
London 26,825,891 26,538,399 21,597,619 17,526,877 17,386,293 18,052,613 20,403,557 25,327,255 24,146,422 22,851,896 22,590,929
South East 8,431,384 7,610,933 6,126,188 4,829,580 3,602,904 3,319,191 3,558,877 3,851,064 4,260,310 5,232,868 5,785,593
South West 3,854,495 3,429,489 3,025,140 2,307,920 2,138,832 1,968,597 1,902,837 2,326,757 2,607,379 3,047,875 3,429,862
Wales 2,480,418 2,095,519 1,731,836 1,353,344 1,355,793 1,061,865 1,158,122 1,156,148 1,379,762 1,484,106 1,743,599
83,915,879 75,042,053 63,072,075 52,252,457 46,962,898 45,762,532 46,178,505 55,710,978 58,093,773 60,309,622 64,912,904
B3 Multiplier CJS Costs from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 7,795,984 4,893,052 4,147,385 4,310,596 4,712,062 5,262,172 3,404,280 3,674,042 4,108,034 2,831,195 3,596,348
North West 23,856,367 19,528,030 15,517,828 15,950,426 15,423,301 15,646,298 14,247,750 15,937,869 19,222,122 14,065,047 19,058,827
Yorkshire and the Humber 16,103,653 14,710,537 15,010,978 12,869,356 11,905,197 11,683,689 9,776,951 13,922,065 10,440,220 13,422,876 15,606,346
East Midlands 12,828,936 11,055,567 11,478,628 8,639,312 7,323,421 8,250,152 7,181,560 11,386,195 9,706,624 8,676,784 8,534,137
West Midlands 18,440,173 19,575,641 14,294,782 12,527,734 10,896,624 10,759,595 12,744,996 12,505,801 19,305,395 14,978,720 19,618,712
East of England 14,367,555 12,648,294 12,984,756 10,888,845 7,933,156 10,129,495 6,779,003 9,651,920 11,108,084 9,707,180 7,410,549
London 53,694,593 66,087,013 43,997,561 39,034,879 38,348,846 38,305,197 41,790,644 47,680,608 49,463,253 46,344,611 51,586,345
South East 19,031,734 15,205,701 12,576,896 13,250,054 7,964,073 8,085,196 11,495,217 10,151,394 13,117,573 13,243,607 13,641,114
South West 10,033,768 7,536,565 7,579,303 6,722,481 5,607,050 7,185,602 5,678,297 6,931,399 7,276,636 9,309,713 12,301,618
Wales 5,081,146 6,313,295 5,029,040 4,005,759 3,128,495 3,092,425 3,767,305 2,966,025 4,161,879 7,313,731 6,185,566
181,233,910 177,553,696 142,617,156 128,199,442 113,242,225 118,399,821 116,866,004 134,807,318 147,909,821 139,893,464 157,539,561
B4 – Multiplier Total Health Cost from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 2,255,434 2,045,169 1,533,733 1,482,216 1,194,571 972,314 112,001 1,048,065 1,100,117 1,078,985 1,199,004
North West 9,613,841 6,127,504 5,245,750 5,006,263 4,765,412 4,705,890 4,384,943 4,779,396 5,301,160 5,984,259 7,187,026
Yorkshire and the Humber 6,692,676 6,143,630 4,951,041 4,036,814 3,351,838 3,076,666 2,939,850 3,395,630 3,103,165 3,526,790 3,643,317
East Midlands 4,504,698 3,893,539 3,206,222 2,709,187 2,485,147 2,657,268 2,478,251 2,510,853 2,650,764 2,885,000 3,322,711
West Midlands 7,021,665 6,045,020 5,263,061 4,537,887 3,530,104 3,449,502 3,280,185 4,436,026 5,679,185 5,936,533 6,761,937
East of England 3,908,315 4,106,446 4,307,678 3,220,727 2,635,076 2,135,931 2,061,002 2,166,932 2,620,667 2,804,583 3,027,698
London 21,608,310 21,234,482 17,388,503 14,074,571 13,965,769 14,517,600 16,424,675 20,434,221 19,437,576 18,400,620 18,127,180
South East 6,767,852 6,130,933 4,931,205 3,850,930 2,893,892 2,657,802 2,818,726 3,075,240 3,381,336 4,184,705 4,637,702
South West 3,079,370 2,755,088 2,420,037 1,835,966 1,708,288 1,550,110 1,512,231 1,849,261 2,077,677 2,419,867 2,703,125
Wales 1,996,706 1,664,702 1,377,856 1,075,895 1,087,544 844,727 916,972 924,129 1,096,042 1,147,808 1,374,903
67,448,865 60,146,511 50,625,087 41,830,457 37,617,639 36,567,810 36,928,835 44,619,754 46,447,690 48,369,150 51,984,605
Part 2 Appendix B:  Offences and Costs, using Police  
Recorded Crime data and the British Crime Survey Data  
via Multiplier
Please note that all figures are rounded.
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Part 2 Appendix B:  Offences and Costs, using Police  
Recorded Crime data and the British Crime Survey Data  
via Multiplier
B5 Multiplier Total Cost from Physical and Emotional Harm from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 
2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 31,705,962 23,107,855 18,568,468 18,729,136 18,304,350 18,598,155 9,397,288 14,866,460 16,256,940 12,838,684 15,434,126
North West 110,842,075 81,854,908 66,964,301 66,865,626 64,271,637 64,546,528 59,284,994 65,677,064 76,851,104 66,960,628 86,037,176
Yorkshire and the Humber 75,856,055 69,446,325 64,148,446 53,937,210 47,947,041 45,970,575 40,329,649 53,399,503 42,881,543 52,773,533 59,028,583
East Midlands 56,216,517 48,504,373 46,099,048 36,204,642 31,651,211 34,931,077 31,248,256 42,316,125 38,674,263 37,197,658 39,058,169
West Midlands 83,590,536 81,558,054 63,881,403 55,604,683 46,240,377 45,474,382 49,759,355 55,028,779 78,993,248 69,086,401 85,322,793
East of England 57,166,960 53,718,853 55,616,612 44,643,774 33,996,091 37,147,338 28,078,410 36,067,051 42,154,600 39,459,493 34,641,697
London 249,324,390 279,550,504 202,679,912 172,926,516 170,593,369 173,292,061 192,046,636 227,748,793 227,292,396 213,922,579 226,119,986
South East 83,831,021 70,665,482 57,736,305 53,977,106 35,395,055 34,506,105 44,167,569 41,990,385 51,240,787 55,661,148 59,000,052
South West 41,706,447 33,579,338 31,982,892 26,785,184 23,242,521 26,529,377 22,428,236 27,394,611 29,453,638 36,468,619 45,669,349
Wales 23,348,598 24,851,572 20,060,141 15,868,336 13,653,135 12,322,335 14,440,284 12,399,200 16,375,785 24,811,652 23,043,727
813,588,562 766,837,264 627,737,527 545,542,213 485,294,786 493,317,932 491,180,676 576,887,971 620,174,305 609,180,395 673,355,659
B6 Multiplier Total Cost of Victim Services from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 30,421 12,666 12,775 14,420 20,109 26,150 22,196 14,489 16,932 8,395 12,415
North West 65,405 71,323 52,832 58,243 57,088 59,224 52,913 60,473 77,662 35,333 57,290
Yorkshire and the Humber 42,076 38,131 52,366 47,017 47,400 48,691 37,015 60,780 39,895 56,019 69,798
East Midlands 41,963 36,045 45,962 31,571 24,836 29,433 23,934 52,427 39,484 30,033 24,586
West Midlands 54,736 72,492 44,270 39,559 38,665 38,549 53,889 40,449 74,374 42,084 65,468
East of England 58,600 44,791 45,043 41,771 27,486 47,639 25,434 44,049 49,400 37,918 19,895
London 147,516 236,292 124,116 123,925 120,332 114,399 118,825 118,271 140,668 129,874 168,601
South East 61,383 41,655 35,881 51,525 25,056 28,296 50,032 38,200 55,411 48,073 46,173
South West 37,351 23,542 27,255 27,344 21,000 33,438 23,491 28,641 28,676 39,120 56,740
Wales 14,451 26,287 20,411 16,479 10,345 12,577 16,466 10,900 17,343 38,423 28,370
553,903 603,223 460,912 451,853 392,319 438,396 424,195 468,679 539,845 465,270 549,337
B7 Multiplier Total Cost of Lost Output from Serious Youth Violence, in GBP and using 2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 6,450,399 5,162,380 4,022,235 3,982,590 3,600,357 3,380,715 1,272,363 3,013,610 3,242,646 2,802,357 3,256,141
North West 24,536,987 17,003,026 14,177,588 13,890,382 13,297,925 13,262,982 12,253,843 13,485,037 15,444,497 15,025,768 18,729,521
Yorkshire and the Humber 16,922,402 15,511,416 13,496,241 11,202,973 9,686,848 9,130,108 8,286,382 10,400,743 8,784,618 10,475,278 11,370,428
East Midlands 12,018,017 10,377,150 9,294,617 7,519,306 6,707,701 7,304,651 6,650,736 8,035,175 7,752,728 7,842,186 8,571,591
West Midlands 18,241,743 16,872,115 13,822,286 11,981,695 9,683,992 9,498,150 9,825,073 11,794,557 16,139,591 15,229,635 18,154,106
East of England 11,448,378 11,256,413 11,718,611 9,134,176 7,165,361 6,975,299 5,785,498 6,879,450 8,141,705 8,025,047 7,695,099
London 55,173,431 58,422,420 44,647,714 37,218,615 36,809,641 37,772,190 42,246,087 51,198,495 49,997,696 47,178,995 48,349,224
South East 17,979,351 15,645,198 12,693,081 10,994,227 7,633,025 7,253,546 8,614,278 8,644,074 10,121,599 11,582,722 12,509,614
South West 8,614,264 7,252,548 6,673,249 5,369,519 4,791,656 5,009,907 4,467,265 5,458,964 5,972,026 7,218,973 8,664,208
Wales 5,135,989 4,937,394 4,024,654 3,167,519 2,911,312 2,470,329 2,811,103 2,570,925 3,252,428 4,338,568 4,384,367
176,520,962 162,440,060 134,570,276 114,461,001 102,287,819 102,057,877 102,212,628 121,481,030 128,849,534 129,719,528 141,684,299
B8 Multiplier Total Cost of Serious Youth Violence (sum of B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, and B7), in GBP and using 
2015/16 prices:
2018/19 2017/18 2016/17 2015/16 2014/15 2013/14 2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 2008/09
North East 51,067,287 37,757,616 30,193,126 30,367,392 29,337,578 29,484,326 14,388,612 23,931,980 26,108,643 20,901,123 24,994,731
North West 180,849,453 132,248,881 108,503,609 108,032,560 103,778,921 104,115,505 95,712,614 105,927,119 123,557,928 109,489,589 140,008,163
Yorkshire and the Humber 123,918,576 113,469,752 103,841,501 87,142,547 77,146,912 73,782,831 65,052,325 85,466,972 69,138,082 84,694,636 94,328,385
East Midlands 91,224,219 78,718,655 74,151,430 58,492,654 51,292,751 56,493,313 50,672,957 67,486,138 62,156,044 60,233,268 63,639,892
West Midlands 136,079,134 131,688,359 103,855,819 90,341,764 74,800,418 73,531,607 79,796,626 89,332,424 127,311,131 112,646,360 138,355,032
East of England 91,863,555 86,905,194 90,050,752 71,965,958 55,046,879 59,151,302 45,309,977 57,556,136 67,388,844 63,552,302 56,552,212
London 406,774,129 452,069,110 330,435,425 280,905,384 277,224,249 282,054,060 313,030,424 372,507,643 370,478,010 348,828,574 366,942,265
South East 136,102,725 115,299,902 94,099,556 86,953,421 57,514,004 55,850,136 70,704,700 67,750,358 82,177,016 89,953,122 95,620,248
South West 67,325,695 54,576,570 51,707,876 43,048,412 37,509,347 42,277,030 36,012,357 43,989,632 47,416,032 58,504,168 72,824,902
Wales 38,057,308 39,888,770 32,243,937 25,487,331 22,146,624 19,804,258 23,110,252 20,027,328 26,283,239 39,134,288 36,760,533
1,323,262,081 1,242,622,807 1,019,083,032 882,737,422 785,797,685 796,544,368 793,790,843 933,975,730 1,002,014,968 987,937,430 1,090,026,365
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As is clear from this final report, serious violence has a 
devastating impact on the lives of many young people 
across the UK, leaving deep and enduring scars on 
the families, friends and communities affected. The 
evidence provided to the Commission over the last 
three years has often forced us to switch our focus, 
from the violence perpetrated by young people, to 
the shocking levels of serious violence inflicted on 
these same young people throughout their lives. 
Far too many young people have seen their own 
friends stabbed to death. Others have had to endure 
the crushing experience of seeing their own mothers 
being brutally and repeatedly attacked in their 
homes or have been the victims of domestic violence 
themselves. These same young people often grow up 
surrounded by stark levels of deprivation, insecurity 
and adverse early-life experiences that have left many 
suffering from severe trauma, which too often goes 
overlooked and unaddressed.
While the magnitude of the effort needed to 
protect young people from serious violence cannot 
be underestimated, we believe there is cause for 
cautious optimism. In recent years, among the vast 
majority of the individuals and groups with whom 
the Youth Violence Commission (YVC) has had the 
privilege of engaging, there has been nothing short 
of a sea-change in the way serious violence is being 
understood and talked about. 
A narrative centred around the ‘public health 
approach’ now increasingly dominates discussions 
among those working to reduce serious violence. 
For the YVC, these are not empty words. This shift 
in understanding opens up huge potential for 
fundamental change in the way we understand and 
respond to violence between young people.
The publication of the Commission’s interim report 
in July 2018 called for the adoption of a public 
health approach to violence reduction, overseen 
and coordinated by regional Violence Reduction 
Units (VRUs). Following the report, both the Home 
Secretary, Sajid Javid, and the Mayor of London, 
Sadiq Khan, endorsed such an approach, leading to 
the establishment of regional VRUs. 
For readers unfamiliar with VRUs, these involve newly 
established teams of people whose responsibility 
it is to increase collaboration between a range of 
agencies at a local level, and – as we discuss below 
– drive forward evidence-informed policies and 
practices at a local and national level to reduce 
serious violence. 
The Commission welcomes the Government’s 
commitment of further support and resources to 
these VRUs. This should be considered a progressive 
step in securing reductions in violence, mirroring the 
positive work carried out by the Scottish Violence 
Reduction Unit (SVRU) that was established back 
in 2005. Pivotal to the success of the SVRU was its 
long-term vision of tackling the root causes of serious 
violence through the adoption of a public health 
approach to violence reduction. 
To be clear, the Commission’s perspective on the 
public health approach is that it should involve three 
main stages:
1) Understanding the nature of the problem by 
gathering and analysing sufficient data; 
2) Doing what works by developing and 
implementing policies and interventions 
informed by the best available theory, data 
(interpreted broadly to include, for example, 
the experiences and views of young people and 
frontline practitioners), and analysis 
3) Learning from experience by robustly evaluating 
and subsequently improving these policies and 
interventions.
While the cyclical nature of democratic elections 
exerts pressure on those in positions of power and 
responsibility to chase short-term results, based on 
the evidence provided to the Commission, a strong 
case exists for the adoption of long-term strategies 
that entail substantial investment in upstream 
prevention. 
As the positive outcomes associated with these 
strategies are unlikely to accrue during the tenures 
of those pursuing farsighted violence-reduction 
strategies, it is particularly important that credit is 
given to those principled enough to prioritise the 
long-term safety of young people over the pursuit of 
short-term political gain. 
The YVC’s vision is that the regional VRUs be 
empowered to act as the vehicles that coordinate 
public health approaches at a local level, while 
also – as a network – driving forward evidence-
informed policies at a national level. Adopting 
these ambitious and expansive roles will give the 
VRUs the best possible opportunity to secure long-
term, coherent, evidence-informed approaches to 
reducing serious violence. 
Based on recent developments, however, the 
Commission is concerned that at least two key 
changes are needed if the recently established 
regional VRUs are to fulfil their potential: 
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1) Long-term funding commitments 
- Regional VRUs have been given insufficient, 
short-term funding. Furthermore, the 
Commission has been alerted to the fact 
that too many of the recently established 
VRUs have already been pressured to 
spend money in haste, resulting in short-
sighted attempts to achieve immediate (yet 
inevitably elusive) results. This is antithetical 
to an evidence-informed, public health 
approach to reducing violence and sets the 
VRUs up to fail. 
2) A more ambitious and expansive role
- Early work by the regional VRUs indicates 
that many may be adopting a relatively 
narrow vision of their potential role, acting 
primarily as commissioning bodies for local 
level violence-reduction initiatives. This is 
one important strand of a VRU’s local level 
work. It must be accompanied, however, 
by the regional VRUs coming together as a 
combined network in order to identify and 
promote the national level policy changes 
that are equally crucial in securing lasting 
reductions in serious violence.
If the VRUs receive the levels of support and 
investment needed to take on the expansive roles 
outlined in this report, our hope is that initiatives 
such as the Youth Violence Commission will be made 
redundant. In short, the VRUs – as a network – should 
be working towards the identification and promotion 
of evidence-informed policies at both a local and 
national level that will bring about reductions in 
serious violence.
Given the extensive research conducted 
by the Commission, we expect that the 
policy recommendations identified and 
promoted in future by the VRU network 
will look broadly similar to those outlined 
in this section of the YVC’s final report. 
Consistent with a public health approach 
to violence reduction, our substantive 
recommendations cross numerous 
policy areas and are based on the 
findings outlined in Parts 1 and 2 of this 
report. These policy areas include early 
years support and early intervention, 
education, employment, housing and 
local communities, policing and criminal 
justice, and youth services. 
In terms of their content and scope, 
we recognise the ambitious nature of 
many of our policy recommendations. 
With the lives of young people at 
stake, we believe such ambition is 
necessary and justified. While the social 
case for action is compelling, as our 
analysis in Part 2 illustrates, a powerful 
economic rationale also underpins our 
recommendations. With current levels of serious 
youth violence costing the taxpayer hundreds 
of millions of pounds every year, even minor 
reductions in these levels of violence will generate 
significant cost savings. 
Below, we outline our key recommendations and our 
full set of policy recommendations.  Many of them 
will require new and additional public resources. A 
case for injecting increased and sustained levels of 
investment to help reduce serious youth violence has 
already been made in Part 2 of this report.
What is needed in terms of future work is to undertake 
an economic and social cost-benefit analysis of the 
various policies recommended below.  The results of 
such analysis will help guide the optimal allocation 
of additional public resources amongst the different 
policy interventions.  
Different policies will have different impacts on violence 
reduction over the course of time, and we need to try to 
assess and measure precisely what these impacts are 
likely to be. Uncertainty and risk will be critical elements 
in the analysis, which will need to assess the likelihood 
of different sets of possible outcomes over a long-term 
horizon of at least ten years.  
While some of those involved in the Youth Violence 
Commission are considering conducting additional 
analysis along these lines in the coming months, this 
may be something that falls within the scope of the 
regional Violence Reduction Units – coming together 
as a national network – assuming they are prepared 
to pursue the expansive and ambitious remit that we 
recommend in this section of the report. 
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3.1 Key Recommendations
The Commission welcomes the Government’s 
decision to support and invest in regional Violence 
Reduction Units (VRUs). Our utmost concern is 
that the recently established VRUs are given the 
best possible opportunity to succeed in bringing 
together and implementing genuine, holistic, 
public health approaches to reducing serious 
violence. To this end, the Commission’s central 




1) VRUs must receive enhanced funding 
immediately, accompanied by funding 
projections for a minimum of ten years. This will 
enable each unit to plan how best to deploy its 
resources strategically, while also ensuring those 
working within these units have the confidence 
to promote long-term, evidence-informed 
policies and initiatives. 
2) The VRUs should have a threefold purpose: 
i) to lead on the development, implementation 
and commissioning of local level initiatives 
to reduce violence, helping to rationalise the 
many disparate funding streams available, 
while bringing together and coordinating 
relevant stakeholders; 
ii) to feed the learning generated by each VRU’s 
local level work into relevant evidence bases, 
such as the ‘what works’ initiative currently 
being led by the Youth Endowment Fund; 
iii) as a combined VRU network, to identify and 
promote the national level policy changes 
that are beyond each regional VRU’s scope 
and control, but are nevertheless crucial to 
securing reductions in serious violence. 
3) In their capacity as local level coordinators of 
holistic public health approaches to reducing 
serious violence, VRUs should actively seek 
to engage all relevant stakeholders to feed 
into their short-term priorities and long-term 
planning. In addition, VRUs should provide 
regular feedback mechanisms to these same 
stakeholders to explain how their input has 
informed the VRU’s work and priorities. This 
will help to increase trust and confidence in the 
work of the regional VRUs among their local 
stakeholders.
 
These VRU-related recommendations aside, we are 
delighted to note the support structures put in place 
by the Home Office to enable the regional network of 
VRUs to meet and communicate regularly, both online 
through the initiative ‘Basecamp’, and through face-to-
face events. Such communication is vital for ensuring 
that the VRUs – as a network – are able to come together 
to discuss and identify the national level policy changes 
that the VRU network should champion. 
Furthermore, the processes put in place to evaluate 
the work of the VRUs appear to be entirely appropriate 
and constructive, providing both continuous feedback 
as the VRUs evolve, as well as an important degree of 
oversight and scrutiny of their work. 
The YVC would highlight the importance of these 
evaluations adopting a long-term lens on what 
‘success’ ought to look like from the perspective 
of the VRUs. It is vital that the evaluations consider, 
for example, any changes facilitated by the VRUs in 
relation to local level partnership working that may 
prove pivotal in the long-term but may not generate 
immediate reductions in levels of serious violence.
3.2 Full list of policy recommendations
As communication between the regional VRUs and 
Central Government should be a two-way dialogue, 
based on the evidence gathered by the Commission, 
we suggest that in first instance the collective network 
of VRUs should support and promote the following 
recommendations for reducing serious violence 
between young people, many of which require action 
at a national policy level: 
Early years support and early intervention 
4) A collaboration of funders – including, but 
not limited to, Central, Regional and Local 
Governments, Arm’s Length Bodies, Trusts, 
Foundations and Corporates -- should invest 
THE YOUTH VIOLENCE COMMISSION: FINAL REPORT – JULY 2020 63
in programmes that help prepare parents for 
parenthood and provide support in the early 
years of parenting. Such programmes should 
be based on existing cradle-to-career models 
that take a whole family approach and provide 
consistency of support from the ante- and 
postnatal periods, through the early years and 
into childhood and adolescence.
5) Central Government should carry out an 
urgent review of the reasons for implementing 
closure programmes for Children Centres 
(initially known as ‘Sure Start’ Centres), desist 
from future closures, and open new Centres in 
careful accordance with proven need.  Central 
Government should provide support to, and 
investment in, all Children’s Centres in order to 
facilitate strong relationships between children, 
families and professionals. This will help to 
reduce inequalities, improve children’s health 
and well-being, and provide integrated services 
to children and their families.
6) Too many parents are struggling to afford the 
rising costs of childcare. Central Government 
must direct more stable and substantial funding 
streams towards the provision of high-quality 
childcare so that all children can have the best 
start in life. In addition, it is essential that more 
is done by Central Government both in terms of 
raising awareness of support and its accessibility, 
to ensure that parents and carers are able to take 
advantage of childcare support.
Education
7) Central Government should provide significant 
and immediate increased funding to enable 
schools to put in place enhanced support 
necessary to avoid off-rolling and pursue an 
aspiration of zero exclusions. Such funding 
should facilitate the provision of trained mental 
health counsellors from a Government-approved 
central register in all primary school and 
secondary schools, as well as the provision of 
ongoing career and professional development 
training for all members of staff. The Commission 
accepts that exclusion will be the only feasible 
option in some cases. Given the numerous 
causal links between excluding and off-rolling 
pupils and the likelihood of these same young 
people being involved in serious violence, 
however, it is imperative that schools are 
provided with sufficient investment to help keep 
pupils in mainstream education.
8) The school Admissions Code should be 
revised and include the return of all powers for 
admissions to Local Authorities. This includes 
giving local authorities the powers to direct the 
admission of a student in any school. 
 
9) Central Government should increase resources 
for Local Authorities so they can deliver on all of 
their responsibilities for children, including on 
school admissions. 
10) Central Government should Commission a 
review to monitor the impact of the new Ofsted 
framework on levels of school exclusion and the 
harmful practice of off-rolling. 
11) All teachers should receive adequate training 
in the underlying causes of poor behaviour, 
including trauma and attachment. This includes 
all forms of Initial Teacher Training and the Early 
Career Framework and subsequent career CPD, 
and should not be dependent upon the teacher 
remaining in one school for the duration of that 
career. An individual teacher’s training record 
in this respect should be tracked via portable 
individualised ‘training passports.’
12) Schools should ensure that their specialist 
safeguarding professionals have the time 
and capacity to effectively integrate support 
services, such as social workers, school nurses, 
centrally accredited mental health counsellors 
and CAMHS, so that pupils have a single point 
of reliable adult support.
13) All schools’ careers programmes should 
meet the Gatsby Benchmarks as soon as 
possible, so that career guidance provision is 
universally strong and meets the needs of all 
young people, providing them with access to a 
diversity of career role models.
Employment
14) A collaboration of funders – including, but 
not limited to, Central, Regional and Local 
Governments, Arm’s Length Bodies, Trusts, 
Foundations and Corporates - should provide 
enhanced investment in youth and community 
organisations to deliver evidence-based, skills 
development, employment and aspiration-
raising programmes. Such programmes 
should be designed for the specific needs 
of local young people, reaching groups 
that are particularly at risk of becoming and 
remaining unemployed, or being stuck in under 
employment. 
15) Increased investment should be made to 
improve the quality and consistency of 
employment programmes. Such investment 
should be targeted at voluntary sector 
infrastructure organisations that are equipped to 
provide capacity building support, knowledge 
sharing and upskilling opportunities for 
practitioners working to support young people 
into work.  
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16) Central Government should address the 
growing issue of insecure, low quality and 
low paid work, and inadequate employment 
packages (which include, for example, 
insufficient pension contributions) for those 
aged under 25. Ensuring young people are in 
secure, high quality work will improve national 
productivity and lifetime earnings potential. 
17) Too often, employers’ training and development 
budgets are skewed towards senior staff 
at the expense of those in lower level 
positions. Employers should be incentivised 
by Central Government to invest in training 
and progression pathways for young people 
embarking on entry-level job roles, to ensure 
they are not stranded indefinitely on the lowest 
rungs of the employment ladder. 
18) Central Government should promote national 
adoption of the Youth Friendly Employer Mark 
from Youth Employment UK to encourage and 
support businesses that are supporting young 
people into work by, for example, speaking 
in schools and colleges, mentoring young 
people, offering meaningful work experience 
placements, internships and employment.  
There should be a focus on a raising the profile of 
a diversity of business leaders to demonstrate the 
myriad different ways that young people from all 
backgrounds can go on to succeed in work.
19) Life skills training in schools should be 
mandated in partnership with the Skills Builder 
consortium. As we adopt new technology, 
the mix of jobs available is set to change and 
the ability of employees at all levels to think 
creatively, problem solve and adapt will be 
crucial. These are the skills business leaders 
consistently report are lacking among young 
people, yet they are not consistently taught in 
our schools.
20) A collaboration of funders – including, but 
not limited to, Central, Regional and Local 
Governments, Arm’s Length Bodies, Trusts, 
Foundations and Corporates – should 
provide enhanced investment in sustainable 
programmes that aim to solve the problem of 
young people’s digital access and work-ready 
digital skills, with the aim being to provide 
the foundations for improved educational 
attainment, skill development, job searching 
and employment.
21) Central Government should increase investment 
in high-quality apprenticeship programmes. 
To succeed, apprenticeships must be able 
to command the support and confidence 
of apprentices and employers alike. Further 
investment should therefore be used to broaden 
the apprenticeship offer to under-represented 
groups by recruitment taking into account, 
for example, young people’s non-academic 
achievements and skills, and highlighting benefits 
such as the ability to ‘earn while you learn’.
Housing and local communities
22) Central Government and Local Authorities 
should embark on a long-term house-building 
strategy to ensure all children and young 
people have realistic prospects of living in 
affordable homes in the areas in which they 
grow up, to counteract the debilitating effects 
of housing insecurity, and to ensure the safety 
and wellbeing of children and young people. 
New partnership models need to be explored to 
enable innovation.
23) Many faith groups and organisations have 
access to substantial resources, including 
funds, buildings and volunteers. If deployed 
appropriately, these resources could play a 
significant role in promoting children and young 
people’s safety and well-being. All professionals 
working with vulnerable young people should 
make an enhanced effort to harness the full 
potential of faith organisations in reducing 
serious violence between young people. 
24) Local Authorities should ensure that all children 
and young people under the age of 18 have 
free access to leisure and sporting facilities 
in their local areas. Such facilities should be 
promoted to young people through suitable 
channels, such as through appropriate content-
sharing and advertising on social media. 
25) Local Authorities should establish scoping 
programmes to identify both the leisure and 
sports facilities that children and young people 
would most like to use, as well as existing facilities 
most in need of upgrading and refurbishment.  
This should be done in consultation with children, 
young people and family units.
Policing and criminal justice
26) The planned increase in police recruitment 
should be used to underpin significant 
reinvestment in local neighbourhood 
policing. The YVC recognises the fundamental 
importance of effective community policing in 
the development of long-term, problem-solving 
approaches to reducing serious youth violence. 
It is the basis on which policing capacity, and 
public trust and confidence in policing, is built 
and sustained. 
27) Central, regional and local governments should 
prioritise funding for co-produced police 
diversionary and deflection projects. These 
projects, such as DIVERT Youth, help to prevent 
the criminalisation of young people and hold 
significant potential in reducing reoffending.
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28) While the evidence concerning the effectiveness 
of Stop & Search is mixed and frequently 
contentious, we recognise that there may be 
instances in which it is a necessary element of the 
short-term enforcement response to knife crime. 
Stop and search should always be intelligence-
led, targeted specifically at those known or 
believed to be carrying weapons.
29) The Knife Crime Prevention Order (KCPO) pilot 
should be subject to close monitoring and a 
robust and independent evaluation, to be laid 
before Parliament. A national rollout should only 
be approved if there is clearly demonstrable 
evidence that the orders are effective in 
preventing young people from carrying knives.
30) Opportunities for diversion from the criminal 
justice system should be continuously explored 
throughout a young person’s involvement with 
the law, not just at the first instance, and should 
be more widely available than current practice 
allows. Attempts to engage young people 
in preventative and diversionary activities on 
a voluntary basis must be fully explored and 
evidenced, prior to an application for a KCPO 
being considered.
31) Central government should take action to 
further reduce the use of custody for children 
and young people and ensure it is used only as 
a last resort, with a specific focus on addressing 
BAME disproportionality. Independent 
inspection reports consistently show that 
imprisonment of children is harmful, exacerbates 
problems and is damaging to life chances, with 
an increased risk of offending when young 
people are released. Where custody is necessary, 
it should be in small settings, close to home, with 
a focus on meeting young people’s needs and 
preparing them for life in the community.
32) At every stage of the criminal justice system 
where overrepresentation of BAME young 
people is evident, the relevant agencies must 
urgently ‘explain or reform’, in line with the 
Lammy Review recommendations.
33) Central government should conduct a wide-
ranging review of the entire criminal records 
regime for children and young people, with 
a view to significant reform. To allow young 
people to move on from past mistakes and 
escape a lifetime of stigma, a better balance 
must be struck between securing appropriate 
safeguarding measures and ensuring young 
people do not face disproportionate and 
unnecessary barriers to rehabilitation, 
including barriers to employment, education, 
and housing.
34) Consistent with evidence provided to the 
Commission, the Government’s own Serious 
Violence Strategy highlights the links between 
illicit drug markets and serious violence. 
Numerous reviews into UK drug policy – 
including but not limited to the reviews by 
Dame Carol Black (ongoing), the Health and 
Social Care Committee (2019) and the Home 
Affairs Committee (2012) - have taken place 
under successive Governments in recent 
years, yet recommendations from such reviews 
have typically been ignored. The adoption of 
evidence-informed, rather than ideologically 
driven, drug policy is long overdue: 
Central Government should implement the 
recommendations that have been made by 
numerous recent reviews into UK drug policy.  
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Youth services
35) High quality youth services can transform 
the lives of young people by helping them 
to build their emotional and social skills, 
particularly around confidence, critical 
thinking, resilience and employability. To do 
so, however, these services require substantial 
and long-term funding commitments that 
recognise the cost-benefit of investing in 
early intervention and preventative youth 
services. Central Government should provide 
Local Authorities with statutory funding and 
a clear statutory duty for providing youth 
services, the levels of which should be 
determined by the number of young people 
living in each Local Authority area. Civil society 
organisations should be central to designing, 
delivering and leading youth services, working in 
partnership with Local Authorities and other key 
stakeholders. 
36) Adult professionals and practitioners involved 
in the commissioning, design and delivery of 
youth services should put in place appropriate 
structures to ensure that the voices of young 
people and those that support them are at the 
heart of any decision-making that affects them.
37) A collaboration of funders – including, but 
not limited to, Central, Regional and Local 
Governments, Arm’s Length Bodies, Trusts, 
Foundations, Corporates and VRUs - should 
provide enhanced investment in early 
intervention and open access youth services as 
well as targeted ‘violence-reduction’ youth work.  
A clear demarcation should be drawn between 
generic youth services and targeted violence 
reduction interventions, the latter of which must 
be delivered by youth organisations whose 
workers have received specialist training.
38) Funders should seek to ensure appropriate 
training and support is available to all youth 
workers. This should include funding for the 
provision of mental health training for frontline 
professionals including but not limited to youth 
workers, focusing in particular on trauma-
informed approaches as well as support services 
for youth workers who may be experiencing 
trauma themselves.
39) Funders should invest in quality assurance 
around youth services, appropriate to the 
size of the organisation, to secure minimum 
standards and consistency of provision. This 
will help to ensure young people have access to 
safe spaces and high quality youth work, and will 
foster a culture of continuous improvement.
40) Central Government investment should provide 
national and local infrastructure support to 
enable coordinated and collaborative working 
and sustainability of youth services to allow 
grassroots organisations to focus on frontline 
delivery. This should include the establishment 
of a joined-up youth offer (voluntary and 
statutory) at a local and national level to 
coordinate opportunities that are available to 
young people. This should be underpinned 
by the establishment of the new Local Youth 
Partnerships across the country, acknowledging 
the important role civil society organisations 
have in providing this service.
41) Youth organisations and other stakeholders 
should avoid outwardly framing themselves as 
being involved in ‘violence reduction’. Wherever 
possible, youth organisations should take an 
asset-based approach to working with young 
people, explicitly framing their work around the 
provision of opportunity, skills and inclusion. 
We hope that the YVC’s findings and 
recommendations will provide welcome support 
to each of the regional VRUs in their task of driving 
forward genuine public health approaches to 
reducing serious violence. While the size of this 
task should not be underestimated, it is one we are 
confident can be met provided that the political 
will exists to drive forward the Commission’s 
recommendations. 
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Alex Atherton, Education 
Consultant and former Head 
Teacher 
A Public Health Approach Can 
Work in Education Too
It has been a privilege to be part of 
the Youth Violence Commission, and to work alongside 
professionals from a range of services and see how this 
has been shaped into a final set of recommendations. 
Through this we have sought to model how a public 
health approach can be used to best effect to drive 
down levels of serious youth violence, particularly that 
which results in the loss of life.
My time as a secondary school headteacher showed 
me that the vast majority of teachers go into the 
profession for the same reasons as I did: to make a 
difference and support young people in reaching 
their potential. There are no worse examples of 
wasted potential than the tragedy of either a death or 
a long prison sentence. The work of the Commission 
has shown that the waste does not stop there. The 
costs associated with every tragedy are immense, and 
the only practical way of reducing them is to cut the 
number of tragedies themselves. Human costs aside, 
it is a highly inefficient way to run a country.
 
Schools can contribute a great deal to understanding 
the causes of youth violence, most notably to finding 
solutions for individual cases. I can think of many 
students where the work of the school and its staff did 
everything to reduce the chances of a serious incident 
and were successful in doing so. I also remember 
the times when I was reminded that the chances 
can never be eliminated, and those who suffered 
were often not those thought to be most at risk. Co-
ordination across services can make an enormous 
difference. A meeting of professionals more often 
than not unearthed new information which provided 
the breakthrough. Those synergies are invaluable, but 
if services no longer have the capacity to send staff to 
those meetings and have those discussions, they are 
lost. School cuts usually lead to support staff cuts, and 
it is often those members of staff who can make the 
biggest difference to vulnerable young people.
 
Supporting the needs of the most vulnerable is often 
expensive in terms of time and resources, but the right 
interventions can ensure the cost is both temporary 
and also tiny when compared to those associated with 
youth violence. Without significant additional resources 
schools will not be able to make the difference and 
spare the cost to the public purse in the future.
 
Teachers cannot make any difference to young 
people if they are not on roll at a school. It is worth 
reflecting for a moment on how the phrase ‘off 
rolling’ ever came into being and why the process of 
inspection has to focus on the integrity of institutions 
set up to serve the needs of children. The bewildered 
look I get when I explain the concept to those who 
work in education abroad says everything.
The school system has changed a great deal in recent 
years, but the statutory guidance which governs 
admissions was last published in 2014. Thousands of 
young people are falling out of the system and never 
getting back in. This includes those with a permanent 
exclusion on their record. The Admissions Code 
needs to be reviewed as a matter of urgency and 
enable local authorities to intervene so all children 
are educated. The Butler Act of 1944 delivered this, 
restoring this principle is an urgent priority. Local 
authorities will also require additional resources for 
delivery. Again, this is a small outlay when compared 
to the alternatives.
 
Ofsted’s focus on off-rolling is welcome, but the 
significance of the issue means that the impact needs 
to be measured in its first year. They also cannot 
be expected to manage this issue alone given its 
engagement with each school comes on average 
every few years. Local authorities engage with schools 
on a weekly basis and know who is playing games or 
not taking their share of vulnerable children.
There has been much national publicity about the 
recruitment and retention crisis in schools, and it is 
well founded. The focus on supporting teachers in 
their first years in the profession provides the ideal 
opportunity for deeper professional development 
and engagement. Understanding attachment and 
trauma, amongst other areas, really matters for the 
future of the many thousands of young people who 
have had Adverse Childhood Experiences. Teachers 
who understand the children in front of them have a 
much better chance of staying in the profession, and 
enabling them to fulfil their potential.
Duncan Bew, Consultant Trauma 
and Acute Surgeon at College 
Hospital London
Healing a Traumatised Society: 
A Shared Obligation to Care, a 
Shared Opportunity to Thrive
The development of national major trauma networks 
has led to significant improvements in the care of 
patients with major traumatic injury, yet the greatest 
opportunity to reduce the burden of the disease 
of trauma is in its prevention. Possibly the greatest 
change which has improved trauma care is a shared 
mindset and agreed operating procedures, working 
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together to form a chain of survival. In a similar way, 
violence prevention and the safeguarding of those 
who are vulnerable requires the responsibility of us all, 
working together to provide a continuum of support. 
Cofactors associated with violence are shared with 
many other public health challenges and addressing 
all of these is essential for population health, and 
the true wealth of our society. We have a moral 
obligation to safeguard those who are vulnerable, but 
there is also an economic imperative to invest in the 
sustainable social development of communities to 
enable them to thrive. 
Public health approaches to violence can be effective 
but must have a true understanding of the local risks 
and deliver relevant, culturally credible interventions 
in partnership with families and communities, rather 
than being imposed upon them. Multi-agency 
collaboration is essential and it is crucial that partner 
organisations understand their shared strategy 
and use the same terminology and definitions. 
Organisations must view each other as mutually 
compatible partners rather than competing rivals in 
their coproduction and delivery and be prepared to 
share their information and insight which is so vital 
for swift, early and effective intervention. Violence 
is not inevitable and is preventable, but it is also not 
an inevitable product of social inclusion and wealth. 
Public health approaches must be supported by 
enforcement from a police force that is adequately 
resourced to be able to proactively engage with and 
protect communities with mutual respect. 
Both victims and perpetrators of violence have 
often witnessed or suffered repeated physical and 
psychological trauma from violence as children. 
Potential solutions to reducing violence have so far 
been hampered by a misunderstanding of the diverse 
challenges individuals in different communities face, 
often determined by an assumed political narrative 
rather than fact and an impatience to be seen to 
produce results. Other than in a small number of 
Violence Reduction Units, this has resulted in a lack 
of long term coordinated strategy sustained beyond 
political cycles or which effectively addresses the 
reality of the structurally violent environments in 
which people live. Short term strategy has focused 
predominantly on enforcement and secondary 
prevention which offers a very recognisable (and 
potentially valuable) intervention but only after harm 
has already occurred. Primary prevention offers huge 
potential to safeguard, educate and inspire positive 
futures as well as civic and first aid preparedness, but 
significantly lacks the investment required to support 
a comprehensive public health approach.
Society has branded knives, gangs and young people 
as a cause of violence, when they are instead the 
most visible symptoms of violence as a much more 
complex endemic societal disease. Families on 
adjacent streets are living parallel lives with polarised 
aspirations and opportunities, and dedicated parents 
suffering in work poverty working multiple jobs 
struggle to support their children.  Our most deprived 
communities face discriminatory criminalisation. For 
many of the most vulnerable children, emotional, 
physical and sexual violence can become normalised 
and for some an inevitability. The lack of safe 
spaces, the ability to make safe journeys and often 
the absence of a trusted adult in their lives is a true 
reflection that they are being failed by our society, 
rather than failing it themselves. Their perceived 
failure to make the right choice is often due to an 
absence of choices for them to make. 
Healthcare has a pivotal role to play in the physical 
and psychological care of patients who are injured 
as a result of violence, the prevention of future 
harm and also as an inspirational employer in every 
community. Caring moments offer an opportunity 
to safeguard and a teachable moment for those at 
risk, but they are also teachable moments for us to 
listen, to understand and appreciate unmet needs, 
expectations and environments which place our most 
vulnerable at risk. 
In a trauma-informed approach we can enable 
effective reachable moments of primary prevention. 
In identifying these risks, effective sharing of data 
across networks must strive to ensure systems of care 
provide continuing support and prevent unrealistic 
thresholds of access or gaps between professional 
silos into which the most vulnerable can fall. This 
understanding can also enable us to effectively target 
the allocation of limited resources to guide primary 
prevention and thereby always place those who are 
most vulnerable at the heart of our care. There is 
now significant potential for the government to make 
this a reality for violence prevention and in doing so 
the social development goals of the SDG2030 (UN 
Sustainable Development Goals 2030) agenda. 
NHS networks of health care provide an incredible 
opportunity to work in partnership with violence and 
injury prevention networks to deliver and evaluate 
evidence-based prevention. 
Every interaction we make is an intervention and we 
must make every encounter count. 
Nicky Bullard, Chairwoman 
and CCO of MRM/McCann 
(Relationship Marketing Company)
The Creative Responsibility: From 
Hype to Hope 
If I had to choose one thing 
that I took from this report, it’s the breakdown of 
relationships.  With parents in early years. With 
educators. With communities.  With social workers.  
With the police.  With each other.  
And you could call the report a depressing read.  
However, this three-year deep dive has given us 
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an understanding of the scope and nature of the 
problem, and now, if the Violence Reduction Units get 
the long-term funding and empowerment they need, 
we will have the hope.
The opportunity ‘to do good work, that does good’.  
That’s why I joined the advertising industry.  
And of course, we all want to do explosive campaigns 
for big brands, win awards, be famous.  
But doing meaningful work for those household 
names, that is really why we are here.
So, are we doing good work when it comes to our 
portrayal of UK Youth?
Or could it be doing more harm than good?
I’ve taken a look at some relevant data my agency 
network has drawn from the last 4 years, which 
provides a glimpse at UK youth attitudes, values 
and beliefs.  And I’ve had a think about what we, the 
marketing industry, can do about it.
The loss of belonging
Community.  It’s a big word.  Where are our youth 
finding it?  Well it’s not in the places they live.  It’s in 
social media. Why? It’s a sad fact that 55% of UK 18-24 
year olds consider themselves to be in a minority 
group. And 17% of 18-24 year olds believe it’s more 
important to live by your own rules rather than those 
set out by others. 
Yet to be part of a community, and not ostracised 
from it, you need to follow that community’s accepted 
norms and guidelines. So, smaller communities are 
formed online, centered around a passion point or 
shared belief that all of the community’s members buy 
into (a marketer’s dream right?). And then of course, 
if you no longer buy into that shared belief, you can 
leave that online community easily and without pain.  
And be instantly accepted into another. Unlike in the 
real world.
Marketing Industry challenge:  How do we leverage 
the power of these online communities to bring that 
sense of belonging to our real-life communities?
The loss of hope
70% of UK 18-24 year olds don’t think they can plan 
for their future due to uncertainty in the world today. 
81% say it’s harder to trust people in their area than 
it was in the past. And 20% would be willing to join 
a counter-crime/terrorism advocacy organisation.  
That’s 1/5 of our youth finding belonging here, rather 
than the communities they live in.
Industry challenge:  Let’s not hype ‘gangsta’ life to the 
20%.  Why not help brands be part of a ‘future plan’ 
for the 70%? 
Brands can bring hope.  
And the data shows it’s also good for business. 58% 
of Gen Z say that they have bought a product solely 
because the brand took a stand on an issue they 
care about.  And 70% said they’d be prepared to pay 
more for it. Advertising can help counter feelings of 
isolation, with 62% of UK young people saying that 
advertising has really helped broaden their exposure 
to other cultures and communities.
And here comes the responsibility for brands and 
their agencies.
80% of UK 18-24 year olds say that brands should 
DO MORE to improve everyday life. 79% think global 
brands have a greater ability to create positive change 
than the government does. 83% of UK 18-24 year olds 
think that global brands have the power to make the 
world a better place.
Conclusion: Hype or hope?
As an industry, it’s not enough to simply reflect our 
youth in our work, show that we ‘get them’, be edgy 
for the sake of cool.  We have to stop the hype of 
the stereotype. Be a community catalyst. Show the 
positivity that young Londoner’s are bringing.
It’s time to hype the hope.
Sources: Truth about New Europe 2018, Truth about 
Youth 2019, Truth About Global Brands 2017, Meta Q 
2019
Pippa Goodfellow, Director of the 
Standing Committee for Youth 
Justice
Rethinking ‘Justice’ for Young 
People
 
This welcome report provides 
a comprehensive analysis of the context in which 
violence has been exacerbated in recent years, 
leaving communities feeling unsupported and unsafe. 
It also highlights the potential to bring about lasting 
change through investment in communities, through 
early help, access to opportunity and addressing 
structural inequalities. There is no question that 
the future response must address the issues and 
recommendations raised in this report, which should 
serve as a pressing call to action for change. 
Alongside this focus on early intervention and 
prevention, the role of the criminal justice system 
must be considered - but with a focus on minimising 
its use rather than as the source of long-term 
solutions. The mantra that ‘we can’t arrest our way out 
of the problem’ is backed up by a growing body of 
evidence that diverting children away from the formal 
youth justice system reduces offending and brings 
about more positive sustainable outcomes. Moves 
towards enforcement and punitive measures that are 
not grounded in evidence risk hampering positive 
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developments in preventative work. The introduction 
of criminal justice measures should be thought 
through carefully and cautiously, to guard against 
damaging and counterproductive consequences.
The commitment to funding 20,000 additional police 
officers is, on the face of it, a welcome development. 
But an effective public health approach to addressing 
violence will require a simultaneous commitment 
to investing in community-based and child-centred 
policing, rather than a narrow focus on enforcement 
and stop and search. Additionally, if these extra police 
officers are successfully recruited, then other public 
services including youth offending teams, youth work, 
mental health and social care will need additional 
resources. Police must be able to signpost and divert 
the young people they encounter into early help 
services with sufficient capacity to provide them with 
the necessary support. 
The imminent introduction of Knife Crime Prevention 
Orders exemplifies the absence of an evidence-
informed and joined-up approach. They did not 
receive the level of consultation, parliamentary 
scrutiny, or impact assessment appropriate for 
legislation with such wide-reaching potential, and 
were rushed through despite a wide coalition 
of professional bodies and voluntary sector 
organisations expressing strong concerns. There is 
no evidence that they will prevent harmful behaviour 
or address the root causes of knife carrying. If it is 
suspected, not certain, that they have carried a knife 
twice in two years, children as young as twelve can be 
given an order lasting up to two years. The order can 
stipulate where they go, when they have to be indoors 
and what they can look at and say on social media. 
Breaching that civil order could see them getting a 
prison sentence of up to two years. 
Neither is there any evidence that the threat of 
custody acts as a deterrent for young people caught 
up in violence. Since the introduction of mandatory 
minimum custodial sentencing for weapon 
possession offences in 2015, numbers of children and 
young adults convicted of possession or threatening 
offences involving knives or offensive weapons have 
risen. Sending children to prison is damaging, harmful 
and has a criminogenic effect. Custody should be 
reserved for the most severe offences, where there 
is a serious risk of harm to the public and all other 
options have been fully explored.
The Serious Violence Bill will introduce of a new legal 
duty on agencies to share information and work 
together to combat serious violence. But without 
widespread investment in additional resources this 
implementation is wholly inappropriate for services 
already tasked with rising demand and shrinking 
budgets. Will the information that agencies are forced 
to share count as ‘intelligence’ that could be used 
as justification for stop and searches, or to impose a 
Knife Crime Prevention Order? Rather than promoting 
early intervention and diversion, the duty could have 
the unintended consequence of creating a dragnet, 
pulling more children into the criminal justice system, 
and further marginalising them. 
Violence affecting young people is the product of 
complex and deep-rooted issues within our society, 
but it is not inevitable. As is clearly demonstrated 
in this report, effective violence prevention means 
dealing with this complexity, including young people 
in the development of solutions, and investing 
in organisations and programmes rooted in the 
communities that are most affected. There is no need 
to reinvent the wheel, but agencies are often working 
without the strategic support and resources they 
need to be effective. We need a system that receives 
the recognition and funding it deserves, enabling 
appropriate and holistic support for children and 
young people where and when it is needed to keep 
them safe.  
Charlie Howard, Consultant 
Clinical Psychologist, Founder 
MAC-UK
Mental Health with Young People 
at the Heart
I’m a Consultant Clinical 
Psychologist and I was delighted when The London 
Mayor announced a Violence Reduction Unit for 
London. It was a bold move by Sadiq Khan and he 
should be applauded. It had been wanting for a while. 
But it was of course the start. The challenge for all of 
us remains how we make this happen. 
Years ago, when I talked about mental health as a 
solution to the violence on our streets, I was the lone 
voice in the room. This is no longer the case (thank 
goodness) but the question remains how to do mental 
health well. Many of the young people bedevilled 
by the complexity of violence, won’t fit into the 
‘traditional’ mental health service model. They might 
not recognise that they have needs. They might not be 
able to get to the place where they have to go for help, 
service might move too slowly, or their lives might 
simply be too chaotic for anyone else to join them. 
Working from the ground up, co-delivering mental 
health interventions with and for young people, has 
taught me one overriding thing: we have to create the 
solutions with young people. And I don’t just mean 
the front of house but the back of house too: the 
policies, the risk assessments, the whole lot. Working 
in this way gives us structures that work better but 
more importantly, we foster trust with young people 
and we erode power. These are powerful ingredients 
for a healthy mind. 
When we take the time to listen, young people 
describe wanting mental health support that is highly 
flexible and creative. It’s about going to where they 
are, delivering what they want, when they need it. The 
bigger thing we need to get our heads around is how 
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to recruit and train the staff to deliver this work. It’s 
not as simple as buying in mental health clinicians and 
relocating them on the streets. In fact, this entirely 
misses the point.  
A Violence Reduction Unit that takes a good 
approach to mental health in London will invest in the 
training of mental health staff and their organisations. 
It will help them to ‘get it’ and to adapt how they 
work. But above all, it will do this with young people. 
They are the ones who taught me to adapt my clinical 
practice. Nothing else came close.   Without them we 
won’t succeed. 
Mental health has to be about them, with them and 
for them. And it has to be about changing what’s in 
their worlds (the wider systems) as well as what’s in 
their heads.
Whitney Iles, CEO Project 507
From Violence Reduction to 
Positive Peace
‘Violence reduction’ is both too 
limited an ambition and too 
negative a perspective – that’s why 
I’m passionate about creating a societal culture where 
peace can exist.
Research on adverse childhood experiences is still 
expanding, and we are continually learning about 
the nature, scope and effects of trauma.  If we are 
willing to recognise the devastating repercussions 
that seeing, hearing or being subjected to domestic 
violence can have on a child, then we should 
also acknowledge the severe impact that racism, 
Islamophobia, homophobia and other forms of 
hate crime can have on children and young people. 
All trauma-centred work needs to include an 
understanding of social injustices and their effects on 
the mind of a child.
Traumatic experiences can and do express 
themselves through behaviour. They also have a 
biological impact on the brain and within the body; 
in the words of Robert C. Scaer, MD, the body bears 
the burden. The physical aspect of trauma needs 
to be taken into consideration when designing and 
delivering interventions with children and young 
people. Person and behaviour focused interventions, 
however, must be part of a more comprehensive 
programme of societal change. 
Ignoring how societal factors contribute to an 
individual’s behaviour -- placing behaviour solely 
as the responsibility of the child or adolescent – 
constitutes an injustice to those individuals and 
the broader communities in which they live. It 
ignores the often racist and oppressive policies that 
have contributed to the lack of opportunities and 
resources within these communities. If we take into 
consideration these broader issues that influence 
behaviour, as well as the different identity groups 
to which the individual relates, this will enable 
interventions to be more productive. 
One of the most important aspects of healing trauma 
is healthy relationships. All professional adults who 
engage in working relationships with children and 
adolescents affected by violence should be qualified, 
monitored and held accountable for their work. 
Accountability does not mean we need to create 
another white-westernised quality standard model 
that excludes grassroots work. It does, however, 
mean that we need to work together to develop a 
new, authentic culture of accountability and quality 
assurance. 
We, as a society, have made good progress in 
decreasing the number of children in custody. 
However, statistics show that this has been most 
effective with the white British population, and we 
still have a way to go in terms of how we successfully 
engage with black, brown and other minority groups. 
Part of the solution is being able to effectively 
engage community organisations into the criminal 
justice system and changing how we perceive and 
manage risk. 
The main focus of strategic planning moving forward 
should not be one of ‘violence reduction’, but that 
of creating and maintaining what Galtung refers to 
as ‘positive peace’. By using evidence and practical 
inventions, such as the ‘Peace Indicators’, we can 
change how we measure success and outcomes. By 
dealing with the root causes of violence and creating 
community-specific measurements of peace, rather 
than myopically chasing generic, police or funding-
driven performance indicators, we will empower 
communities to create significant and sustainable 
change. 
Mat Ilic, Chief Development 
Officer, Catch22; former Special 
Adviser to the Prime Minister
Giving Back Control
This might sound strange, but 
even sat at a desk in the country’s 
most famous building and a few rooms away from 
the Prime Minister, there are days when you feel 
completely powerless in the fight against serious 
youth violence. The morning after a teenage murder 
has happened in faraway Manchester, for example; 
or the day that you are due to meet bereaved families 
to try and comprehend what more can be done 
through victim support services. There can be a lack 
of grip and control; but there is seldom a shortage of 
sympathy and concern.  
I have been engaged in work surrounding this 
issue for the past decade, from City Hall to 
Whitehall, and community sector in between. 
As I write this, the latest crime statistics confirm 
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that knife crime is at its highest since records 
began. The problem is growing and mutating, 
becoming more flagrant, at times even affecting 
young people (and adults) with no connection to 
criminal peers, or a background of misbehaviour or 
neglect. We all can, and must, do more. 
Interest in social issues such as violence waxes and 
wanes. Concerns about crime and safety have shot 
up into the top five issues of matter to the public, 
with traditional and new media being in a position to 
broadcast incidents almost in real time. It is therefore 
no surprise that the Government is making law and 
order one of its principal domestic priorities. The 
commitment to reducing violence – through additional 
police funding as well as the parallel investment in 
Violence Reduction Units – needs to be viewed in this 
context. It goes without saying that the politicians will 
want to see results from their intervention, in the form 
of reduced homicides and weapon-enabled injuries, 
especially among young people.
Funding and legislation are two of the main things 
that Whitehall can deliver, and on this issue, both have 
been committed (the legislation being the stated 
intent to introduce a public health duty to prevent 
violence). The urgency, in response to public interest 
and media pressure, is crucial and welcomed. What 
we can demand now is more intelligent design: 
connecting the cash closer to the root of the problem, 
for example, greater precision and problem solving 
in policing, not simply a blunt commitment to ‘more’ 
stop and search). 
The Commission deserves all the credit for its 
consistency and drive for the adoption of a public 
health approach to violence reduction. Adoption has 
happened, but long-term retention will depend on 
whether this works: and in order for it to work, the 
recommendations of this report (adopting solutions 
based on the ‘best available theory, data and analysis’) 
need to be taken on. Perhaps even more importantly, 
it is now for communities (defined as anything from 
towns, cities, local authorities, neighbourhoods) to 
take control and drive long term change. I think only 
they can. It is too important and fragile to be left to 
politics alone.
Ebinehita Iyere, Founder of Milk 
and Honey (a female-led safe 
space that empowers young 
women and helps them to heal 
from their experiences)
Girls, Young Women and Their 
Unheard and Unhealed Trauma
 
The Youth Violence Commission’s final report lays 
bare how society has failed to address the root 
causes of serious violence that devastates the lives of 
so many young people and communities. Drawing 
on the views and experiences of professionals from 
across the sector, this report provides an important 
insight into what is happening on the ground, both 
to understand the impact of youth violence, and to 
reduce levels of violence in the future. 
The final report has, however, like many reports, 
neglected to provide sufficient attention to young 
women. It has failed, for example, to look at how 
young women respond to traumatic experiences 
-- how their loyalty, rules and roles within their 
communities are central aspects of youth violence, 
which we must strive to better understand. There is 
extensive research on, and frontline work for, young 
women who are subjected to child sexual exploitation 
(CSE). However, young women who do not fall into the 
‘CSE’ bracket are often missed and lost in the system, 
due in large part to the stereotypes with which they 
are labelled. This in turn increases the likelihood of 
these young women having negative experiences 
and contact with various adults across many of our 
institutions, including education, justice, health and 
social care.
I started my career working predominantly with 
young males in the Youth Justice System and across 
various communities in London. Every time an incident 
occurred, such as an arrest, a fight or a stabbing, it 
would be a young female that would call me to explain 
who they were and also what had happened; this 
pattern repeated itself many times. These girls were 
aged as young as 11, and as old as 27, but most of 
them were between 13 and18 years of age. They also 
tended to be young black girls, as the sad reality is that 
black boys are disproportionately affected by serious 
violence in the areas where I work in London. 
There are so many young women who are unhealed 
and unheard due to the traumatic impact of youth 
violence, who uphold contextual and cultural rules 
such as ‘no snitching’ and roles such as ‘keepers’ of 
their environment. Most have had a lack of consistent 
positive attachment figures and therefore have 
some of the highest social and emotional needs. 
The lack of support for these young women leaves 
many likely to experience negative contact within the 
education, justice, health and social care systems; 
they are managed and labelled as a problem, while 
the problems they have experienced are disregarded 
or overlooked.
Although some research has been conducted on the 
role(s) women play in gangs, insufficient attention 
has been given to the supportive roles many young 
women play that have nothing to do with gangs, such 
as their ‘brother’s keeper’ – a role that can bring with 
it traumatic experiences directly or vicariously from 
violence, loss, bereavement and family breakdown. 
These girls have always had to play protective roles, 
directly or indirectly, sometimes in positive ways, 
sometimes negative. Their role as ‘protector’ is 
expected due to certain unwritten rules, including 
those stemming from the roles they have seen older 
women play: to nurture the males around them; to 
ensure that boys and young men are coping and safe. 
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Instead of being given the time and space to 
grieve, girls often have to wear a suit of armour – to 
immediately adopt the role of protector, caring for 
the boys and young men around them who have 
been directly involved in serious violence. Girls 
put out the flowers, girls organise the funerals or 
memorial services, girls are on the phone at night to 
boys who can’t sleep and are crying because they’re 
so traumatised and don’t feel they can speak to 
other males. 
In short, girls are spending more time and energy 
mobilising for others than they are healing 
themselves. This is why I founded Milk and Honey 
in 2016, an organisation for young women who 
are either involved in, at-risk of being involved in, 
or who have already witnessed, traumatic events. 
We offer young women a therapeutic safe space 
where they can express their trauma using creative, 
expressive arts and where they can flourish and 
take ownership of their healing, empowerment and 
resilience (HER) through one-to-one sessions and 
group projects. My work with young people through 
Milk and Honey has shown me the lack of child and 
adolescent mental health and therapeutic services 
for all children and young people, but particularly for 
those from BME communities who have experienced 
loss, bereavement and grief in the communities most 
affected by violence.
It is easy to see why there has been a focus on the 
male experience of violence, but it leaves a serious 
blind spot. Apart from brief soundbites provided 
by distraught mothers or sisters on television in the 
aftermath of a murder, we rarely hear about the ways 
in which youth violence hurts young women and girls. 
Male faces and voices typically feature at the centre 
of debates, rendering other perspectives secondary. 
If we as a society are serious about understanding 
and curing the epidemic of knife crime and violence, 
we ought to be trying to capture a much more 
diverse range of experiences and personal insights – 
especially if those experiences and insights are those 
of the girls and women who have, for decades, had 
to pick up the pieces when a community experiences 
the tragic loss of a young life. 
The lack of resource dedicated to, and research 
on, young girls impacted by the trauma of youth 
violence, as well as black girls who experience 
disproportionately negative contact across many 
of our societal institutions, is a major failing that 
must be addressed. That is why I am recommending 
extensive research is conducted in two areas: 1) 
the traumatic impact youth violence has on young 
girls; and 2) specific research on black girls and 
their negative experiences across many societal 
institutions, including education, social care, health 
and the criminal justice system. We cannot continue 
to ignore and neglect the trauma that devastates 
the lives of so many girls and young women in 
the UK – it is something that we must address as a 
matter of urgency. 
Pastor Ben Lindsay, CEO Power 
the Fight
Harnessing the Potential and 
Resources of Faith Groups
As a pastor, community leader 
and charity CEO, I welcome the 
final report of the Youth Violence Commission. This 
in-depth report looks at the root causes of violence 
between young people and gains insight from a 
wide range of sources, presenting a holistic view 
which is often missing. It is refreshing to see an 
acknowledgment of the role faith groups can play 
in the reduction of youth violence and the creation 
of more peaceful communities. The findings of this 
report will undoubtedly further encourage faith 
groups to identify the contributions they can make 
to these objectives. Youth violence is an issue which 
belongs to the whole of society – not just to particular 
groups – and so it requires all of us to play our part. 
With recent research showing that spending on 
youth services in England and Wales has been cut by 
70% in the last decade, resulting in a loss of £1bn of 
investment and zero funding in some areas 
, the need for faith groups to increase their 
commitment to youth work has become more 
urgent. Since the budget cuts in 2011, youth clubs 
have closed and front-line youth services have 
been eradicated. According to research by Unison, 
freedom of information requests from 168 local 
authorities across the UK show that youth services 
lost at least £60m of funding between 2012 and 2014. 
More than 2000 jobs were lost. Around 350 youth 
centres closed and 41,000 youth service places for 
young people and at least 35,000 hours of outreach 
work by youth workers were cut. 
 
Faith groups have access to three resources that, due 
to the austerity measures of the last decade, are now 
in short supply: buildings, unrestricted funds and 
volunteers. Many faith groups own buildings and halls 
in the heart of their communities at a time when public 
space is increasingly under threat. A study published 
in BMJ Open in 2018 identified the hours after 
school as a period of significantly heightened risk of 
violence for school-aged children, with the majority of 
incidents occurring close to home and school. Places 
of worship, like other public buildings, are vital to our 
communities and if accessible to young people, can 
offer places of refuge. 
With unrestricted funds, mainly from congregational 
giving, faith groups are able to be more responsive 
to needs in their community by delivering funds to 
organisations and individuals in need much faster 
than public sector grants can. Faith groups have 
established cultures of volunteering and a long 
history of providing support to families and young 
people in the UK. They consistently provide free and 
safe spaces for children and young people through 
Sunday schools, youth clubs and programmes for 
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students and young adults. They often include 
free meals, providing community and nutrition to 
young people who otherwise may be home alone. 
Faith groups offer mentoring, advice, support and 
guidance that, due to austerity, statutory services 
struggle to provide. They provide connection to an 
intergenerational community, which can help to build 
resilience against criminality and violence.  
Tragically, some faith groups have been slow to 
respond to safeguarding issues, sometimes due to 
negligence and in other cases, due to a willingness 
to help the vulnerable without understanding the 
risks and complexities involved. Across the board, 
faith groups must learn the lessons and improve in 
the area of child protection. While many have strong 
safeguarding procedures in place, we know there 
have been many high-profile incidents where faith 
groups have either ignored basic safeguarding 
procedures or have out of date policies. As a member 
of the Contextual Safeguarding network, I encourage 
all faith groups to take this seriously and to be open to 
fresh approaches that can improve their practice and 
keep young people safe. 
Diversity and inclusion is also an important issue for 
faith communities to engage with and respond to. 
While some groups are uniquely placed to develop 
leaders from ethnically diverse backgrounds, in other 
cases, they can struggle to find youth leaders from 
the context they are serving and therefore lack the 
cultural competency to serve their local community 
with understanding. Often, there can be a lack of a 
leadership pipeline for working class young people, 
because of a reliance on unpaid internships and gap 
years, which tend to be more accessible to white 
middle class young people. 
At Power the Fight we advocate for a partnership 
approach in which faith groups receive effective 
training and support as well as access to a network of 
well-resourced services. The goal is that the bringing 
together of all of these groups will form part of a wider 
public health response. 
With evidence proving the existence of a ‘school-
exclusion to pupil referral unit to prison pipeline’, 
it is clear that this needs to be disrupted through 
more nurturing school environments (as pioneered 
in Glasgow). While fixed period and permanent 
exclusions are the highest in England and Wales 
since 2012 it’s heartening to see faith-based charities 
like Transforming Lives for Good (TLG) working in 
partnership with local churches to develop alternative 
education provision. 
With the number of police officers in England 
and Wales falling by 20,600 between March 2010 
and March 2019 and a growing ‘wall of silence’ 
between officers and the communities they serve, 
confidence in the police – and particularly by minority 
communities - is low. Faith groups - often in a position 
of trust – can be uniquely placed to build stronger 
relationships between the community and the police. 
Some faith groups have, for example, held prayer 
meetings where the police are given the opportunity 
to share about their work, answer questions and hear 
concerns and observations from the general public. 
Faith leaders often hold critical insights that might 
support criminal investigations but often do not have 
clear pathways or procedures to assist the police. 
There are examples of good partnership work, such 
as Project Mosaic, an interfaith initiative in Greenwich 
south east London, which brings faith leaders 
together with the local authority and Greenwich MET 
police. 
Faith groups have a clear mandate to stand with those 
who mourn.  In my experience it is often people of 
faith supporting families through grief, conducting 
funerals and ‘nine nights’ and providing support to 
traumatised youth, who for various reasons find it 
difficult to access therapeutic services. 
Many churches, mosques, temples and synagogues 
are the glue in their local community. With the right 
training, faith groups could be a major resource in 
the ongoing battle to reduce youth violence. This will 
require policy-makers to engage with faith leaders 
and listen to a wide range of community voices. It 
will require faith groups to open themselves up to 
receiving training and specialist support. It will require 
different parts of the community getting better at 
working together for the common good of our towns 
and cities. Clearer guidance is needed to facilitate 
effective collaboration between local authorities and 
faith groups. 
Through my work with Power the Fight I have seen 
first-hand the change that comes when people work 
together. This is why I am heartened that partnership 
and collaboration is at the centre of this report. 
Temi Mwale, CEO The 4Front 
Project
Rethinking Peace and Justice: 
Addressing Structural Violence 
and Institutional Racism
The 4Front Project is a member-led 
youth organisation on a mission to empower young 
people and communities to fight for justice, peace 
and freedom. I set up the organisation in 2012 to 
support people with direct experiences of violence 
and the criminal justice system to create change; 
in their own lives, communities and society. I have 
welcomed the increased attempts to examine the 
root causes of serious youth violence in recent years. 
The work of the Youth Violence Commission certainly 
falls within this context. Recognising poverty and 
rising inequality; social, educational and economic 
marginalisation and exclusion; as well as unaddressed 
trauma and mental health issues, as prominent causes 
of this violence brings us closer to the solutions. 
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However, whilst the general public discourse about 
serious youth violence in the UK continues to be 
highly racialised, it is extremely disappointing that 
institutional racism was not identified as a cause of 
serious youth violence in this report. It is certainly true 
that violence affects young people across the UK, 
but it remains a fact that young Black men and boys 
are disproportionately represented as the victims of 
this violence. Between 2015/16 and 2017/18, Black 
children made up 20% of all child victims and a higher 
proportion of Black homicides were against children 
- 17% of Black victims were 17 or younger, compared 
to an average of 11% across all ethnicities (Ministry 
of Justice: Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System 2018). For the most part, the efforts to explain 
this disproportionality have failed to progress beyond 
the age-old racist narratives that seek to link violence 
and crime more generally, inextricably with Blackness. 
Whilst there was some exploration of specific 
barriers that face young Black people in Part 1 of this 
report, it is disconcerting that this was not examined 
further. The report explores poverty and housing, 
school exclusion, unemployment, and the criminal 
justice system without highlighting that (1) Black 
people are most likely to live in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods (Office for National Statistics, 
2018); (2) Black children are disproportionately 
excluded from schools (Department for Education, 
2020); (3) the unemployment rate for young Black 
men aged 16-24 is higher than for most other 
groups (House of Commons Library: Unemployment 
by ethnic background, 2020); and (4) Black people 
are disproportionately represented at every stage 
of the criminal justice system (Ministry of Justice: 
Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 
2018). Evidentially, a gap remains within this space 
for a nuanced account of the relationship between 
young Black people and serious youth violence. 
Institutional racism must become central to our 
analysis of this disproportionality. 
Since the launch of this Commission, trauma 
and adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have 
increasingly become part of the mainstream 
conversation about serious youth violence. It 
is unfortunate that in many ways, these terms 
have become ‘buzz words’, often used without 
full explanation or understanding. Furthermore, 
the traditional ACEs survey fails to substantially 
incorporate the trauma that can be inflicted on 
children directly by institutions (particularly criminal 
justice institutions). How can such institutions 
promote and use a ‘trauma informed approach’ 
without recognising the trauma that they can cause? 
The positioning of a public health approach as 
the overall solution, with many institutions already 
claiming to implement this approach, is unsettling, 
particularly where these claims lack substance. 
Without the adequate support in place for victims, 
it is hard to envision a system that can provide the 
necessary support to whole communities that are 
traumatised. Furthermore, the framing of violence as 
a ‘disease’ that can be transmitted, often fails to move 
beyond individual accountability which runs the risk of 
upholding the systems which generate violence. 
I am dubious of this report recommending that the 
police focus on a truly intelligence-led stop and 
search approach whilst also acknowledging that there 
is no evidence that stop and search is an effective 
policy. We must continue to question what this 
police ‘intelligence’ is and how it is obtained. This is 
particularly important when we consider the use of 
‘intelligence’ in establishing ‘gang’ lists which have 
breached data protection laws. We cannot accept the 
framing of these tools as ‘intelligence-led’ as a means 
to justify the disproportionate targeting of young 
Black people. 
More than two decades after the Macpherson report 
acknowledged institutional racism within the police, 
young Black boys are still over-policed and under 
protected. Furthermore, the lack of accountability for 
historical failures has led to the lack of legitimacy of 
policing in the eyes of many Black people. Overall, 
‘crime’ should not be the predominant lens through 
which young Black people are seen and their 
experiences understood. Not only is this distorted, 
but incredibly dangerous, as it prevents young Black 
people from accessing adequate support, offering 
instead, only punishment. 
I do not believe that the recommendation for a 
further reduction to the number of young people in 
the secure estate goes far enough. In 2017, the Chief 
Inspector of Prisons said that youth custody centres 
in England and Wales were so unsafe that a “tragedy” 
was “inevitable” and that “not a single establishment 
inspected was safe to hold young people”. How 
can we reconcile our understanding of trauma with 
the existence of these establishments which have 
been exposed as perpetuating further violence and 
harm? The disproportionate representation of young 
Black people in the youth estate also highlights 
the disproportionate impact of this harm on them. 
Overall, our approach should focus on the needs of 
children, as opposed to treating them as risks that 
need to be managed. As Angela Davis said, “prisons 
do not disappear social problems, they disappear 
human beings”. 
It is positive that this report recommends that 
structures are put in place to ensure that young 
people’s voices are at the heart of decision making 
that affects them. Whilst capturing youth voice is 
important, work that empowers the young people 
most directly impacted by violence and the criminal 
justice system to drive change should be furthered. 
We must ensure that movements for change are 
youth-led. 
At The 4Front Project, we were able to transition away 
from framing our work around violence reduction 
to a broader more positive focus on building 
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peace. There is an important distinction between 
the two, not just in terms of focus, but approach. I 
fundamentally agree with the recommendation that 
youth projects should take an asset-based approach 
which is framed around opportunity and inclusion 
as opposed to the stigmatising label of ‘violence 
reduction’. However, this recommendation should 
be expanded to include institutions. This calls into 
question the establishment of ‘Violence Reduction 
Units’ which arguably could be more positively 
received and effective if framed differently. 
Whilst the concept of peace may be aspirational, if 
we are not bold enough to have this vision within 
our sight, then attempts to reduce violence are 
relatively meaningless. I believe the work of the 
Commission has begun to answer the question 
of what peace could look like. But overall, without 
recognising the full extent to which institutions 
currently contribute towards inflicting harm, this 
report has only partially answered what would make 
all young people feel safe.
Lib Peck – Director, London 
Violence Reduction Unit
Violence Reduction Units: Driving 
Forward a Preventative, Public 
Health Approach
In 2019 violence cost 149 
Londoners their lives. Financially it cost the capital £3 
billion. Neither statistic comes close to representing 
the incalculable emotional pain and cost to families, 
friends, and communities. But what these two 
statistics do provide is a hugely compelling case for a 
different approach to tackling violence. 
In London we have adopted a preventative, public 
health approach that is rooted in 15 years of Scottish 
experience. This approach has already demonstrated 
elsewhere that violence is preventable, and is 
strongly supported by the Mayor of London through 
the establishment of a London Violence Reduction 
Unit (VRU). Our model first identifies and then tackles 
the real long-term drivers of violence. This requires 
working genuinely with communities and young 
people, convening and aligning the policies and 
priorities of public sector partners, and building a 
coalition of voices that can demand relevant policy 
change.
This report comes at a timely moment for the London 
VRU, a year after we started our mission to reduce 
violent crime in the capital. The report suggests that 
we are on the right path with what we’ve focused on 
in our first year, and it also provides evidence and 
recommendations that should shape our future work. 
The report emphasises the importance of gathering 
and acting on data, collaborative working, and 
sustained funding. 
Over the last year, we have focused on building 
our data and evidence. Our blend of public health, 
public perception of safety, and crime statistics 
gave us a sharper focus for action. A project with 
the Information Commissioner’s Office is helping to 
break down organisational barriers to information 
sharing. More recently, the first ever capital-wide 
assessment of violence alongside an analysis of the 
reviews of homicides revealed a gap in our collective 
learning. With this new data, we are now pressing 
the government to establish a mechanism for funded 
statutory reviews to take place for all homicides.
An equally valid source of data on what and why 
violence is occurring is the evidence Londoners have 
shared with us from their personal experiences. The 
team prioritises getting out of City Hall to talk and, 
critically, listen to communities directly affected 
by violence. They tell us what they think the key 
challenges are and suggest what needs to be done 
now and in the longer term. Our commitment to this 
form of engagement will only intensify with a Young 
Leaders Programme and more community-led 
funded programmes.
It is this rich data and intelligence we’ve drawn on 
to inform our £15.8 million spending programme. In 
a short timeframe we’ve tried to prioritise funding 
collaborative bids, to fill the known gaps in provision 
and to back small, innovative projects from which we 
can learn.  
These insights have empowered us to invest in youth 
workers, often the most neglected professions but 
one of the most important for young people. We have 
also added extra support for young people who have 
been exposed to trauma. And, we have invested in 
school inclusion programmes, alongside providing 
more tailored guidance and opportunities to those 
young people excluded from mainstream. 
Of course, the context is as important as the person. 
Three-quarters of the boroughs in London with 
the highest levels of violent offending are also in 
the top ten most deprived. We have supported 
local authorities and local partnerships to develop 
borough violence reduction plans; and invested in 
community leaders and capacity for the grassroots 
sector. We want our place-based work to go deeper 
to tackle violence at a neighbourhood level and to 
make sure we extend our focus to exploring issues 
around vulnerability, exploitation, and safeguarding. 
One of the strongest powers of the Mayoral office is 
its convening and influencing role. We are drawing on 
that to build pan London alliances. ‘Working together’ 
is a mantra that trips easily off the tongue but is much, 
much harder to do effectively and genuinely.
We have prioritised extending and strengthening 
existing networks where we can. Drawing on the 
public sector partnership which guides the Unit, we 
have forged early positive relationships with the NHS 
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and the Met. We are excited by the Young People’s 
Advisory Board, the growing schools network, and 
the convening of our charities group. Partnership 
isn’t always easy in a city with as much complexity as 
London, but we know that it’s essential if London is to 
reduce violence and increase feelings of safety. 
Over the next year, we want to do more, and 
do better – from data sharing and evaluation to 
programme development and partnership growth. 
We will be making the case for long-term, sustainable 
funding for community groups, greater joint working 
from the charity sector, and much more alignment 
from the public sector. 
We need to shift the message around violence and 
to make an irrefutable case for greater funding for 
prevention. The connections and evidence that 
this report brings together will be a great source of 
support and guidance.
Sherry Peck, CEO Safer London
To Safeguard Young People we 
must Tackle Inequality and Social 
Injustice 
We welcome the key messages 
from the Youth Violence 
Commission’s final report – in particular, the 
recognition of the importance of the early years, how 
important families and communities are, and how 
they should be empowered to have a voice going 
forward.
 
Safer London is privileged to have worked with 
thousands of Young Londoners. What we learn 
from them is often inspirational, but can also be 
challenging when it makes us face up to some of 
the realities around the context we are asking them 
to grow and thrive in.  We are clear that Young 
Londoners are not the issue – the context in which 
they are trying desperately to create their lives in is.  
The paucity of housing, long term employment that 
pays adequately and social injustice experienced 
by many, as this report clearly demonstrates, is 
likely to impact on an entire generation and future 
generations unless we all face up to our responsibility 
to work to change things. We know that a clear driver 
of violence is inequality and social injustice – class 
and income inequality is without doubt key, but 
racial inequality also needs to be recognised and 
responded to as a matter of urgency. 
 
The work we do at Safer London alongside Young 
Londoners goes some way to advocate at an 
individual level for change, our work is relationship 
based which helps young people strive towards 
their aspirations despite this backdrop.   We support 
young people by listening to them. By building strong 
trusting relationships we gain insight into their world, 
what they need and how we can work with them in 
the way that best suits them.  For example, we have a 
specialist mental health worker who meets the young 
person in a place where they feel most comfortable. 
This approach to addressing the impacts of trauma on 
a young person’s life has yielded great results.
 
We are clear about the need to change the wider 
narrative around young people affected by violence 
– so that it is seen for what it is – a safeguarding 
issue.  Historically, we saw the term ‘Child Prostitute’ 
used and quite rightly we have, as a whole society, 
realised this was victim blaming and clearly incorrect 
– the young people labelled as such were victims 
of exploitation, had been groomed and needed 
support.  Now we need to change the narrative 
around the children who are finding themselves 
trapped in a cycle of violence. 
 
The removal of services for young people which 
generations before would have taken for granted 
is advancing at a pace – the local youth club simply 
doesn’t exist for many any longer and outstanding 
youth workers who operated both assertively on 
the streets and within those local buildings are too 
few and far between.  Sadly, there is a need for a 
specialist organisation such as Safer London who 
work exclusively with young Londoners affected by 
violence and exploitation. 
Arguably even more sadly, however, many of those 
organisations who historically would provide that 
essential youth provision or children or family centre 
spaces are having to attempt to move into this 
specialist ‘youth violence’ world to secure funding 
to continue to exist.  This is wrong on a number of 
fronts and we would advocate both an increase in 
locally embedded youth work and support to ensure 
specialist services are funded to undertake the work 
that is still desperately needed.
John Poyton, Chief Executive and 
Eleanor Riley, Policy and Comms 
Manager, Redthread 
No Young Person is an Island: Why 
Youth Violence Isn’t a One Sector 
Issue
At Redthread, our work revolves 
around the idea of a ‘teachable 
moment’ – one that happens in 
the immediate aftermath of a 
violence-related hospital visit. 
Away from their usual routine and 
environment, a young person is often in a space where 
they are open to receiving help, to begin moving 
forward towards a healthier, safer and happier life. 
The impact of the teachable moment can be seen 
across a young person’s life, an acute intervention in 
hospital can send ripples across entire lives, families, 
peer groups and communities. 
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But just as the teachable moment can have a wide-
ranging impact, the causes of a trip to hospital, and of 
youth violence incidents in general, are just as broad, 
and the young people we support face a range issues. 
A Redthread Youth Worker might liaise with a young 
person’s school or college to prevent a permanent 
exclusion; be in touch with CAMHS to discuss therapy 
or be speaking to their social worker about moving to 
an area that is safer for them – often they will need to do 
all three. No young person is an island and the support 
they need is not limited to one area of their life. From the 
teachable moment forward, our youth workers mobilise 
the professional network around this young person. 
Our success also hinges on our relationships with 
doctors and nurses and the wider NHS. We only get 
the opportunity for the timely teachable moment 
because of their willingness to invite us into their 
hospital departments. The mutual respect between 
our teams and medical teams at ground level, and the 
common approach we share to meet young people 
where they are and without judgement, means we 
can work together as trusted colleagues. These 
teachable moment interventions in health settings 
are beginning to be recognised and are expanding 
across the country. This is why existing and emerging 
hospital-based violence intervention programmes 
are growing the HIVE (Hospital Interrupting Violence 
Exchange) Network. While our initial services began 
with a link forged at a professional to professional 
level, the past few years have seen a shift towards 
commissioner recognition and adoption of the 
teachable moment and hospital-based youth work. 
Cross-sector work, and commissioning, is crucial. 
We’re not the only people working in this way; other 
schemes see similar successes by rethinking what sort 
of support is possible in certain places. The Divert 
programme for instance, places ‘custody coaches’ 
in police stations in London. Since 2018 they’ve 
worked with over 800 people and are set to expand 
to South Yorkshire, Thames Valley and Lancashire in 
2020. Conversations between a young person who’s 
been arrested, and a coach are confidential. The 
coaches are not police, and the young person can 
be open about what they need and their situation 
without fear of worsening their situation. Liaison and 
Diversion programmes rethink criminal justice spaces 
too, placing forensic mental health practitioners in 
courts and police stations to screen for vulnerabilities 
and mental health issues that people might need 
additional support with.  
The potential of other health innovations, like social 
prescribing for instance, haven’t been fully explored 
with young people. Social prescribing is a non-clinical 
intervention prescribed by a health professional. 
Often a young person presenting with an injury needs 
a youth work intervention, social prescribing could be 
the lever to make this happen.
All these examples are crucial parts of a public 
health approach – an often-heralded solution to 
youth violence. There’s an evidence base for this 
way of working, and we’ve made huge progress in 
recent years – commissioners and politicians now 
understand the approach and are putting it into 
practice.  We have taken a crucial step in the right 
direction with the establishment of regional Violence 
Reduction Units, but implementation and ongoing 
success will not be easy or without complications. 
Putting a public health approach into action takes 
time and careful planning. That is why we welcome 
the calls in this report for longevity of funding 
commitment and the accompanying scrutiny and 
oversight of the work of the newly established 
regional Violence Reduction Units. But more than 
anything, the success of a public health approach 
needs us all to work together and recognise the 
important role we all play. All young people deserve 
to lead healthy, safe and happy lives and no one 
sector can be solely responsible for all three of these 
elements – none of us can be islands anymore. 
Niven Rennie, Director, Scottish 
Violence Reduction Unit
15 Years On and Still Challenges 
Remain
‘Violence is preventable, not 
inevitable’.  So said Nelson 
Mandela and that statement has become the byword 
for the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit.
It doesn’t sound so radical nowadays, but it was 
in 2004/5 when Scotland was amongst the most 
violent places to live in the world and Glasgow 
had the reputation of being the ‘murder capital 
of Europe’. In the communities of Glasgow young 
people were being maimed and were dying on the 
streets every day.   For them, violence was merely 
part of the struggle of everyday life.  To believe of a 
different future, a better set of outcomes for those 
young people, amongst the darkness they were 
experiencing was truly radical.
Scotland has come a long way since those dark times 
and the Scottish Violence Reduction Unit has played 
a part in that.  We have walked beside an army of 
determined doctors, teachers, nurses, police officers, 
social workers and many more who do their duty 
every day - putting communities and the people 
who comprise them at the core of their daily work.  
Long term change can only be achieved if everyone 
pulls together with a message of prevention allied to 
mutual respect and understanding.
The journey that Scotland has undertaken has 
been identified by many as ‘good practice’ and 
thus ‘Violence Reduction Units’ are now appearing 
elsewhere.  Whilst it is nice to see our initiatives being 
recognised, I always stress to those who look for 
advice that our work is not yet done.  We may have 
reduced homicide by half since 2005 but Scotland 
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remains a relatively violent country.  60 homicides in 
the last year pays testament to that fact.  Too many 
lives still scarred by violence and too many lives lost 
in tragic circumstances. We may have seen significant 
and undeniable progress but there has been a 
levelling off in terms of reduction and the big drops 
we once saw are now harder to achieve.  Further 
reduction will require social change.
We know that it is in some of our poorer communities 
violence remains a daily normality.  If you are poor in 
Scotland you are still more likely to become a victim 
of violence.  That is unacceptable.  Added to that we 
know that those living in our poorer communities are 
more likely to self-medicate with alcohol and drugs to 
blur the reality of their daily lives.  Indeed, their children 
are more likely to grow up with significant childhood 
trauma and the likelihood of poor life chances with 
limited expectation.  Thus the cycle repeats.
In the last year, Scotland has recorded the highest 
number of drugs deaths in Europe per capita, 
our levels of suicide are a cause for concern and 
homelessness and foodbank usage appears to be on 
the rise.  These issues are related and whilst a ‘public 
health approach’ is within the current lexicon of the 
public sector, we still appear to tackle each issue 
in isolation rather than addressing the underlying 
causes of poverty and inequality.  I constantly reaffirm 
my belief that the structures of our public services 
were created for the problems of the 1950’s and may 
no longer be suitable to address the challenges being 
presented to us in the 21st century.
Many of the key services dealing with drug addiction, 
alcoholism and homelessness are delivered by the 
third sector for low levels of remuneration and subject 
to constant competitive tendering where cost savings 
often appears to be the driver.  A true ‘public health 
approach’ would recognise the importance of these 
vital services and prioritise them accordingly. 
Added to that, our historic approach to drug and 
alcohol misuse have not addressed the problem.  
Perhaps there is a need to take a wholly fresh 
approach, one which addresses the chaotic needs of 
the individual rather than seeking to punish them for 
their shortcomings.
With this in mind, I am delighted to read the conclusions 
of the Youth Violence Commission. They reflect the 
understanding of violence that we have gained over 15 
years of operation and the need to provide properly 
funded and sustained services if we are truly to address 
the impact of poverty and social exclusion in all its 
forms.  I believe that employment offers the best 
solution to these issues, but our young people require 
equality of opportunity and the removal of often 
unnecessary barriers if that is to be achieved.
In Scotland, the VRU will continue to work with partners 
to develop solutions to the violence that still infects us.  
Our strength has been in our ability to innovate without 
being held to the normal public sector demand to meet 
targets and produce outcomes.  We don’t believe in 
quick fixes – it takes time to develop interventions that 
work.  Soundbites are not solutions!
Determination, graft and a commitment to follow the 
evidence (not the ideology) have been the hallmarks 
of the SVRU approach. There can be no bystanders in 
addressing the issue of violence in our communities.  
There can be no excuses if we are to prove that 
violence is preventable and not inevitable.
I sincerely hope that the recently established regional 
VRU’s in England and Wales provide such a vehicle for 
change and that the recommendations of the Youth 
Violence Commission report will be welcomed and 
implemented. 
John Sutherland, Former Chief 
Superintendent, Metropolitan 
Police 
Saving Lives: A Police Officer’s 
Greatest Duty
I was a police officer in London for 
more than twenty-five years and I have stood in far too 
many of the haunted places where boys and young 
men have lost their lives. 
We are facing a humanitarian crisis on our streets and 
in our homes - and the easiest thing in the world is to 
look for someone to blame, whether it be politicians, 
police officers, parents, perpetrators, or whoever else 
happens to come to mind. The much harder thing to do 
is to try to understand what’s really happening out there 
- and what’s actually required by way of a response. 
Here is a list of the five things I think we need to do 
if we are to have any hope of avoiding the continual 
madness of history repeating itself.
(1) A Long Term Plan
We need a long-term, nationwide violence reduction 
plan – at least ten years, preferably twenty. We have got 
to get beyond the relentless demand for quick fixes - 
understanding the simple truth that, where problems 
have been a generation or more in the making, they 
might just take a generation or more to mend.
From a policing perspective, there is an urgent 
need to get back to the absolute basics: the 
acknowledgement that the police are the public and 
the public are the police. Substantial reinvestment 
in effective neighbourhood policing - built on 
relationships of trust, established over time within 
local communities - ought to be the starting point for 
everything else we attempt to do. 
At the same time, we need to understand that whilst 
the professional and effective use of police Stop & 
Search powers undoubtedly saves lives, it is not the 
long term solution to anything.
THE YOUTH VIOLENCE COMMISSION: FINAL REPORT – JULY 2020 81
(2) A Public Health Approach
We need to re-frame our understanding of violence, 
recognising that it is at least as much a public health 
issue as it is a crime problem. Violence is a disease 
that can be caught and transmitted. But it can also be 
diagnosed and treated.
(3) Young People as the Answer
The current wave of concern tends to define young 
people as the problem. In fact, they are a very large 
part of the solution. And we need to involve them in 
designing and delivering every single aspect of the 
response to violence.
(4) Operational Independence from Political Control
The delivery of the violence reduction plan needs 
to remain completely independent from any form 
of political control. When politicians are in charge, 
experience suggests that the reaction to any pressing 
concern remains vulnerable to partisan priorities 
and shifting political winds. And we simply cannot 
allow that to keep happening. Some things are far 
too important to be left to politics. Violence is one of 
them.
(5) Policing at the Heart, but not the Head
Policing will always be first in line to respond to 
violence, and that is exactly as it should be. There is 
no greater duty or privilege for a police officer than 
to save a life. But the police should not be in overall 
charge of the plan. Violence is – and has always been 
– a whole society problem that demands a whole 
society solution.
The publication of the Youth Violence Commission’s 
final report is both timely and immensely significant. 
The report seeks to change, for the better, the 
conversation we are having about youth violence 
- not least in deepening our understanding of the 
underlying causes of youth violence. More than 
that though, it seeks to change, for the better, our 
actual response to youth violence. I have no doubt 
that, if we treat the report with the seriousness and 
urgency it deserves, and if we determine to act on its 
recommendations, lives will be saved.
 
Ciaran Thapar, Freelance writer 
and youth worker 
Drill Music: An Opportunity for 
Understanding and Empowering
The Youth Violence Commission’s 
final report treats youth violence 
as a product of societal failure. It is grounded in the 
realism of testimony sourced from experts and victims, 
and driven by a practical motivation to challenge the 
status quo. In the face of confusion on the subject of 
youth violence, institutional dysfunction and visible 
socioeconomic inequality, the YVC has served a major 
public good by publishing these findings.
Since 2014, my youth work and journalism has led me 
to trace the inception of UK drill — a thriving local genre 
of violent rap. This music form is inherently digital. 
Its violent lyrics, provocative music videos and wider 
ecosystem of secondary content (e.g. artist broadcasts, 
marketing campaigns, comments and likes etc) circulate 
on social media platforms like YouTube, Instagram 
and Snapchat. Drill music exploded in Chicago in 2011 
as a way for impoverished young gang members to 
communicate with one another and turn the outside 
world’s fascination with the bleak extremes of inner-city 
life to their own financial advantage. UK drill artists have 
copied this model because it works with remarkable 
efficacy. More than ever, music has become a way for 
the most marginalised British young people to gain 
popularity, self-affirmation and livelihoods. As more UK 
drill artists get record deals, enter the music charts and 
gain brand partnerships, the genre must be viewed 
in terms of its growing audience, and the industry that 
helps to monetise it, as much as the success of its artists.
To study UK drill music is to study the impact of social 
media on human life. Understanding this equation is 
essential to understanding rising youth violence. Like 
adults warring or congratulating on Twitter, young 
people in Britain have at their fingertips a powerful 
opportunity that did not exist even fifteen years ago: 
the chance to like, listen and see others; to be seen, 
liked, and listened to at the click of a button. Equally, 
they have the chance to engage in negative forms 
of provocation. The rise of UK drill music reflects this 
spread of opportunity where it has been granted 
to young men affected by the overwhelming social 
forces outlined in the YVC report (poverty, domestic 
abuse, school exclusion, unemployment, etc). 
However, treating UK drill and social media as 
synonymous in conversations about youth violence is 
problematic. Where social media technology should 
be the core focus, music has taken centre-stage. This 
distraction is misguided and dangerous, resulting in 
the criminalisation of creativity (and ultimately forced 
survivalism) amongst poor communities of colour. 
Evidence of this everywhere. Some of the most 
demonised and restricted UK drill artists (e.g. Skengdo 
& AM) are categorically not criminals, and yet they 
are treated and framed as such, which communicates 
frowning judgment to young people who might relate 
to their music or be inspired by their success. In my 
youth work I have held hundreds of conversations with 
vulnerable teenage boys who feel like they now cannot 
express how they feel to adults because of the way drill 
music is being blocked and dismissed by policymakers, 
police and educators. My fear is that an unnecessary 
preoccupation with music is further entrenching an 
entire generation’s shared anger and disillusionment.
Much more useful and just would be a rational 
focus on how technology is used and abused by all 
people. I view social media platforms much like a 
car: it is a technology that is potentially dangerous. 
Its autonomous use should require training to 
demonstrate ability and maturity. If not, people who 
are incapable of using it, or who are sensitive to its 
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problematic use — those with low self-esteem and 
anxiety; those who are traumatised by normalised 
violence in their communities — are most likely to use 
it irresponsibly, to provoke and be provoked. They 
are the ones who are most likely to hurt and get hurt 
when digital interactions spill into real life as violence. 
We must treat UK drill music’s preoccupation with 
violence as a product of the socially unequal and 
technologically advanced state of the world. This 
means accepting that it is problematic, and that in 
specific circumstances it fuels gang rivalries and 
a propensity for youth violence. But it also means 
refusing the temptation to see music as the problem, 
per se, and instead focusing on the way vulnerable, 
disenfranchised, actively excluded young people 
are partnering with technology to communicate 
and express themselves. UK drill — a rich, visceral, 
unforgiving cry for help with a mass global audience 
— provides an opportunity to learn about the roots of 
violence, as well as tap into solutions for empowering 
those who have been left behind. Solutions to 
violence can and must operate by harnessing such 
modern forms of cultural production for the better, 
not banning them or pretending they don’t exist.
Roadworks, an inclusive music education charity I 
founded in 2019, seeks to do exactly that. We deliver 
training for adult educators and work directly with 
excluded young people, using UK drill and rap as a 
point of engagement. We treat subcultural phenomena 
as tools to develop critical thinking, provide safe spaces 
for participants to speak their mind, collaborate in 
research, and ultimately make music that is true to their 
life experience without being dangerous to others or 
criminalised by the state. We teach academic subjects 
such as philosophy and sociology, and facilitate 
careers-skills workshops with experts from across the 
contemporary music industry. A responsible, savvy and 
fun use of social media practically underpins our entire 
method of fighting social inequality and providing 
meaningful opportunities to marginalised young 
people. We believe this methodology urgently requires 
critiquing and upscaling to respond to the current 
demands of youth disenfranchisement. 
Jon Yates, Executive Director, 
Youth Endowment Fund 
Funders: Finding Out ‘What Works’ 
and Helping to Put it into Practice
I heartily welcome this Final 
Report of the Youth Violence 
Commission. The Commission has done an excellent 
job in understanding and speaking out about the 
lack of safety that so many of our young people feel 
each day. For those of us listening regularly to young 
people affected by the threat of violence it is easy 
to become despondent. Young people frequently 
tell me that ‘nothing can make a difference’; that 
this is ‘just the way it is’. The Commissioners have 
managed to communicate frankly and honestly the 
level of pain that many young people feel while also 
creating a message of hope; a message that says ‘it 
doesn’t have to be this way’. Those of us with power 
to make a difference – including us funders - have a 
responsibility to ensure this comes true.
Leading the Youth Endowment Fund, I feel this 
responsibility acutely. What then do we do? Our first 
responsibility should be to get clear on what actually 
works. We owe these children real solutions; that 
means solutions that we know work. That is why I 
wanted to stand up and clap when I read the section 
in the report stating the importance of evidence 
and the need for independent evaluation. At times, 
evidence and evaluation can seem a bit irrelevant. 
When I am sat listening to young people about 
friends they have lost, threats on social media, areas 
of town they can’t go to and ‘beefs’ they can’t shake, 
banging on about evidence can feel like missing 
the point. When I am talking to young people about 
something as emotive as their own safety, obsessing 
about evaluation can feel like a bit soulless. Surely – 
my heart says – what we need is more empathy not 
more measurement.
But in the cold light of day, I always think again. 
Why? Because these children deserve our best. We 
wouldn’t dream of giving our children medicines that 
haven’t been properly tested and the same should 
be true of the help we give our most vulnerable 
children. In our country last year, our food companies 
spent £900m working out what works when it comes 
to selling food. £900 million. I don’t want to live in a 
country that cares more about knowing how to sell ice 
cream than it does about keeping vulnerable children 
safe. We have to be prepared to spend proper money 
working out how to protect our children. If we are 
prepared to research ice cream, we must be prepared 
to research their safety.
That is why I am excited to work for the Youth 
Endowment Fund. Founded last year, the Fund has 
a simple mission: to spend £200m working out what 
keeps young people safe and spread the news. 
Those who are commissioning and delivering local 
services also deserve the very best, they should 
have the evidence they need to guide their decision 
making.  Over the next ten years, we are committed to 
spending our efforts and our money to this end. But 
how should we focus the work? The report brilliantly 
suggests some key areas: how do we best support 
children in care?, how do we help children who are at 
risk of exclusion?, how do we best support vulnerable 
children in the early years?, what is the best place-
based approach to take? 
Over the next ten years, the Fund will do all it can 
to answer these questions. But alone - we will make 
no difference. Together, though, I believe we have a 
chance not only to find out what works but to ensure 
it is put into practice. Why must we do this? To answer 
the key challenge this report brings home to all of us – 
to ensure that our young people are truly safe.
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Alex Atherton is 
an experienced 
secondary school 
head teacher and 
senior leader. He 
has had three 
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Appendix B: Overview of Evidence Sessions and 
Regional Visits
16 October 2017 
Youth Services and Community Work  
 
From the Commission:
• Vicky Foxcroft - Chair 
• James Cleverly 
• Chuka Umunna 
• Siobhan Benita 
• Keir Irwin-Rogers
Participants:
• Steve Webster, Head of Research, NCS. 
• Beth Murray, Director of Communications and 
Engagement, Catch 22. 
• Richard Parkes, Managing Director, Young 
Lambeth Co-operative. 
• Gary Hutton, CEO, Product of a Postcode. 
• Temi Mwale, Director, 4Front Project. 
• Rhammel Afflick, Communications and Media 
Officer, British Youth Council. 
• Tekisha Henry, Deputy Young Mayor, 
Lewisham Young Mayor’s Team.
• Steve Drowley, Youth and Community Work 
Consultant, Cardiff Metropolitan University. 
11 December 2017      
Mental Health and a Public Health Approach 
From the Commission:
• Vicky Foxcroft - Chair 
• Chuka Umunna 
• Abhinay Muthoo 
• Zoe Leadley-Meade 
Participants:
• Karyn McCluskey, Former Director, Scottish 
Violence Reduction Unit. Currently Chief 
Executive, Community Justice Scotland. 
• Mark Bellis, Director of Policy, Research and 
International Development, Public Health 
Wales and UK Focal Point to the World 
Health Organisation for Violence and Injury 
Prevention. 
• Mathew Shaer, West Midlands Police 
Superintendent and Co-Chair of the Strategic 
Board responding to guns, gangs and 
organised criminality. 
• Dr Duncan Bew, Consultant Trauma Surgeon, 
Kings Hospital and Co-Founder of Growing 
Against Violence. 
• Dr Emer Sutherland, Emergency Medicine 
Consultant, Kings Hospital.
• John Poyton, Chief Executive, Redthread.
• Sinem Cakir, Chief Executive, MAC-UK. 
• Jamel Fraser, Youth Consultant, MAC-UK. 
• Alika Agidi-Jeffs, Rethink Mental Illness. 
• John Sutherland, Chief Superintendent, 
Scotland Yard. 
 
26 February 2018     
Early Years, Education and Employability
From the commission:





• Edward Melhuish, Academic Research Leader, 
Oxford University and Director, National 
Evaluation of Sure Start. 
• Ann Graham, Director of Operations, Barking 
and Dagenham Council.
• Jessica Streeting, Executive Committee 
Member, School and Public Health Nurses 
Association, Queen’s Nurse and Named Nurse 
for Looked After Children in Hammersmith 
and Fulham.
• Christine Goodall, Academic Oral Surgeon 
and Senior Lecturer, Glasgow University and 
Co-Founder, Medics Against Violence.
• Jamal Khan, Writer and Performer, Author 
of ‘Words Within Walls’ and Youth Mayor, 
Waltham Forest. 
• Kiran Gill, Former Inner City Teacher, 
previous Head of Policy at the Social Mobility 
Commission, Policy Writer, IPPR and Founder, 
The Difference.
• Andy Briers, Former Teacher and Police 
Officer, Metropolitan Police (Trident Gang 
Crime Command). 
• Seamus Oates, CEO, TBAP (multi-academy 
trust providing alternative provision 
schooling) and Board Member, Youth Justice 
Board. 
• Nina Champion, Head of Policy, Prisoners’ 
Education Trust and Western Europe 
Representative, European Prison Education 
Association.
• Euan Blair, CEO, WhiteHat.
• Oliver Hypolite-Bishop, Head of Digital 
Communications, Confederation of British 
Industry and Board Member, Spirit of London 
Awards.
• Liz Williams Director, Tech Literacy and 
Education Programmes, BT Group. 
Evidence Sessions
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26 March 2018          
Housing, Communities and Faith Groups
 
From the Commission:
• Vicky Foxcroft - Chair




• Matt Coe, Sergeant, Metropolitan Police. 
• Jennifer Foster, Head of Housing, Centrepoint. 
• Brian Hamlin, Community Specialist, Housing 
Sector. 
• Talia Kensit, Founding Director, Youth 
Realities.
• Dunia Shafik is a mother, a Neuro-Linguistic 
Programmer and her educational background 
includes a BA in Childhood Studies and MA in 
Youth and Community Work. 
• Ben Lindsay, Pastor in South East London 
who has worked in the field of serious youth 
violence for many years. He previously led 
the early intervention team at Lewisham 
Youth Offending Service, where he 
developed successful knife crime prevention 
programmes. Ben also developed Camden 
Council’s gangs and serious youth violence 
strategy and previously worked for the mental 
health charity MAC-UK. 
• Steve Chalke, Social Entrepreneur, Justice 
Campaigner, Author, Motivational speaker 
and Baptist Minister. Former UN Special 
Advisor on Human Trafficking. Founder of the 
Oasis Trust.
• Tobi Adegboyega, Senior Pastor of Salvation 
Proclaimers Anointed Church and Founder of 
SPAC Nation Foundation. 
23 April 2018             
Media, Music and Role Models 
 
From the Commission:






• Ciaran Thapar, Youth Worker, Writer and 
Volunteer at Marcus Lipton Community 
Centre.
• Kwame Safo (Funk Butcher), DJ, Music 
Producer, Owner of independent Record label 
Houseology.
• Ray Oudkerk. Assistant Principal, BRIT School 
of Performing Arts and Technology. 
• Cameron Miller, AOP Music (online UK rap 
label).
• Harjeet Sahota, Adviser to the Mayor of 
London on night time economy and culture, 
women’s safety and knife crime.
• Kwabz Ayim, Mixtape Madness (online 
platform for UK urban music). 
• Gary Younge, Editor-at-large for The Guardian 
and author of Another Day in the Death of 
America, about US gun crime.
• Andre Johnson, Online Journalist, Link UP TV. 
• Jasmine Dotiwala, Multi-platform Broadcaster 
and Head of Youth Media at Media Trust.
• Mark Prince, Former Professional Boxer and 
Founder, Kiyan Prince Foundation. 
• Abdul Karim Abdullah, Pathway Co-ordinator, 
Young Lambeth Cooperative and Director, 
Solution Focused World, member of London 
Independent Youth Safety Advisory Board.
21 May 2018:  
Policing and Criminal Justice
From the Commission:




• David Lammy British Labour Party politician, 
MP for Tottenham since 2000.
• Katherine Copperthwaite, Criminal Justice 
Alliance.
• Patrick Williams, Senior Lecturer, Manchester 
Metropolitan University.
• Justine Coleman, detail of role, organisation 
needed
• Michael Turner QC, former Chair of the 
Criminal Bar Association.
• Olivia Pinkney, Chief Constable, Hampshire 
Constabulary.
• Lynne Owens, Director General, National 
Crime Agency.
• Graham McNulty Trustee, Embrace and 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan 
Police.
• Will Linden, Violence Reduction Unit, 
Scotland.
• Stan Gilmour, Detective Superintendent Head 
of Protecting Vulnerable People, Thames 
Valley Police.
• Daniel Hurst, Freelance journalist.
• Kamahl Sami Miller, Youth Activist for Waltham 
Forest Council.
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Visit to Scottish Violence Reduction Unit






• Camara Fearon, Presenter, Actress and 
Charity Worker.
• Temi Mwale, Director, The 4Front Project.
Participants:
• Graham Goulden, Cultivating Minds UK.
• Dr Christine Goodall, Medics Against 
Violence.
• Sergeant Danny Stuart, Royal Marines Youth 
Engagement Team. 
• John Hendry, Young Point (Street Outreach). 
• Inspector Iain Murray, Street and Arrow Police 
Scotland.
• Inspector Keith Jack, (Navigator Project) 
Violence Reduction Unit.
• Khadija Coll, One Community Violence 
Reduction Unit Scotland.
Regional Visits
A number of regional visits were also made during 
2018 and attended by Vicky Foxcroft. Participants 
were from a broad range of organisations including 
councils, VRUs, the Criminal Justice System, Active 
Communities Network, Police, Youth Offending 
Services, Charities, Youth and Sports Organisations.
11 April 2018 
Meeting with Portsmouth Stakeholders
 
12 April 2018 
Roundtable with Liverpool Positive Futures Project 
and Young People 
 
13 April 2018 
Roundtable with Manchester Active Communities 
Network, CN and partner agencies 
13 April 2018 
Salford/Moss Side Visit 
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We developed the Safer Lives Survey to gain a 
better insight into the level and nature of violence 
experienced by young people living in the UK.
During the early months of 2017, we drafted an initial 
version of the survey using items informed by the 
extant literature on serious youth violence. The scope 
of the survey items included: the types and levels of 
serious violence in young people’s day-to-day lives; 
where young people feel most and least safe; who 
young people trust and where they are most likely to 
go for help and support. 
The first draft was 
piloted with a 
group of 24 young 
people in June 2017. 
Amendments to 
the survey at this 
stage concerned 
the precise wording 
of questions, the 
deletion of certain 
topics felt to be 
either irrelevant 
or insensitive, and 
the introduction of 
topics which young 
people felt ought to 
be included. Once 
we had revised the 
survey accordingly, 
we piloted the 
second draft with a 
group of 10 young 
people in August 
2017. Feedback 
on this version of the survey was generally very 
positive, with a small number of minor changes being 
integrated into our final draft. 
The survey went through an ethics approval process 
with the University of Warwick, as well as being 
scrutinised and approved by a number of youth 
work professionals who had received safeguarding 
training. Working with a range of delivery partners, 
we implemented the survey during January and 
February 2018. 
Our sampling frame was designed to maximise 
variation across a number of factors: age, gender, 
ethnicity, geographical location, and school type. The 
sample included young people who were serving 
sentences in Youth Offending Institutions. All surveys 
were completed under the supervision of an adult, 
who ensured that the purpose and nature of the 
survey was explained clearly to each participant, with 
the aid of a child-friendly information sheet. In total, 
we received 2,278 responses to the survey.
The following sections present key findings from the 
survey.  
Early Years and Early Intervention
Almost half of children aged 8-11 reported seeing 
serious violence at least once a day, or at least once a 
week, in real life.
 
Indeed, these children were more likely to report 
seeing serious violence in real life at least once a day 
than any other age group:
It is of course possible that for this age group, 
‘serious violence’ referred to ‘punching’ or ‘kicking’, 
whereas for older groups it may have been more 
likely to refer to ‘attacking someone with a weapon’ 
(all of these types of violence were included in our 
definition of ‘serious violence’ highlighted at the 
start of the survey to all participants). It is worth 
noting, however, that almost a third of 8-11 year 
olds reported personally knowing at least one 
young person who had been the victim of serious 
violence in the past five years requiring a hospital 
visit (see overleaf).
In short, a significant proportion of our survey 
participants reported being exposed to serious 
levels of violence from a very young age, lending 
support to our recommendations around the 
importance of early years intervention.
 
Appendix C: Safer Lives Survey Analysis
Exposure to Serious Violence in Real Life by Age (%)
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Youth Services
In answer to the question, ‘If there was one thing you 
could change that you think would make young people 
safer, what would it be?’, the most popular response 
was the provision of more youth centres, sports clubs 
and other youth activities in their local areas. 
Indeed, 23% of respondents stated that they would 
ask youth workers for help and advice if they felt 
worried about being a victim of violence. This 
provides evidence that youth workers already provide 
an important source of help and support, albeit 
increasing the provision of youth centres, sports clubs 
and other youth activities, as recommended by our 
participants, is likely to enhance the accessibility and 
take-up of such support. 
Schools
Responding to a question about who young people 
would ask for help if they felt worried about being a 
victim of violence, 34% of participants stated that they 
would ask their teachers. 
Some of the most encouraging responses from the 
survey came to the question about how important 
it is to work hard at school and achieve good 
grades. Almost 90% of young people very much 
agreed or agreed with the statement ‘Working 
hard on my education and getting good grades is 
important’. More concerning, however, were the 
responses to our survey question about how safe 
young people felt in school. While three quarters 
of respondents reported feeling very safe, or safe, 
a quarter stated that they felt neither safe nor 
unsafe, unsafe, or very unsafe: 
Safety in place of education
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Very safe 579 26.71% 26.71%
Safe 1009 46.54% 73.25%
Neither 452 20.85% 94.10%
Unsafe 77 3.55% 97.65%
Very unsafe 51 2.35% 100.00%
Total 2168 100.00% 100.00%
Moreover, respondents were more likely to report 
seeing serious violence in their schools at least once 
a day than in their local neighbourhoods or areas 
Known victims requiring hospital treatment by age (%)
Safety in place of education
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outside their neighbourhoods. Over half of our 
participants reported seeing serious violence in their 
school at least once a month. 
Policing 
Less than half of young people agreed, or very much 
agreed, with the statement ‘The police make the 
lives of young people safer’ – a good indication of a 
perceived lack of confidence in the police’s ability to 
keep young people safe:
Not surprisingly, respondents who personally knew 
ten or more young people who been hospitalised 
as a result of serious violence had the lowest 
confidence in the police keeping young people 
safe, with 43% either disagreeing, or very much 
disagreeing, that ‘the police make the lives of young 
people safer’. 
Our regression analysis90 revealed a strong link 
between young people serving time in a Young 
Offender Institution and disagreeing (.513, p<.05) or 
very much disagreeing (.660, p<.05) that the police 
make the lives of young people safer. Echoing the 
findings of previous studies, we also found a strong 
link between ethnicity and confidence in the police, 
with black young people being more likely to 
disagree (.826, p<.01) or very much disagree (.850, 
p<.01) with the assertion that the police make the 
lives of young people safer. 
Police make young people safer
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Very much agree 281 13.07% 13.07%
Agree 706 32.84% 45.91%
Neither 701 32.60% 78.51%
Disagree 283 13.16% 91.67%
Very much disagree 179 8.33% 100.00%
Total 2150 100.00% 100.00%
90  Regression analysis is a powerful statistical method that enables one to examine the relationship between two or more variables of interest.  At the 
core, they explore the influence of one or more independent variables on a dependent variable.  See, for example, Regression Models for Categorical 
and Limited Dependent Variables (Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences), 1997 by John Scott Long.
Drug markets
Almost 40% of participants personally knew at least 
one person who sells drugs: 
Known people who sell drugs
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Less than 10 206 9.52% 9.52%
Between 7-10 86 3.97% 13.49%
Between 4-6 170 7.86% 21.35%
Between 1-3 367 16.96% 38.31%
None 1335 61.69% 100.00%
Total 2164 100.00% 100.00%
Some of the strongest links we found in our survey 
were between drug markets and serious violence. 
For example, 75% of those who personally knew 
ten or more people who dealt drugs also reported 
personally knowing four or more victims of serious 
violence in the last five years. In contrast, of those who 
did not personally know anyone who dealt drugs, 
only 17% reported personally knowing four or more 
victims of serious violence in the last five years. 
Similarly, over 50% of those who ‘very much agreed’ 
that it was easy to buy drugs in their local area also 
reported personally knowing four or more victims 
of serious violence in the last five years. In contrast, 
of those who ‘very much disagreed’ that is was easy 
to buy drugs in their local area, only 19% reported 
personally knowing four or more victims of serious 
violence in the last five years. 
The links between illicit drug markets and serious 
violence were also strong in our regression analysis. 
For example, there was a strong link between 
personally knowing 10 or more people involved in 
dealing drugs and seeing serious violence daily (.772, 
p<.01) and weekly (.999, p<.01) in real life. 
Police make young people safer
Known people who sell drugs
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Weapon possession
A third of young people personally knew at least one 
young person who carried weapons, such as knives, 
when they were outside their home:
Known people who carry weapons
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Less than 10 164 7.56% 7.56%
Between 7-10 79 3.64% 11.21%
Between 4-6 147 6.78% 17.99%
Between 1-3 383 17.67% 35.65%
None 1395 64.35% 100.00%
Total 2168 100.00% 100.00%
The relationship between personally knowing 
high numbers of young people who had been 
hospitalised as a result of serious violence and 
knowing high numbers of people who carried 
weapons outside the home was strong. For 
example, 76% of people who personally knew ten or 
more people who had been hospitalised as a result 
of serious violence also personally knew 4 or more 
people who carried weapons outside their home. In 
contrast, of those who personally knew no one who 
had been hospitalised as a result of serious violence 
just 4% personally knew 4 or more people who 
carried weapons outside their home. 
Further statistics
While our survey findings provide evidence of the 
relatively high levels of serious violence that many 
young people are exposed to, the survey highlights 
that certain young people – for example those in 
PRUs and YOIs – are far more likely to experience 
high levels of serious violence than others. Over 
25% of young people in PRUs and YOIs reported 
personally knowing 4 or more young people who 
had been hospitalised as a result of serious violence 
in the last five years, compared to just 10% of our 
mainstream school sample.
 
There was a fairly even divide between participants 
who agreed, or very much agreed, that young 
people carry knives to feel safer (39%), and those 
who disagreed, or very much disagreed with this 
statement (27%):
Known people who carry weapons
Personally known victims of serious violence by how easy it is to buy illegal drugs in local area
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Young people carry knives to feel safer
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
Very much agree 267 12.51% 12.51%
Agree 569 26.66% 39.18%
Neither 708 33.18% 72.35%
Disagree 376 17.62% 89.97%
Very much disagree 214 10.03% 100.00%
Total 2134 100.00% 100.00%
When young people were asked to rank where they 
felt most and least safe, choosing between home, 
school, in your local neighbourhood, or in areas 
outside your neighbourhood, 16% of participants 
did not rank home as the safest place. Exposure to 
serious violence was greatest when home was not 
ranked as the safest location:
The survey explored young people’s exposure to 
serious violence through various forms of media:
Exposure to violence across all media
Frequency Percentage Cumulative
1+/day 1556 68.79% 68.79%
1+/week 470 20.78% 89.57%
1+/month 131 5.79% 95.36%
1+/year 51 2.25% 97.61%
Never 54 2.39% 100.00%
Total 2262 100.00% 100.00%
• 35% reported seeing videos or photographs 
on social media that contain acts of violence, 
at least once a day
• 31% reported playing computer games that 
contain violence, at least once a day
• 29% reported watching TV programmes or 
films that contain acts of violence, at least 
once a day
• 47% reported listening to music that contains 
violent lyrics, at least once a day
Exposure to violence by relative  
location safety, age 18+ (%)
Exposure to violence by relative  
location safety, age under 18s (%)
Young people carry knives to feel safer
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